ART IV. Elements of Intellectual Philosophy; or, an Analysis of the Powers of the Human Understanding; tending to ascertain the Principles of a Rational Logic. By R.E. Scott, A.M., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University and King's College, Aberdeen. 8vo. PP 401. 9s. Boards. Constable and Co., Edinburgh; Cadell and Davies, London.

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ITH the primary intention of forming only a text-book for part of a course of Academical Lectures, Mr. Scott enlarged his plan and augmented his materials until the result has been the present volume. We infer, therefore, that, as it is now offered to us, it contains all the elucidation and explanation which the Professor has been accustomed orally to bestow on the abstruse subject of Intellectual Philosophy. He found reason to believe, he says, that a short Treatise, which should contain an Analysis of the Powers of the Human Understanding, tending to illustrate the Principles of sound Rea soning and scientific Investigation, might be a desirable acquisition to Students in general: because the Elementary Sys tems of Logic which have yet appeared, are almost all founded upon the metaphysical subtleties of the schoolmen; and have little reference to the present advanced state of Intellectual Philosophy. Actuated by these considerations, the Author presumes to offer to the Public the following attempt to supply a desideratum in Elementary Science; which may prove of some use to the Student, till an abler hand shall undertake the execution of the task.'

Certainly, this work ought to be highly valued by the public, if it can occupy the place and discharge the duties of an ele mentary system of logic. We concede to the author, that for mer treatises are founded on the metaphysical subtleties of the schoolmen: that is, are generally either false or fanciful, or both. Many of these subtleties were verbal, general terms be ing used without precise signification, or, which is the same thing, without preceding definition. These faults, then, ought most carefully to be avoided in a treatise which professes to be formed in direct opposition to such a system of subtleties: yet, without meaning to say that Mr. Scott endeavours to perplex his readers with false refinements or imposing terms, we must remark that he leaps at once in medias res, and, in his first half page, distributes the objects of human knowlege into material and intellectual, and gives the distinguishing character istics of matter and of mind. It is not our intention to controvert the justness of the distribution, nor to question the ucility of general terms: but, when such distributions and terms occur in the beginning of an elementary treatise, the young

student

student who is solicitous to acquire notions, and not words, must find himself in as great a dilemma as if he suddenly plunged into the forms, accidents, and essences of the metaphysical schoolmen. -The evil of which we complain is very common, and demands a remedy. Are we never to have a Horn-book of Metaphysics, or a Grammar of Intellectual Philosophy? Such an introductory work is very necessary; and no Professor, whatever be his abilities, should despise the construction of it as beneath his exertion. If difficulties rouse ambition, we apprehend that no inconsiderable difficulties await the composition of a plain and perspicuous Grammar of the human mind.

Of metaphysical science, Reid and Dugald Stewart have familiarized and simplified the study, and have laid down most excellent rules for its cultivation. These writers, however, suppose their readers to possess some knowlege of metaphysics, and write principally to the learned: but a student requires a treatise springing from lower beginnings; in which many pages should be turned over before a faculty or mental power was mentioned. Almost all authors who write on Mind are too prone to talk of powers and faculties, and suddenly to parcel out the Intellect into conception, perception, abstraction, &c.— in fact, to take a theory for granted which it is their business to prove.

In Metaphysics, as in Physics, a just philosophy teaches us to attend first to facts, or mental phænomena: in our farther progress, those mental phænomena which appear mixed are to be separated into simpler phenomena, and the laws of their composition are to be observed; and since it will be necessary to class them, terms of classification must be invented. The introduction of such terms, however, ought to be made with the greatest caution, and most scrupulously because terms, having associated meanings, are apt to introduce foreign notions; and, in their new alliance, to impart those which are derived from subjects to which they had previously been applied. Lord Bacon finely illustrates the nature of the operation of words, when he says that, like to the Tartar's Bow, they shoot back on the Understanding."

The exact observation and register of the phænomena of the Mind, and their subsequent classification, forin not an easy task in what treatise is it completely effected? Writers find greater facility in constructing sentences with general and abstract terms: but this is not to explain. The invention of terms may assist and expedite explanation, but explanation can never be involved in a term. That which is simple, and that which is to be proposed as an elementary truth, may, what

ever be the subject of discussion, be stated in ordinary words. We feel at once embarrassed and indignant when a treatise, in its very outset, speaks of the qualities of matter and the faculties of mind, and informs us that Consciousness is the faculty by which we know the powers or faculties of the mind; that Perception is the faculty by which we know the qualities of matter, &c.

The result of proof should not be prematurely introduced into the demonstrative process. If the terms Consciousness. Perception, Conception, &c. be not mere terms of classifica. tion, and if they be made to stand for mental powers and faculties, the existence of such powers and faculties should be rendered evident or probable, before their agency is employed in the solution of phenomena. We feel, hear, think, wish: these acts, if any, are real: but that these acts arise from the operation of powers is either an hypothesis, or a figurative or illustrative mode of expression, or it is the result of reasonings.. If the first interpretation be admitted, the author who employs such terms should distinctly explain why he uses them: if the latter interpretation, then much ground of discussion ought to be passed over, before the mention of such terms is introduced.

Few, if any, metaphysical treatises are exempt from the preceding reprehension; and the present work suggested the. necessity of inflicting it. Science is said to be advanced by the increasing perfection and dextrous combination of general terms: but Metaphysical Science, in our judgment, would be tending to improvement, if it condescended to use words of ordinary occurrence, of precise meaning, and above all not figu

rative.

Professor Dugald Stewart, in his Philosophy of the Human Mind, noticing a difference between the mere acts of wishing, thinking, &c. and an observance and attention to the order and laws of such acts, introduced a distinction between Consciousness and Attention, which, for the reasons alleged by that eminent writer, appears to us to be just. Of phænomena classed together, one part differs from another; and of this difference there ought to be some note. Philosophizing, or using language offered to us in analogical subjects, we may say that this difference of phænomena arises from different faculties. Mr. Scott, however, dissents from the necessity of making this distinction:

Mr. Stewart (he remarks) considers intellectual processes of this nature as objects, not of consciousness but of attention; but to me there appears no necessity for calling in the aid of this new faculty. That ingenious philosopher has given a variety of interesting illustrations

relative

relative to trains of thought, which certainly are daily passing through our minds, but which are never recollected; because, on account of their great rapidity, they are not objects of attention, or as I should prefer to say, of consciousness. Such, for example, is that train of thought by which we are led to judge of the distances of visible objects, and which includes in it a comparison of various particu lars, such as the apparent magnitude of the object, its distinctness or obscurity, the brightness of its colours, the inclination of the axes of the eyes, and change of conformation of the eye itself. In this instance, and in some of the others mentioned by Mr. Stewart, it may be remarked, that the inactivity of Consciousness is to be ascribed, not only to the rapidity of the intellectual process, but also to its having been familiarized to the mind in early life, before the faculty of Consciousness came into exercise. In other instances, par ticularly such as are ascribed to the mechanical agency of habit, as where a musician comes, by long practice, to perform a piece of music with such facility as to be unconscious of any voluntary effort, the inactivity of Consciousness seems wholly due to the rapidity of the mental exertions; and Mr. Stewart appears to have been peculiarly successful in illustrating the true nature of such phenomena, which had been most unphilosophically ascribed to the influence of an undefined and misunderstood principle called Habit. But, for the ingenious remarks of this philosopher, upon these interesting topics, we refer to his own work, chapter second.'

We see not much of confutation in this passage: the author merely says that he differs from Mr. Stewart: but in a subsequent part he endeavours to put in motion a greater force of

argument:

Still, however, (he is speaking of Mr. Stewart's Illustrations) though I admit the justness and the utility of these illustrations, I can see no necessity for assigning to the mind a peculiar faculty called Attention, whose office it is to take previous cognizance of our various thoughts, in order that they may be again recognized by the memory. I can find no peculiar objects for the employment of this faculty, which do not belong to some one or other of those whose existence seems to be certainly established. Whatever is afterwards remembered is either an object of the senses, that is, of the faculties of sensation and perception; or, it is some mental abstraction, some real or fancied relation, some object of consciousness or conception; in short, of some one or other of those mental faculties which are contained in the enumerations of Pneumatology, without, however, resorting to this disputed one of Attention. Thus, the Attention, if it be a peculiar faculty, must be a generally assisting faculty, which comes occasionally to the help of all the others, to give them clearer views of their several objects.

Instead of adopting this conclusion, I would (should) be inclined to reject the existence of the faculty altogether, and consider the mean. ing of the term Attention, or of doing a thing attentively, to be no more than a sedulous and steady exertion of the particular mental power then in question, whether it be Perception, Abstraction, Combina

tion, or any other. To assert the contrary doctrine, appears to be nearly as inconsistent as to to say, that, when a man lifts a burden of a hundred pounds weight, he must exert a muscular power, different in kind, as well as in degree, from that by which he is enabled to lift a weight of ten pounds. The rapid currents of thought which pass in our minds, generally unknown to ourselves, and which afford the most plausible argument for the necessity of a peculiar faculty, of the nature of Attention, appear to me to be proper objects, not of Attention, but of Consciousness, and, as such, have been considered in Chapter 1st.'

In the first part of this quotation, the author either gives up the point in dispute, or we see not his meaning. The Attention, he says, if it be a peculiar faculty, must be a generally assisting faculty :-the mode of operation is not the real subject of discussion, it is the Independence and separate Existence of the faculty.

A subsequent passage in the work contains a piece of historical criticism which deserves notice. It is shewn by an extract from Condillac, that this author, previously to Mr. Stewart, considered Attention as a peculiar faculty of the human mind.

Besides the positions which we have mentioned, this first chapter, an Consciousness, contains others that excite our doubt, and would, if our limits permitted, provoke us to discussion. Consciousness being, by Mr. Scott's definition, the power by which the various powers of the mind are made known to us, he says that this power is denied to the lower animals: what must be the nature of the proof that can establish this fact?

The second Chapter treats of Sensation; and here, in noticing Dr. Reid's distinction between perception and sensa." tion, the author remarks: According to this distinction, the very essence of a sensation consists in its being felt; and, when it is not felt, it ceases to exist, and has no longer any object; while the objects of perception have a permanent existence without us, whether they are perceived or not.'-Now it seems to us that the latter part of this sentence is not a fair inference from Dr. Reid's opinion; and after the convincing arguments of Berkeley on this point, we were rather surprised at meeting with such a statement.-On the subject, too, of the primary and secondary qualities of bodies, Mr. Scott is again at variance with Berkeley:

'If it be asked (he says) what I mean by the smell of a rose,' it is. evident that, in the general acceptatios of the phrase, this denotes a sensation of the mind; as appears from the epithetsfragrant, agreeable,' &c. which are applicable to it, and which alone have meaning when referred to a sentient being. Along, however, with this sensation of an agreeable odour, there is conjoined a perception, by which we form a certain notion of that quality in the rose which is the

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