THE

CASE OF IMPEACHMENT OF WASTE.

ARGUED

BEFORE ALL THE JUDGES IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.

the sense which the other side would force upon it, that it were a clause repugnant to the estate and void.

THE case needs neither repeating nor opening. First, That if that clause should be taken in The point is, in substance, but one, familiar to be put, but difficult to be resolved; that is, Whether, upon a lease without impeachment of waste, the property of the timber trees, after severance, be not in him that is owner of the inheritance?

The case is of great weight, and the question of great difficulty: weighty it must needs be, for that it doth concern, or may concern all the lands in England; and difficult it must be, because this question sails in confluentiis aquarum, in the meeting or strife of two great tides. For there is a strong current of practice and opinion on the one side, and there is a more strong current, as I conceive, of authorities, both ancient and late, on the other side. And, therefore, according to the reverend custom of the realm, it is brought now to this assembly; and it is high time the question receive an end, the law a rule, and men's conveyances a direction.

Secondly, That the sense which we conceive and give is natural in respect of the words; and for the matter agreeable to reason and the rules of law.

And, lastly, That if the interpretation seem ambiguous and doubtful, yet the very mischief itself, and consideration of the commonwealth, ought rather to incline your lordships' judgment to our construction.

My first assertion therefore is, that a timber tree is a solid parcel of the inheritance; which may seem a point admitted, and not worth the labouring. But there is such a chain in this case, as that which seemeth most plain, if it is sharply looked into, doth invincibly draw on that which is most doubtful. For if the tree be parcel of the inheritance unsevered, inherit in the reversion, severance will not alien it, nor the clause will not divest it.

This doubt ariseth and resteth upon two things to be considered; first, to consider of the interest and property of a timber tree, to whom it belongeth: and, secondly, to consider of the construc- To open, therefore, the nature of an inheritance; tion and operation of these words or clause, abs- sense teacheth there be, of the soil and earth, que impetitione vasti: for within these two parts that are raised and eminent, as timber trees, branches will aptly fall whatsoever can be perti-rocks, houses. There be parts that are sunk and nently spoken in this question, without obscuring the question by any other curious division.

For the first of these considerations, which is the interest or property of a timber tree, I will maintain and prove to your lordships three things. First, That a timber tree, while it groweth, is merely parcel of the inheritance, as well as the soil itself.

And, secondly, I will prove, that when either nature or accident, or the hand of man hath made

depressed, as mines, which are called by some arbores subterraneæ, because that as trees have great branches and smaller boughs and twigs, so have they in their region greater and smaller veins; so if we had in England beds of porcelain, such as they have in China, which porcelain is a kind of a plaster buried in the earth, and by length of time congealed and glazed into that fine substance, this were as an artificial mine, and no doubt part of the inheritance. Then are the ordi

it transitory, and cut it off from the earth, it can-nary parts, which make the mass of the earth, as

not change the owner, but the property of it goes where the inheritance was before. And thus much by the rules of the common law.

And, thirdly, I will show that the statute of Gloucester doth rather corroborate and confirm the property in the lessor than alter it, or transfer it to the lessee.

And for the second consideration, which is the force of that clause, absque impetitione vasti, I will also uphold and make good three other assertions

stone, gravel, loam, clay, and the like.

Now, as I make all these much in one degree, so there is none of them, not timber trees, not quarries, not minerals nor fossils, but hath a double nature; inheritable and real while it is contained within the mass of the earth, and transitory and personal when it is once severed. For even gold and precious stone, which is more durable out of earth than any tree is upon the earth, yet the law doth not hold of that dignity as to be matter of inheritance if it be once sever

ritance and particular estate is in effect their dominium and usus-fructus; for so it was conceived upon the ancient statute of depopulations, 4 Hen. VII. which was penned, "that the owner of the land should re-edify the houses of husbandry," that the word owner, which answereth to dominus, was he that had the immediate inhe. ritance; and so ran the later statutes. Let us see therefore what judgment the law maketh of a timber tree; and whether the law doth not place it within the lot of him that hath the inheritance as parcel thereof.

The writ of felling

waste supposeth

First, It appeareth by the register out of the words of the writ of waste, that the waste is laid to be ad exhæredation- ber to be ad ex hæredationem.

And it is most evident that the elements them-em, which presupposeth hæreditatem : selves, and their products, have a perpetuity not in individuo, but by supply and succession of parts. For example, the vestal fire that was nourished by the virgins at Rome was not the same fire still, but was in perpetual waste and in perpetual renovation. So it is of the sea and waters, it is not the same water individually, for that exhales by the sun, and is fed again by the showers. And so of the earth itself, and mines, quarries, and whatsoever it containeth, they are corruptible individually, and maintained only by succession of parts, and that lasteth no longer than they continue fixed to the main and mother globe of the earth, and is destroyed by their separation.

for there cannot be a disinherison by the cutting down of the tree, except there was an inheritance in the tree, quia privatio præsupponit actum.

According to this I find the wisdom of the law, by imitation of the course of nature, to judge of inheritances and things transitory; for it allow eth no portions of the earth, no stone, no gold, no mineral, no tree, no mould to be longer inheritance than they adhere to the mass, and so are capable of supply in their parts; for by their continuance of body stands their continuance of time. Neither is this matter of discourse, except the deep and profound reasons of law, which ought chiefly to be searched, shall be accounted discourse, as the slighter sort of wits, Scioli, may esteem them.

And, therefore, now that we have opened the nature of inheritable and transitory, let us see, upon a division of estates, and before severance, what kind of interests the law allotteth to the owner of inheritance, and what to the particular tenant, for they be competitors in this case.

The consent of

the law with

the civil law in the distingui h ing between in heritance and

particular es

tates, which

hath reation to

their division

of dominan n

and uns fou tus

Oxnerin

First, In general the law doth assign to the lessor those parts of the soil conjoined, which have obtained the reputation to be durable, and of continuance, and such as being destroyed are not but by long time renewed; and to the terminors it assigneth such inte

the stat. 41. 7. rests as are tender and feeble against the

The statute of

recupered not locum vas tatum.

Again it appeareth out of the words of the statute of Gloucester, well ob- Gloucester, served, that the tree and the soil are rem vastatam, one entire thing, for the words are, quod recuperet rem vastatam; and yet the books speak, and the very judgment in waste is quod recuperet locum vastatum, which shows, that res and locus are in exposition of law taken indifferently; for the lessor shall not recover only the stem of the tree, but he shall recover the very soil, whereunto the stem continues. And therefore it is notably ruled in 22 H. VI. f. 13, that if the ter

minor do first cut down the tree, and 22 H. 6. 1. 13. then destroy the stem, the lessor shall declare upon two several wastes, and recover treble damages for them severally. But, says the book, he must bring but one writ, for he can recover the place wasted but once.

Mullin's case.

And farther proof may be fitly alleged out of Mullin's case in the commentaries, where it is said, that for timber trees tithes shall not be paid. And the reason of the book is well to be observed; "for that tithes are to be paid for the revenue of the inheritance, and not for the inheritance itself."

Co. p. 4, 1. 62.

Nay, my lords, it is notable to consider what a reputation the law gives to the trees, even after they are severed by grant, as may be plainly inferred out of Herlackenden's case, L. Coke, p. 4, f. 62. I mean the principal case; where it is resolved, that if the trees being excepted out of a lease granted to the lessee, or if the grantee of trees accept a lease of the land, the property of the trees drown not, as a term should drown in a freehold, but subsist as a chattel divided; which shows plainly, though they be made transitory, yet they still to some purpose savour of the inheritance: for if you go a little farther, and put the case of a state tail, which is

force of time, but have an annual or seasonable a state of inheritance, then I think clearly they

return or revenue. And herein it consents again with the wisdom of the civil law; for our inhe

are reannexed. But, on the other side, if a man buy corn standing upon the ground, and take a lease of the same ground, where the corn stands, and its solid parts grow putrefied, and, as the poet

I say plainly it is reaffixed, for paria copulantur cum paribus.

And it is no less worthy the note, what an operation the inheritance leaveth behind it in matter of waste, even when it is gone, as appeareth in the case of tenant after possibility, who shall not be punished; for though the new reason be, because his estate was not within the statute of Gloucester; yet I will not go from my old master Littleton's reason, which speaketh out of the depth of the common law, he shall not be punished "for the inheritance sake which was once in him."

The derivation

But this will receive a great deal of illustration, by considering the terminor's estate, and the nature thereof, which was well defined by Mr. Heath, who spake excellent well to the case, that it is such as he ought to yield up the inheritance in as good plight as he received it; and therefore the word firmarius, which is the word and force of the of the statute of Marlebridge, cometh, word firmarı as I conceive, a firmando; because he makes the profit of the inheritance, which otherwise should be upon account, and uncertain, firm and certain; and, accordingly, feodi firma, feefarm, is a perpetuity certain. Therefore the nature and limit of a particular tenant is to make the inheritance certain, and not to make it worse.

145.

saith, non jam mater alit tellus viresque ministrat. then the law returns it back to the lessee. This is true justice, this is suum cuique tribuere; the law guiding all things with line of measure and proportion.

The have Last the lessee ha'ba 8ecial proper

very improper; for be hart but the profis of

And therefore that interest of the lessee in the tree, which the books call a special property, is scarce worth thatty in the the name. He shall have the shade, so shall he have the shade of a rock; but the tree. he shall not have a crystal or Bristol diamond growing upon the rock. He shall have the pannage; why? that is the fruit of the inheritance of a tree, as herb or grass is of the soil. He shall have seasonable loppings; why? so he shall have seasonable diggings of an open mine. So all these things are rather profits of the tree, than any special property in the tree. But about words we will not differ.

So as I conclude this part, that the reason and wisdom of law doth match things, as they consort, ascribing to permanent states permanent interest, and to transitory states transitory interest; and you cannot alter this order of law by fancies of clauses and liberties, as I will tell you in the proper place. And therefore the tree standing belongs clearly to the owner of the inheritance.

Now come I to my second assertion, that by the severance the ownership or property cannot be altered; but that he that had the trees as part of the inheritance before, must have it as a chattel transitory after. This is pregnant and followeth of itself, for it is the same tree still, and, as the Scripture saith, uti arbor cadet, ita jacet.

The owner of the whole must needs own the parts; he that owneth the cloth owneth the thread, and he that owneth an engine when it is entire, owneth the parts when it is broken; breaking cannot alter property.

Herlackenden

Care.

And therefore the book in Herlackenden's case doth not stick to give it somewhat plain terms; and to say that it were an absurd thing, that the lessee which hath a particular interest in the land, should have an absolute property in that which is part of the inherit ance: you would have the shadow draw the body, and the twigs draw the trunk. These are truly called absurdities. And, therefore, in a conclusion so plain, it shall be sufficient to vouch the authorities without enforcing the reasons.

And although the division be good, that was made by Mr. Heath, that there be four manners of severances, that is, when the lessee fells the tree, or when the lessor fells it, or when a stranger fells it, or when the act of God, a tempest, fells it; yet this division tendeth rather to explanation than to proof, and I need it not, because I do main

And for the tree, which is now in question, do but consider in what a revolution the law moves, and as it were in an orb: for when the tree is young and tender, germen terræ, a sprout of the earth, the law giveth it to the lessee, as having a nature not permanent, and yet easily restored; when it comes to be a timber tree, and hath a nature solid and durable, the law carrieth it to the lessor. tain that in all these cases the property is in the But after again if it become a sear and a dotard, lessor.

but Danby goes farther, and saith, the law that gives him the thing, doth likewise give him means to come by it; but they both agree that the interest is in the lessor. And thus much for the seisure.

For the grant; it is not so certain a badge of property as the other two; for a man may have a property, and yet not grantable, because it is turned into a right, or otherwise suspended. And, therefore, it is true, that by the book in 21 H. VI. that if the lessor grant the trees, the grantee shall not take them, no, not after the lease expired; because this property is but de futuro, expectant; but it is as plain on the other side that the lessee cannot grant them, as was resolved Marwood and in two notable cases, namely, the case Sanders. C. of Marwood and Sanders, 41 El. in communi banco; where it was ruled, that the tenant of the inheritance may make a feoffment with exception of timber trees: but that if lessee for life or years set over his estate with an exception of the trees, the exception is utterly void; and the like resolution was in the case between Foster and Mills, plaintiff, and Spencer Spencer's case. and Boord, defendant, 28 Eliz. rot. 820. Now come we to the authorities, which have an appearance to be against us, which are not many, and they be easily answered, not by distinguishing subtilly, but by marking the books advisedly.

Foster and

7 H. 6.
44 Ε. 3, C. 44.

1. There be two books that seem to cross the authorities touching the interest of the windfalls, 7 H. VI. and 44 E. III. f. 44, where, upon waste brought and assigned in the succision of trees, the justification is, that they were overthrown by wind, and so the lessee took them for fuel, and allowed for a good plea; but these books are reconciled two ways: first, look into both the justifications, and you shall find that the plea did not rely only in that they were windfalls, but couples it with this, that they were first sear, and then overthrown by wind; and that makes an end of it, for sear trees belong to the lessee, standing or felled, and you have a special replication in the book of 44 E. III. that the wind did but rend them, and buckle them, and that they bore fruit two years after. And, secondly, you have ill luck with your windfalls, for they be still apple trees, which are but wastes, per accidens, as willows or thorns are in the sight of a house; but when they are once felled they are clearly matter of fuel.

speak not a word what he shall recover, nor that it shall be to the value. And, therefore, 9 E. IV. is a good expositor, for that distinguisheth where the other two books speak indefinitely; yea, but 5 H. IV. goeth farther, and saith, that the writ shall purport arbores suas, which is true in respect of the special property; neither are writs to be varied according to special cases, but are framed to the general case, as upon lands recovered in value in tail, the writ shall suppose donum, a gift.

13 H. 7, Г. 9.

And the third kind of authority is some books, as 13 H. VII. f. 9, that say, that trespass lies not by the lessor against the lessee for cutting down trees, but only waste; but that it is to be understood of trespass vi et armis, and would have come fitly in question if there had been no seisure in this case.

Upon all which I conclude, that the whole current of authorities proveth the properties of the trees upon severance to be in the lessor by the rules of the common law; and that although the common law would not so far protect the folly of the lessor, as to give him remedy by action, where the state was created by his own act, yet, the law never took from him his property; so that, as to the property, before the statute and since, the law was ever one.

Now come I to the third assertion, that the statute of Gloucester hath not transferred the property of the lessee upon an intendment of recompense to the lessor; which needs no long speech: it is grounded upon a probable reason, and upon one special book.

12 E. 4, L. &.

The reason is, that damages are a recompense for property; and, therefore, that the statute of Gloucester giving damages should exclude property. The authority seems to be 12 E. IV. f. 8, where Catesbey, affirming that the lessee at will shall have the great trees, as well as lessee for years or life; Fairfax and Jennings correct it with a difference, that the lessor may take them in the case of tenant at will, because he hath no remedy by the statute, but not in case of the termors.

This conceit may be reasonable thus far, that the lessee shall not both seise and bring waste; but if he seise, he shall not have his action; if he recover by action, he shall not seise; for a man shall not have both the thing and recompense; it is a bar to the highest inheritance, the kingdom of heaven, receperunt mercedem suam. But at the

Another kind of authorities, that make show first, it is at his election whether remedy he will

against us, are those that say that the lessee shall punish the lessor in trespass for taking the trees,

which are 5 H. IV. f. 29, and 1 Mar. Dier. f. 90, Mervin's case; and you might add if you will 9 E. IV. the case vouched before: unto which the answer is, that trespass must be understood for the special property, and not for the body of the tree; for those two books

use, like as in the case of trespass: where if a man once recover in damages, it hath concluded and turned the property. Nay, I invert the argument upon the force of the statute of Gloucester thus: that if there had been no property at common law, yet the statute of Gloucester, by restraining the waste, and giving an action, doth imply a property: whereto a better case cannot