lar sovereignty, but in the name of the authority that convenes them. Assume the absence of that authority, and the whole action of the people would want the sacred character of legality. Their acts are law, only because they are sanctioned by authority, only because the Convention, is by virtue of the authority convening it, in principle that authority itself.

This amounts, as I understand myself, simply to this: the people in organizing the State, and administering its affairs, are the active agency, and may do whatever the State itself permits or authorizes them to do. But, I am asked, What then have you gained by your long metaphysical discussions, and furious tirades against your democratic brethren? Was it necessary to go over all this ground, to make all this ado, merely to tell us, that the people can only act under and in obedience to constituted authorities? Do you forget the "ridiculus mus” of the old fable? No, my good friends, but you forget, that I have, for your side of the house, demonstrated, that man is not the passive subject, but the active subject, of government, and therefore, have demonstrated his right to free action even in being governed. Moreover, I have demonstrated that men, are, and must be, active, not passive, agents in constituting and administering the government; and that the larger the number of individuals you can bring into the category of active agents, the more wisely will your government be constituted. This is more than any democrat, to my knowledge, has ever yet done, whether it be the mountain bringing forth a mouse or not.

But this is not the point. We would know where you lodge the sacred right of insurrection, "the glorious right of rebellion and revolution; " what the part of the people in throwing off corrupt and oppressive government, and instituting "a new government, and laying its foundations on such principles, and organizing its powers

in such form, as shall seem to them most likely to effect their safety and happiness." If the people can act only under the sanction of constituted authority, how can they overthrow that authority itself, when it becomes corrupt and oppressive? How can we, on this ground, ever get rid of bad government? Your rule, if adopted, would perpetuate every government that is, however corrupt and intolerable, and prohibit all change, all redress, and therefore all progress.

This, I presume, is the real objection in the minds of my countrymen, to the doctrine I am trying to set forth. It is a fair objection, an honest objection, and deserves a serious and an honest answer. Such an answer it shall have.

1. This objection can, in this country, never be anything more than a purely speculative objection; for we have agreed, that our government is all that can be wished. Change here can never be desirable. Every true American must say with Mr. Calhoun, “I am a conservative in the broadest and fullest sense. I solemnly believe that our political system is, in its purity, not only the best that ever was formed, but the best possible, that can be devised for us. It is the only one by which free states, so populous and wealthy, occupying so vast an extent of territory, can preserve their liberty. Thus thinking, I cannot hope for a better. Having no hope of a better, I am a conservative."* All that we need, or ever can need in this country, is to preserve our institutions in their purity, and administer them according to their true intent and meaning. Here, we are never to be revolutionists, and therefore have no occasion to assert the right of revolution.

2. But, still it may be insisted, that it is a right, and ought to be asserted theoretically, even if suffered to lie in abeyance, for the time may come when it will be necessary to assert it practically. I am not certain, that resort to this right, in the sense some of our

politicians contend for it, can ever in any country, or in any possible combination of circumstances, be necessary. In their sense, the right of rebellion and revolution, is the right of the people, independent of all the constituted authorities, to rise up and overthrow all constituted authority, and institute government de novo. The necessity of ever resorting to such a right, is in my judgment, to say the least, extremely problematical. I have met with no instance, in my historical reading, where the State has been modified by a practical resort to this right. I take the English Rebellion, which beheaded Charles Stuart, and founded the Commonwealth of England, and I find the movement party acted always, professedly, under law, through the Parliament a legally constituted body, and claiming to represent the English State; in the Revolution of 1688, which drove out James the Second, and called to the throne William, Prince of Orange, I find the revolutionists acting also by authority of Parliament. In our own Revolution, I have shown that there was no rebellion, properly so called, of the inhabitants, and that resistance to the Crown of Great Britain was made by the authorities, to which the American people owed allegiance. Strange as it may seem to those, who have not investigated the matter, the same is the fact in regard to the French Revolution of 1789. The States General were a legal body, a constituent element of the French State; and they were assembled in 1789 by the competent authority. The Constituent Assembly legally succeeded to the States General, and the National Assembly was elected and convened by a law of the Constituent; and so also was the Convention, which, when the king had forfeited the throne, converted the French Monarchy into a constitutional Republic. There were doubtless factions, disorderly proceedings of individuals, which were authorized by no law, and which went against all law; but one shall look in vain, through all the successive stages of that terrible movement, for a practical'avowal by the French people of a revolutionary principle so broad and unmitigated as that, which we have seen resorted to, in the case of Rhode Island, Michigan, and Maryland.

I repeat, that I have met, in my histo

rical reading, with no instance in which the State has been modified by disregarding all the constituted authorities, and falling back on the right of the subjects to rebel and overthrow the government. There have been rebellions, insurrections, and outbreaks enough, I freely own; but whenever the constitution of the State has been successfully changed, the reform or movement party, has always acted under some publicly acknowledged authority, an authority known previously to the State itself. I will not say, that the authority alleged has always been broad enough to cover all the doings of this party; but that the party always professedly acts under it, and relies on it for its justification.

3. We cannot admit the right of rebellion and revolution in the people, without destroying the very foundation of government. There is, in fact, no such right. I deny it altogether. It cannot be a right conferred by the Constitution; for it is the right to overthrow the Constitution. It is not a right conferred by the State, for it is the right to subvert the State. If a right at all, we must, then, in order to find it, go out of the State to that which constitutes the State, and commissions it. Assume now, with the advocates of this right, that this authority, which constitutes the State, is the people; it must be the people either as organized into a body politic, or the people as an unorganized mass of individuals. But the people, as an organized body, are not superior to the State, but are it, and subject to the authority that organizes them, and, through the Convention, prescribes the forms of their action. We cannot find the right in the people in this sense, for it would imply a right in the State to subvert itself,—a manifest absurdity, for the subversion would be by legal authority, and therefore no subversion; for again, the authority of the State would survive in the subverter, and reappear in all its doings. We cannot find it in the people as individuals, without asserting the right of each individual to rebel, and resist government whenever it shall seem to him good; which, as we have seen, is to deny the very foundation of government. I repeat, then, that the right of rebellion and revolution, on the part of the people, is no right at all. The people have not, and never can have, this

right. The people can never have the right to act, save through the forms prescribed by the supreme authority.

But suppose such is the character of the existing political order, that it is impossible for the people to modify the practical organization of the State by the authority of the State itself, what remedy would you propose? Must we submit and endure all?

The right to resist civil government, nay, to subvert it, when necessary for human freedom, I admit and contend for, in the most unqualified terms; though I believe violent resistance and subversion are rarely, if ever, necessary or expedient. But, in my view, civil government is, properly speaking, only the subordinate department of government. The people are subject to a higher law than that of the civil government, to a higher sovereign than the State. When this higher sovereign, -the real sovereign, of which the State is but the minister, commands, it is our duty to resist the civil ruler, and to overthrow, if need be, the civil government. This higher sovereign is, as we have seen, the Will of God, represented, in the department superior to the State, by THE CHURCH. It belongs to the Church, then, as the representative of the highest authority on earth, to determine when resistance is proper, and to prescribe its forms, and its extent. When this commands, it is our duty to obey.

But suppose, as in Protestant countries, the Church has been perverted to a function of the State, or that it has itself become corrupt and oppressive, as we contend was and is the case with the Catholic Church, and that there is no element of reform in the State on which you can seize to sanction your movement, what then 'will you do in order to get rid of bad government? NOTHING; for in such a case nothing could be done. But, in return, you suppose an unsupposable case, or at least a case not likely to occur. If, however, such a case should occur, no remedy could come from the people themselves. A more wisely governed people must redeem them by conquest; or Providence must send a Lawgiver, specially commissioned to lead them forth from the bondage of Egypt to the Promised Land. A people in this case would have so little social virtue, be so destitute of all bonds of

union, and acknowledge so few rules of collective action, that no attempt, it could make at insurrection, would end otherwise than in disaster and total defeat. We see this in oriental populations, where insurrection sometimes changes the despot, never the despotism.

I know of only three cases in which insurrection, or rebellion, ever does, or ever can succeed. 1. Where the peo. ple rebelling has been a conquered people, and falls back on its national laws, customs, and usages, and under a descendant of one of its national chiefs, or under its national banner, strikes for its old nationality and independence. 2. When colonial populations, acting under the authority and ban of the colonial governments, declare themselves independent of the mother country. 3. Where the people act, under the sanction and at the command of their religion, through its, to them, authorized interpreters. Where one or another of the elements here implied, is wanting, the insurrectionary movement will amount to nothing. People will not fight, will not consent to kill or be killed except at the command of what is to them legitimate authority; at least this is true of the populations generally. The officer of state must lead them, or the minister of religion bless their cause. When God commands us to resist the civil ruler, we fear not to buckle on our armor; for we can say to the expostulations and threats of the tyrant-" Whether it is right to hearken unto men rather than unto God, judge ye?"

I see, then, I own, no occasion to assert this boasted right, on the part of the people, of rebellion and revolution. In the only cases in which insurrectionary movements can be successful, they are authorized by other principles, and imply no right of the people themselves, to rebel against government. I will add, moreover, that as I extend my historical reading, and the deeper I penetrate into the principles of government and the laws of its operation, the more and more convinced am I, that resort to this alleged right of rebellion can never be justifiable, nor even necessary.

But I have, in point of fact, as yet only half answered the question, what is the part of the people in constituting and administering the government ?

The people are never to be regarded as the passive, but always as the active, agents in the constitution and administration of government. I have thus far spoken of only one mode of their activity. In attentively studying our Constitution, we shall find, that it does not of itself secure all the legitimate ends of government. The most we can say of it is, that it is a guaranty against bad government. Its positive benefits depend on its administration. Its administrators are, with us, the great body of the people. Now, their administrative action will always be affected by their own wisdom and virtue. The civil government, as such, in no country is the only directive power, essential even to secure the ends of civil government. There must be, beside the civil authority, a moral authority. This moral authority, organized is the Church; but I will not now speak of it as organized. The main sphere of human activity, of popular action, if you will, in regard to government, is within the domain of this мoRAL AUTHORITY, under which term I conclude all that belongs to general and private intelligence, all that comes within the scope of public or private morality. Now, the constant moral action of the administrators of government, whether these be the whole people or a few, is essential to guard government, even when you have the best possible constitution; and, under the worst, it will find the means of legally and peacefully introducing such changes, organic or administrative, as shall be necessary to secure social and individual freedom.

This moral force is after all the great matter. This may be constantly accumulating in the mass of the people, and in the heads of administration, and moulding all, in obedience to the will of God, for the better security of Freedom. And here I find the sphere of the importance and influence of individual Statesmen. The necessity, and the great public blessing, of enlightened and virtuous Statesmen, we are too prone in this country to overlook. We have thought to elevate the mass, by reducing all to the level of the mass. A fatal mistake! The mass are too low, and need elevating. If not, what mean we by demanding individual and social progress? Is there already all the wisdom and virtue in the people, needed for the highest conceivable social state? If so, wherefore do we de

mand anything better than we have? Wisdom and virtue cannot be hid, nor can they, in any state, be passive. Just so much as you have in your community, just so much will show themselves in the public, as well as private, action of that community. Unless you have individuals wiser and more virtuous than the mass, you cannot add to the wisdom and virtue already possessed by the mass. In contending for the necessity of individual statesmen able to instruct the mass, to be their school-masters and chiefs, I am not warring against the mass, but contending for their elevation. Is it a misfortune to the people of this country, that they have had a Washington, a Jefferson, a Madison, a Samuel Adams, a Patrick Henry,-not to speak of a Jackson, and a Calhoun ? Has the superiority of these tended to depress the masses, to deprive them of their glory, and their rights? No: these men do lift the masses up from their degradation, and place them on a higher platform. Honor to the wise, the brave, the good!

Blessed be God, that he does now and then send us a free and noble spirit, who gives us a higher conception of the capabilities of our race; in whose wisdom and virtue, enlarged intelligence, ardent patriotism, and allenduring love of humanity, we find somewhat to which we can look up, or before which we can bow down and reverence. I would not feel in relation to every man I meet, "I am as good as you." In the darkness of life, and the uncertainty of my path through this wilderness, I want a guiding and directing mind, in whom I can confide, and feel that a wisdom superior to my own is directing me.

I believe as much in the capabilities of the masses, as do any of my brethren. I demand of them no blind reverence, no passive obedience to a distinguished few. I ask for them free and full scope for the manifestation of all the wisdom and virtue they have, and to acquire all that they are capable of acquiring; but I demand for them, men wiser and better than the general average, as the condition of enlarging the sum of their wisdom and virtue. My censures are not bestowed on them, but on the mischievous demagogues, who lay down the rule, that we must echo the opinion of the masses, instead of doing our best to form in

them wise and just opinions. I demand scholars and statesmen, priests and moralists; but I demand that these scholars, statesmen, priests, and moralists fulfil their functions as educators of the people, that they seek for truth, and proclaim it, freely, boldly, conscientiously, whether it coincides with the previous convictions of the people or not. The wisdom of the people will be equal to the demands of good government, only on condition, that every man, according to the measure of his ability, from his own stand-point, wherever it may be, throws the highest wisdom he can command into the mass, to enlarge the general average. If this is aristocracy, so be it. If for this I am to be denounced by my countrymen, as an enemy of our institutions, and as a contemner of the people, so be it; it will only prove, that my estimate of popular intelligence and virtue is none too low, and that in calling upon moralists, divines, scholars and statesmen, to seek to enlarge the moral power and intelligence of the whole people, I am not performing a work of supererogation.

Every country demands enlightened, virtuous, and patriotic Statesmen, and there is no country having these, that cannot, through these, obtain all the reforms needed. I say through these, for the whole history of our race proves, that nothing great or good can be obtained without sacrifice; and peoples, or communities, can be made self-sacrificing rarely, if ever. Our appeals must be made not directly to the masses in their collective capacity, but to individuals, and first and foremost to the individuals, whose elevated position and commanding genius, enable them to operate powerfully on the masses. Individuals may be moved by appeals to duty. They may be wrought up to such a high pitch of enthusiasm for truth and justice, for religion, for country, for humanity, that they will sacrifice all to work out for us a higher social, and individual, good. Through these, placed at the head of the government, and guiding within constitutional limits its action, we can, if need be, reform the government itself, and continually enlarge its beneficent action. I may here say, that to one man chiefly, almost exclusively, who dared place himself in opposition to the majority of his countrymen, who scrupled not to

sacrifice all the brightest prospects of the highest political advancement, and almost at the hazard of life, to resist the popular invasion of the Constitution, it is that we owe the preservation of the Constitution, and the liberty of this country; and when party animosities, and the wrath of defeated interests, shall have subsided, and the people come to understand the true nature of their institutions, they will see and acknowledge it; and they will place the South Carolina Statesman, high, if not highest, on the lists of those, who have well served the Republic.

Here, in this moral power, through statesmen constantly elevating the intelligence and virtue of the mass, and, through the government itself, constantly improving its organization, where needed, and perfecting its administration, is my chief hope; and in this I see a remedial power, that, in the worst of times, may save us from a resort to violence, to the alleged popular right of rebellion and revolution. I take, for example, the Government of Great Britain. I am no eulogist of the British Constitution; I am too much of an Irishman to eulogize anything Saxon or English, if I can help it. This government is terribly corrupt and oppressive. The people under it are overwhelmed with taxes, and only one twelfth of the proceeds of labor, I am told, is secured, upon an average, to the laborer. Yet all the changes, organic or administrative, needed to make this the wisest and best of governments, are attainable, without revolution, if we only suppose a requisite degree of wisdom and virtue in the individuals placed at its head. Suppose these, and you can legally enlarge the popular basis of the House of Commons, convert the House of Lords into an American Senate, and divest the Crown of its undue patronage. Now, bring the moral power to bear directly on these individuals, and you force them to make the reform, needed. And you will sooner secure them in this way, than in any other. The same remark will hold good in any other country we may select.

It is, then, after all, the exercise of this moral power of the people, constantly accumulating, that is the real and efficient part of the people in con. stituting and administering the govern