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vis theoretica et scientifica, or the power by which we produce, or aim to produce unity, necessity, and universality in all our knowledge by means of principles * a priori ; the will, or practical reason; the faculty of choice (Germanice, Willkühr) and (distinct both from the moral will and the choice) the sensation of volition, which I have found reason to include under the head of siugle and double touch.” To this, as far as it relates to the subject in question, namely the words (the aggregative and associative power) Mr. Wordsworth's “only objection is that the definition is too general. To aggregate and to associate, to evoke and combine, belong as well to the imagination as the fancy.” I reply, that if by the power of evoking and combining, Mr. W. means the same as, and no more than, I meant by the aggregative and associative, I continue to deny, that it belongs at all to the imagination; and I am disposed to conjecture, that he has mistaken the co-presence of fancy with imagination for the operation of the latter singly. A man may work with two very different tools at the same moment; each has its share in the work, but the work effected by each is distinct and different. But it will probably appear in the next Chapter, that deeming it necessary to go back much further than Mr. Wordsworth's subject required or permitted, I have attached a meaning to both fancy and imagination, which he had not in view, at least while he was writing that preface. He will judge. Would to heaven, I might meet with many such readers. I will conclude with the words of Bishop Jeremy Taylor : he to whom all things are one, who draweth all things to one, and seeth all things in one, may enjoy true peace and rest of spirit. (J. Taylor's Via Pacis.)
* This phrase, a priori, is in common most grossly misunderstood, and an absurdity burthened on it, which it does not deserve! By knowledge, a priori, we do not mean, that we can know any thing previously to experience, which would be a contradiction in terms; but that having once known it by occasion of experience (i. e. something acting upon us from without) we then know, that it must bave preexisted, or the experience itself would have been impossible. By experience only I know, that I have eyes ; but then my reason convinces me, that I must have had eyes in order to the experience.
On the imagination, or esemplastic power.
O Adam ! one Almighty is, from whom
PAR. Lost, b. v.
“ Sane si res corporales nil nisi materiale continerent, verissime dicerentur in fluxu consistere neque habere substan
tiale quicquam, quemadmodum et Platonici olim recte agnovêre.-Hinc igitur, præter purè mathematica et phantasia subjecta, collegi quædam metaphysica solaque mente perceptibilia, esse admittenda : et massæ materiali principium quoddam superius et, ut sic dicam, formale addendum : quandoquidem omnes veritates rerum corporearum ex solis axiomatibus logisticis et geometricis, nempe de magno et parvo, toto et parte, figura et situ, colligi non possint; sed alia de causa et effectu, actioneque et passione, accedere debeant, quibus ordinis rerum rationes salventur. Id principium rerum, an INTEXívar an vim appellecuus, non refert, modó meminerimus, per solam Virium notionem intelligibiliter explicari.”
LEIBNITZ: Op. T. II. P. II. p. 53.-T. III. p. 321.
SYNESII, Hymn III. I. 231.
DES CARTES, speaking as a naturalist, and in imitation of Archimedes, said, give me matter and motion and I will construct you the uni
We must of course understand him to have meant; I will render the construction of the universe intelligible. In the same sense the
transcendental philosopher says; grant me a nature having two contrary forces, the one of which tends to expand infinitely, while the other strives to apprehend or find itself in this infinity, and I will cause the world of intelligences with the whole system of their representations to rise up before you. Every other science pre-supposes intelligence as already existing and complete: the philosopher contemplates it in its growth, and as it were represents its history to the mind from its birth to its maturity.
The venerable Sage of Koenigsberg has preceded the march of this master-thought as an effective pioneer in his essay on the introduction of negative quantities into philosophy, published 1763. In this he has shown, that instead of assailing the science of mathematics by metaphysics, as Berkley did in his Analyst, or of sophisticating it, as Wolff did, by the vain attempt of deducing the first principles of geometry from supposed deeper grounds of ontology, it behoved the metaphysician rather to examine whether the only province of knowledge, which man has succeeded in erecting into a pure science, might not furnish materials or at least hints for estab. lishing and pacifying the unsettled, warring, and embroiled domain of philosophy. An imitation of the mathematical method had indeed been