E. To me it seems, that a man may know, whe ther he perceives a Thing or no; and if he perceives it, whether it be immediately or mediately, and if mediately, whether by means of fomething like or unlike, necessarily or arbitrarily connected with it.

A. It feems fo.

E. And is it not certain, that Distance is perceived only by Experience, if it be neither perceived immediately by itself nor by means of any Image, nor of any Lines and Angles, which are like it, or have a necellary Connexion with it?

A. It is.

E. Doth it not feem to follow, from what hath been said, and allowed by you; that before all Experience a Man would not imagine the Things he saw were at any Distance from him?

4. How! let me fee.

E. The Littleness or Faintnels of Appearance, or any other Idea or Sensation not neceffarily connected with or resembling Distance, can no more fuggest different Degrees of Distance, or any Distance at all, to the Mind, which hath not experienced a Connexion of the Things fignifying and fignified, than Wos can fuggeft Notions before a Man hath learned the lan guage.

4. I allow this to be true,

E. Will it not thence follow, that a Man born blind, and made to fee, would, upon first receiving his fight, take the Things he faw, not to be at any Dis tance from him, but in his Eye or rather in his Mind? A. I mult own it feems fo, and yet, on the other hand, I can hardly perfuade myself, that, if I were in

fuch

-fuch a State, I fhould think those Objects, which I now fee at fo great Distance, to be at no Distance at all.

E. It seems then, that you now think the Objects of Sight are at a great Distance from you.

A. Doubtless I do. Can any one question but yonder Castle is at a great Distance?

E. Tell me Alciphron, can you difcern the Doors, Windows, and Battlements of that fame Castle?

E. But I, who have been at it, know that it is no small round Tower, but a large fquare Building, with Battlements and Turrets, which it seeins you do not fee.

A. What will you infer from thence?

E. I would infer, that the very Object, which you strictly and properly perceive by fight, is not that Thing which is feveral Miles diftant,

E. Because a little round Object is one Thing, and a great fquare Object is another. Is it not?

A. I cannot deny it. F

E. Tell me, is not the vifible Appearance, alone the proper Object of Sight?

A. It is. What think you then (faid Euphranor pointing towards Heavens) of the vifible appearance of yonder Planet? Is it not a round luminous Flat, no bigger than a fixpence?

itself.

E. Tell me then, what you think of the Planet

4

Do you not conceive it to be a vast opa

que

que Globe, with feveral unequal Rifings and Vallies? cit

A. I do.

E. How can you therefore conclude, that the proper Object of your Sight exifts at a Distance?

A. I confefs I know not.

E. For your farther Conviction, do but confider that crimson Cloud. Think you, that if you were in the very Place where it is, you would perceive any Thing like what you now fee?

Mist.

A. By no means. I fhould perceive only a dark

E. Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the Caftle, the Planet, nor the Cloud, which you fee here, are those real ones which you fuppofe exift at a Distance?

A. What am I to think then? Do we see any thing at all, or is it altogether Fancy and Illufion?

t

E. Upon the whole, it seems the proper Objects of Sight are Light and Colour, with their several shades and Degrees, all which, being infinitely diversified and combined, do form a language wonderfully adapted to fuggeft and exhibit to us the Distances, Figures, Situations, Dimensions, and various Qualities of tangible Objects; not by Similitude, nor yet by the arbitrary Impofition of Providence, just as Words fuggest the Things fignified by them.

A. How! Do we not, strictly speaking, perceive by Sight fuch Things as Trees, Houses, Men, Rivers, and the like?

E. We do, indeed, perceive or apprehend those Things by the Faculty of Sight. But will it follow

from thence, that they are the proper and immediate Objects of Hearing, which are fignified by the Help of Words or Sounds?

A. You would have us think then, that Light, Shades, and Colours, variously combined, answer to the feveral Articulations of Sounds in Language, and that by means thereof all forts of Objects are fuggefted to the Mind through the Eye in the fame manner as they are fuggested by Words or Sounds through the Ear; that is, neither from neceflary Deduction to the Judgment, nor from Similitude to the Fancy, but purely and folely from Experience, Custom and Habit.

E. I would not have you think any thing more, than the Nature of Things obliges you to think, nor fubunit in the least to my Judgment, but only to the Force of Truth, which is an Impofition, that I suppose the freeft Thinkers will not pretend to be exempt from.

A. You have let me, it seems Step by Step, till I am got, I know not where. But I fhall try to get out again, if not by the Way I came, yet by fome other of my own finding.

Har

5 a r ris.

James Harris, Esq., ein Schwestersohn des Grafen von Shaftesbury, dessen Gelehrsamkeit, Geschmack und Scharfsinn fein Erbtheil geworden zu seyn scheint. Geb. 1709; geft. 1780.

Am berühmtesten hat ihn sein Hermes, or a Philofophical En quiry concerning Universal Grammar gemacht, ein Werk, wels ches Bischof Lowrly mit Recht das schönste und vollkommenste Muster der Analysis, seit der Zeit des Ariftoteles, nennt. Auch in feinen Philofophical Arrangements und Philological Inqui ries findet man überaus viel Belehrung, und einen durch tiefes Studium der Klassiker, vornehmlich der Griechen, gebildeten Schriftsteller. Früher, als alle diese Schriften, erschienen seine Dialogen über Kunst, Musik, Mahlerei, Poesie und Glückseligs keit, von deuen man auch eine deutsche Ueberseßung hat. nennt fie Treatises; und sie sind auch, der zufälligen dialogischen Form ungeachtet, wirkliche Abhandlungen; gleich den Dialogen des Cicero eingeleitet, und nicht dramatisirt. Die Manier der Ideenentwickelung darin ist indeß ganz sokratisch; und ich habe daher folgende Stelle aus dem Gespräch über Glückseligkeit lies ber als eigentlichen Dialog ausgezogen, um fie nicht durch das beståndige: faid I, replied I, faid he, continued he, zu unters brechen.

Er

ON HAPPINESS.

A. Every Being on this our terreftrial dwelling exists encompassed with infinite objects; exifts among aniinals tame, and animals wild; among plants and vegetables of a thoufand different qualities; among heats and colds, tempefts and calms, the friendships and discords of heterogeneous elements. - What lay you? Are all these things exactly the fame to it, or do they differ, think you, in their effects and consequences?

B. They differ widely.