'Lau-ati,' the talking chief, followed the King. It was to the powerful stranger, whose force was overwhelming, and to resist whom meant destruction, that the King yielded, and not to Tamasese. They had given utterance to many prayers, and they must leave their cause in the hands of One mightier than earthly princes. At two o'clock the farewell speeches were ended. Malietoa then rose, and, accompanied by his chiefs and a large number of Europeans, went to the German barracks and gave himself up.

An hour afterwards the German consul came out with Malietoa, and they marched together to the wharf, where a boat waited to take them to the 'Bismarck.' As Malietoa proceeded the crowds followed him. Many voices cried out in tones of grief, his friends clung about his person, his servants sought to touch, if it were possible, his hand, and amid the bitter grief which pervaded the whole assemblage it seemed as if it would be scarcely possible for them to give up the person of their beloved King.

At length the exile disengaged himself from the embraces of his people. With impressive dignity he lifted his hands and blessed them, and then sat down in the boat and was swiftly rowed to the German man-of-war. Next morning he was transferred from the Bismarck' to the 'Adler.' All night many of the people watched the ships, and in the morning they saw him taken from one vessel to the other, which latter got up steam and left the harbour. Thousands of eyes, blinded with tears, watched the retreating form of the German ship until the last wreath of its smoke sank beneath the horizon. Then they dispersed to their homes. That day and for many days afterwards there was a bitter sorrow throughout Samoa.

The movements of Malietoa since that time have been somewhat uncertain. He was, however, taken to the Cameroons on the African coast and detained there for some time. Latterly he has been removed to Berlin, and a few days before the recent outbreak in the Navigators group it was telegraphed that the German Government were about to send him back to his own country.

6

On the 23rd of September, five days after Malietoa had been carried off in the Adler,' the German minister in Washington, acting under instructions from Prince Bismarck, announced to the American Ministry that Germany had declared war against Malietoa; in answer to which Mr. Bayard pointed out that Germany had no right to take such a course, as the conference was at that time adjourned, and all the injuries complained of were of date long prior to the conference having been appointed. This was the first notice given to the American Government of the declaration of war, and it will be seen that it was only given after Malietoa had been six days in captivity.

Mr. Bayard reminded the German representative that, it had been arranged by the powers that a new king was to be elected by the Samoans, and that Malietoa was to be eligible, and he also urged VOL. XXIV.-No. 141. 3 E

upon the notice of Prince Bismarck that the Samoans could not give the guarantee required by Germany without breaking their treaties with England and the United States.

Correspondence, however, was now useless, as Malietoa had been deported from his kingdom and Tamasese had been declared king by the German forces, an act totally in derogation of the rights of the other two countries. Subsequently the conference fell through. Sir J. B. Thurston attended at Washington confessedly with his hands tied by the instruction of the English Government. Finally the American representative withdrew, because, to use Mr. Bayard's own words, neither the commissioner nor the United States Government would submit to be made use of for the purposes of Germany, or Germany and England combined.'

Before the sitting of Congress in this present year, and in anticipation of the President's message, Mr. Bayard requested the assent of Lord Salisbury and Prince Bismarck to the publication of all the documents and proceedings in the Samoan matter. But both the German and English ministers refused.

Soon after the deportation of Malietoa a meeting was held by order of Tamasese and the German officials, at which the Samoan chiefs were called upon to attend. At this meeting Herr Brandeis, Tamasese's German minister, issued a command that there should be no disputation as to the right of Tamasese to be king, and no discussion.

It had been reported to the German Government, and was steadily maintained by them, that the followers of Tamasese far outnumbered the adherents of Malietoa. The German Government alleged that Tamasese was chosen king by the Samoans at this meeting. This statement was made to the American ambassador by Count Herbert Bismarck. Herr Brandeis himself states that at this same meeting he made this speech: 'It is strictly forbidden that any discussion should take place relating to the question as to whether it is good or not that Tamasese is King of Samoa both at this and at any future fono (meeting).' The Samoan chiefs displayed no implicit obedience to the command of Brandeis. The majority of them indeed signed the paper presented to them by Brandeis stating that Tamasese had assumed the government of Samoa, but the principal chiefs made no effort to conceal their contempt for Tamasese and their opposition to his government.

The chieftain next in order of rank to Malietoa in the islands is called Mataafa, whose name appears in the recent telegrams from Auckland, N.Z., as having been made king in lieu of Tamasese. The government during the last twelve months has been one longcontinued series of outrages, and, indeed, anarchy may be said to have prevailed. The courts have been shut, the Germans have refused to sit in the municipal council, thereby preventing a

quorum from appearing. The subjects of France, England, and America have complained bitterly to their respective Governments of the treatment they have received. On several occasions life has not been safe through the orders given and the conduct practised by German officers and men, and at length, on Herr Brandeis determining to give the name of Malietoa to Tamasese, the chiefs and the people have broken into rebellion, and, led by Mataafa, have defeated Tamasese's troops although backed by the moral force of German sympathy and the almost certain military assistance of the Empire. So much for the statement that Tamasese's followers were the great majority, and that the people were in favour of him as king.

In reply to questions asked by Mr. McArthur in the House of Commons between the 4th and 17th of May of the present year, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated that no arrangement had been entered into with Germany that she should become the dominant power in Samoa, that the English Government saw no reason to interfere between Germany and Malietoa, and that Tamasese, the king de facto, would be recognised by England. In reference to both questions and answers it will be necessary to carry the reader back to an interview between Prince Bismarck and Sir E. de B. Malet in 1885. At that interview, as reported by Sir E. de B. Malet to Lord Salisbury, the tone taken up by the German Chancellor seems to the ordinary reader to be of a most truculent character. Prince Bismarck said, 'that at every point at which Germany had endeavoured to found a colony England had closed in, making new acquisitions so as to restrict Germany's power of expansion.' He instanced the case of New Guinea, and, in spite of the clear reasoning of Sir Edward Malet, he clung to his own argument with pertinacity.

He proceeded to read a despatch which he had written to Count Munster on the 5th of May, 1884, and stated that the English Government had entirely failed to appreciate the importance that the German Government attached to the colonial question. For if Lord Salisbury had understood it the successive annoyances to which Germany had been exposed would have been averted.

The despatch to Count Munster, Sir Edward Malet continues, was a very remarkable one.

It stated the great importance that the Prince attached to the colonial question and also to the friendship of Germany and England. It pointed out that in the commencement of German colonial enterprise England might render signal services to Germany, and said that for those services Germany would use her best endeavours on England's behalf on questions concerning her interests nearer home. It pressed these considerations with arguments to show the mutual advantage which such understanding would produce, and it then proceeded to instruct Count Munster to say if it could not be effected the result would be that Germany would seek from France the assistance which she had failed to obtain from England, and would

draw closer to her on the same lines on which she now endeavoured to meet England. Prince Bismarck went on to say that, not being satisfied with the results, and attributing it in part to the ambassador not having stated the points with precision, he sent his son Count Herbert Bismarck to England in the hope that he might succeed where Count Munster had failed, but that Count Herbert unfortunately had only succeeded in obtaining those general friendly assurances of good-will which were of little value in the face of subsequent occurrences.

6

Sir Edward Malet proceeded to state that Prince Bismarck takes up a remark attributed to Lord Salisbury in a report on the Egyptian question, to the effect that the attitude of Germany on the colonial question makes it difficult for Lord Salisbury to be conciliatory on other points. The Prince then went on to speak of what he termed the closing-up system of England,' and cited Zululand, in which discussion Sir Edward Malet clearly had the best of the argument and proved that the Prince was misinformed. He continued, in speaking to Prince Bismarck, to allege that the situation was an unhappy one between the two great powers, and one which gave him great pain, as he had been instructed by Lord Salisbury to bring about a better understanding; that he knew it was never the intention of the Government of England to thwart Germany, but that Great Britain could not know the German Chancellor's wishes without those wishes being revealed. And Sir Edward Malet asked what it was that the Prince wanted-was it that part of New Guinea that England was annexing? Was it Zululand? The Prince replied that the understanding which he had arrived at with France put it out of his power to take up the question now, as he had explained it in May last.

The long conversation ended in an expression of regret on the part of Prince Bismarck as keen as that to which Sir Edward Malet had given utterance. It is remarkable that after this communication the British consuls in Samoa were always instructed to favour the Germans, and cautioned expressly and repeatedly not to interfere. It is also remarkable that Sir J. B. Thurston recommended the domination of one power in Samoa, and that the first term of domination should be given to Germany. Sir John Thurston's hands seemed so completely bound in the conference at Washington by his instructions as to cause in the American Government an absolute belief that an arrangement had been come to between England and Germanythe surmise being that it had reference to that matter of 'Egypt,' and to those interests nearer home,' on which such stress had been laid by Prince Bismarck in his interview with Sir E. B. Malet. The best-informed minds in New Zealand and Australia are of the same opinion as the Americans, and it does not tend to implicit confidence between the colonies and the Imperial authorities that such a belief can be held, which seems to be substantiated by historical occurrences, especially when, as in this instance, no mention is made by

the Government of Great Britain of the real circumstances surrounding the case.

In 1886-when the feeling of the colonies upon French and German annexation was at fever-heat-a delimitation treaty was signed between England and Germany as to the partition of the islands and that portion of the South Pacific, omitting Samoa, Tonga, and some other smaller groups. Was there no understanding between these two countries at the time of the signing of this treaty, or at any other time prior to that event? If not, what excuse can be given for the abandonment to Germany of English interests, and the repudiation of all our assurances to Malietoa and Samoa?

The colonial conference of 1887 seems to have exercised a considerable influence upon the Imperial Government in relation to its dealings with continental powers in the South Pacific. It may safely be asserted that the matters of New Guinea, of the New Hebrides, of French convict settlements in New Caledonia, and of German aggression in Samoa, strain the relations between England and the Australasian colonies very severely. Subsequently to the English delimitation treaty and the setting up of Tamasese as king in Samoa, Prince Bismarck, through the Baron von Zedtwitz, sent a most remarkable despatch (dated the 18th of November, 1887) to the Government at Washington. In this document the German Chancellor accuses every American consul of opposing and thwarting Germany, of encouraging disputes between Malietoa and the German officers, and of deceiving his own Government. The language used by Prince Bismarck is, to say the least, very dictatorial, and he complains bitterly, in view of the very friendly relations which had continued undisturbed for more than a century between Germany and the United States, that in a remote group of islands where neither America nor Germany had any political interests to defend, Germany was exposed to the continual ill-will of a series of American representatives. In contrast, says the Prince, to the ill-will of America, look at our relations with Great Britain. The contiguity of English and German colonies in the South Pacific must, he says, lead to rivalries and great friction. Great Britain also is compelled to take into consideration the claims and prejudices of her colonies, which, 'grown up under the idea of a British monopoly of ruling in Transatlantic countries, are inclined to look upon foreign neighbourship as an interference with the sphere of their interests, or as a menace to their security.' And he proceeds to point out that, especially in the case of Samoa, the covetousness repeatedly shown by New Zealanders of obtaining possession of these islands' has made it much more difficult for England to act with friendship towards Germany. "Nevertheless we are there in much better relations to England than to America, although the commercial interests of Great Britain in Samoa, though smaller than ours, are more considerable than those of the United States.'