Some writers of eminence have suggested, or asserted, that Person and Being are not terms of the same import; and, therefore, it may imply no contradiction, to say, three persons in one Being or one God. But I have pot found that they have attempted to explain the difference between Person and Being. I shall not pretend that these terms are uniformly of synonymous import, for the term Being may be applied to any object which exists, but the term Person is applicable only to intelligent existence. But the phrases, an intelligent Person and an intelligent Being, may properly be considered as synonymous. If you think otherwise, be pleased to explain the difference.

In writing on divinity, it is highly important that we should use language according to its common acceptation: To make use of terms, of which we can give no intelligible explanation, has no tendency to communicate light. Those who make use of terms in relation to God, or to Christ, ought, at least, to be able and willing to tell their own meaning in the use of those terms. If I say that the Father and the Son are two distinct Persons, I ought to be willing to tell what I mean by the word Person. And if I have any definite meaning to the term, it may be expected that, in some way, I can make it known. But if I have no definite meaning to the term, how is it possible that another person can tell whether he agrees or disagrees with me in sentiment ?

If I only state, that I believe that the Father and the Son are two distinct Persons, there is, perhaps, no Christian but will say he believes the same. But as soon as I explain what I mean by the word Person many will dissent and avow their disagreement. Haying thus exposed myself to their disapprobation, by

explaining my meaning, may I not be permitted to ask what they mean by the term, that I may be able to compare the two opinions? And ought I to receive it as a satisfactory answer, if I am told that Person and Being are not the same, and that personality is something which cannot be defined?

As you, sir, profess to believe that the Father and the Son are two persons, and yet but one intelligent Being, I would ask whether the Father is not one intelligent Being? And is not the Son also an intelligent Being? Was he not an intelligent Being who came into the world to die for our sins? And was he who came and he who sent him one and the same intelligent Being?

As you also deny the human personality of Christ, or that as a derived Being, he was a Person, and still admit that he was, in respect to his human nature, truly a Man, I would ask what addition would have been necessary to constitute that Man a proper person? If we deny that, as a derived intelligence, he was a Person, will it not be difficult to make it appear that there is any such thing as personality in Man? Sin excepted, what do we find in ourselves which was not found in the Man Christ Jesus? If we take ground respecting personality, on which it cannot be proved that there is any such thing as a human Person, how shall we be able to show that there is any propriety in applying the term Person to the Deity? It is a clear case, that so long as we remain ignorant of the import of the term, we can never be sure that it is properly applied.

I have not, sir, pursued this inquiry with any desire to perplex the minds of others, or to multiply or widen the breaches which exist among professed Christians, but, if possible, to do something which may contribute

to greater unanimity. Nothing, perhaps, has contributed more to keep the subject of the Trinity involved in obscurity, than an indefinite and unmeaning use of the term Person. I will not affirm, that the definition I have given is perfect; but I will hope, that by frankly avowing my own views, and exposing myself to the censure of others, I may, at least, be the occasion of further inquiry and further light on the subject.

Permit me now, sir, to appeal from your theory to your enlightened common sense. Did you ever conceive of the Father and the Son as one and the same intelligent Being? When you thank God for the gift of his Son to die for us, do you not uniformly conceive of the Father as one intelligent Being, and of the Son as another? From my own past experience, I may presume, that, according to your common sense, the Father and the Son are as distinctly two intelligent Beings, as Abraham and Isaac. Of what importance then can it be to Christianity, to attempt to support a theory of personality which is undefinable and ineffable, which does not accord with the common acceptation of the term Person, nor with the practical views even of those who adopt it? Seareely any thing is more obvious to the common understanding of men, than what is usually intended by the word Person; but when the term is applied to the Deity, they must be told that it means something which cannot be explained. But if the explanation I have given of the meaning of the word Person shall be found to accord with the common sense of mankind, and with the practical views of Christians in relation to the Father and Son, may I not hope to escape the eensure of those who profess not to know what is meant by Person as applied to God?

It will probably be urged, that God is incompres hensible, and that the doctrine which affirms three persons in one God or one Being, is no more above our comprehension than the eternity and self-existence of Jehovah.

It will readily be granted, that God is to us incomprehensible in his Being and all his attributes; yet, in respect to any of his attributes, we can explain what we mean by the terms in which they are expressed. We can so explain as to make each other understand what we mean by the terms eternity and self-existence. Let it, then, be as intelligibly explained what is meant by Person, when we say that there are three Persons in one God, or one intelligent Being.

The incomprehensibleness of an object is no reason why we should use terms without any definite meaning. God is an incomprehensible object; but in using the term, we may have an intelligible and definite meaning. We ought, at least, to have so much meaning to the terms we use, that we' can explain our own meaning.

By some good writers it has been supposed, that the proposition which affirms a plurality of Persons in one intelligent Being, implies no contradiction. But I would ask, how is it known that it does not imply a contradiction? Can we affirm any thing of a proposition any farther than we understand the terms? Let the terms be explained, and then we stand on fair ground to judge whether the proposition does or does not imply a contradiction. But until this be done, it would be very improper, at least for me, to affirm any thing concerning it, one way or another. Until we understand the term Person, we know not what is affirmed in the proposition. And if there be no defi

aite meaning to the term, he who states the proposition either affirms nothing, or he affirms he knows not what. If we think to give instruction by using terms in an indefinite and undefinable sense, we most certainly miss our aim. For no person can be enlightened by any proposition any farther than he understands the meaning of the terms. If then, in writing on divinity, we use terms which are undefinable in our own application of them, what do we better than to darken counsel by words without knowledge?

The following proposition is supposed to be apostolic, "There are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost." This passage, I am fully satisfied, as will appear, Letter VI, is an interpolation. But even should it be supposed genuine, it affords no proof of the Trinitarian sentiment. For neither the term Persons, nor the name God, is to be found in the passage. And if we know not the import of the term Persons, was it not very improper for Trinitarians to insert it in a proposition intended to express an apostle's meaning? It was with a view to render this proposition more explicit, that the term Person was inserted. But however inexplicit or indefinite the proposition may be, as it stands in the Bible, it surely could not be amended by inserting a word without meaning, or by using a definite term in an undefinable sense.

As to the improper use of the term Person, I consider myself as having been culpable as well as others. And while I frankly place myself on this ground, I do it in hope that the preceding remarks will not be viewed as designedly reproachful to any class of Christians or divines.