us; we have no way to give our wills to God in matters of belief, but by our industry in searching it and examining the grounds upon which the propounders build their dictates. And the not doing it is oftentimes a cause that God gives a man over εις ναν ἀδοκιμον, unto a reprobate and undiscerning mind and understanding.

And this very thing, though men will not understand it, is the perpetual practice of all men in the world that can give a reasonable account of their faith. For if you tell them, Scripture and tradition are their rules to follow, they will believe you when they know a reason for it, and if they take you upon your word, they have a reason for that too, either they believe you a learned man, or a good man, or that you can have no ends upon them, or something that is of an equal height to fit their understandings. If you tell them they must believe the church, you must tell them why they are bound to it, and if you quote Scripture to prove it, you must give them leave to judge, whether the words alledged speak your sense or no, and therefore to dissent if they say no such thing. And although all men are not wise, and proceed discreetly, yet all make their choice some way or other. He that chooses to please his fancy, takes his choice as much, as he that chooses prudently. And no man speaks more unreasonably, than he that denies to men the use of their reason in the choice of their religion.

In this question, by Reason I do not mean a distinct topic, but a transcendent that runs through all topics; for reason, like logic, is instrument of all things else, and when revelation and philosophy and public experience, and all other grounds of probability or demonstration have supplied us with matter, then reason does but make use of them; that is, in plain terms, there being so

many ways of arguing, so many sects, such differing interests, such variety of authority, so many pretences, and so many false beliefs, it concerns every wise man to consider which is the best argument, which proposition relies upon the truest grounds; and if this were not his only way, why do men dispute and urge arguments, why do they cite councils and fathers, why do they alledge Scripture and tradition, and all this on all sides, and to contrary purposes? If we must judge, then we must use our reason; if we must not judge, why do they produce evidence? Let them leave disputing and decree propositions magisterially, but then we may choose whether we will believe them or no; or if they say we must believe them, they must prove it, and tell us why. And all these disputes concerning tradition, councils, fathers, are not arguments against or besides reason, but contestations and pretences to the best arguments, and the most certain satisfaction of our reason.

But then all these coming into question, submit themselves to reason, that is, to be judged by human understanding, upon the best grounds and information it can. receive. So that Scripture, tradition, councils, and fathers, are the evidence in a question, but reason is the judge, that is, we being the persons that are to be persuaded, we must see that we be persuaded reasonably, and it is unreasonable to assent to a lesser evidence, when a greater and clearer is propounded, but of that every man for himself is to take cognizance if he be able to judge, if he be not, he is not bound under the tie of necessity to know any thing of it; that that is necessary shall be certainly conveyed to him; God that best can, will certainly take care for that; for if he does not, it becomes to be not necessary; or if it should still remain necessary, and he be damned for not knowing it,

and yet to know it be not in his power, then who can help it? There can be no further care in this business. In other things, there being no absolute and prime necessity, we are left to our liberty to judge that way, that makes best demonstration of our piety and of our love to God and truth, not that way that is always the best argument of an excellent understanding, for this may be a blessing, but the other only is a duty.

[Liberty of Prophesying.

Rev. Mr. Ware's Historical Discourses.

THE Rev. Henry Ware, of Boston, has lately published two Historical Discourses, which were preached by him on a particular occasion in that place. They relate more immediately to the history and concerns of the church and society, over which he is settled. But they have more than a local importance. Together with the body of notes which accompany them, and which appear to have been collected with diligent research, they comprise much valuable information for the general historian. He has delineated at some length the characters of his two memorable predecessors, Increase Mather, and Cotton Mather; the former conspicuous for the part he acted in the early history of New England, both in a political and a theological capacity, and the latter renowned as the learned and eccentric author of the Magnalia Christi. Mr. Ware's example is worthy of imitation. If clergymen generally would adopt the same plan, we should soon have materials for an accurate and complete history of our country.

Seventh Letter to the Rev. Dr. Miller. On the Nature and Objects of Christian Charity.

SIR,

The fourth division of your Reply is occupied in explaining your views of christian charity. As this service was gratuitous on your part, and not called for by the original conditions of the subject, I should not think it necessary to bring your remarks under consideration, were it not, that you have contrived to deduce from them a sort of apology for the harsh and revolting aspect of your charges.

You introduce the subject in the following words. "My Baltimore accuser dwells much and pathetically on what he considers a gross violation of christian charity, in speaking as I have done of unitarians." And then you go on to inform your readers, that this accuser takes charity to "consist in entertaining a favourable opinion of others, however widely they may differ from us on the most essential points; in supposing that they have inquired after truth as candidly as we have done; and in taking for granted, that there is as much reason to hope they will be finally accepted of God, as that we ourselves shall be accepted." Against this sense of the term you loudly bear your testimony, and affirm, that "though current enough in common society, among a thousand other popular crudities, it is certainly not found in scripture, and ought to receive no countenance from any accurate thinker." After this formality of statement, and freedom of censure, your readers could hardly be prepared to learn, that the word charity is not once mentioned in my letter, as being necessarily understood in any definite sense. It is never used except incidentally, and in each instance I should

be willing, that your own meaning should be affixed. I had said, that the censorship you exercised, and the judgment you passed against unitarians, were "at variance with the letter and spirit of the Gospel of the Saviour, and even the common principles of charity," and I hold this to be equally true, in whatever sense you may choose to receive the word charity. And yet, upon the strength of this phrase, and this alone, you talk about my dwelling much and pathetically on what I consider a gross violation of this virtue. But it is enough to have mentioned these things, without attempting to conjecture by what accidents you were led into them. They conducted you to the subject of charity, and to this I propose at present to confine my attention.

I will commence with your definition. "The word charity, as used in scripture is equivalent to the word love. To exercise charity towards another, in the language of the Bible, is to love him. I may, therefore, exercise the most perfect charity towards one, whose principles I reprobate, and whose conduct I abhor, and ought to abhor." Before I examine the merits of this definition, as founded on the language and spirit of scripture, allow me to ask one or two questions. You make the term charity exactly synonymous with love. When you speak of loving a man, what is the specific object of your affection? Is not this comprised in such of his moral qualities, as come within your notice, and gain your approbation? Take a man's principles and his conduct away, and what is left, which you can either love or hate? His principles are interwoven with all the moral elements of his nature, and his conduct is the only test we can have of the rectitude and purity of his motives; or, in other words, the principles and the conduct constitute the whole moral man. Now what kind