place in the brain." The late Dr. Gregory, when speaking of memory, imagination, and judgment, observes, that "Although at first sight these faculties appear to be so purely mental as to have no connexion with the body, yet certain diseases which obstruct them prove, that a certain state of the brain is necessary to their proper exercise, and that the brain is the primary organ of the internal powers." The great physiologist of Germany, Blumenbach, says, "That the mind is closely connected with the brain, is demonstrated by our consciousness, and by the mental disturbances which ensue upon affections of the brain." (Elliotson's translation, 4th edit. vol. i. p. 196.) Magendie, a celebrated French physiologist, says, "The brain is the material instrument of thought. This is proved by a multitude of experiments and facts."

- Dr. Neil Arnott, in his recent work on Natural Philosophy, writes thus: "The laws of mind which man can discover by reason, are not laws of independent mind, but of mind in connexion with body, and influenced by the bodily condition. It has been believed by many, that the nature of mind separate from body, is to be at once all-knowing and intelligent. But mind connected with body, can only acquire knowledge slowly, through the bodily organs of sense, and more or less perfectly, according as these organs and the central brain are perfect. A human being born blind and deaf, and therefore remaining dumb, as in the noted case of the boy Mitchell, grows up closely to resemble an automaton; and an originally misshapen or deficient brain, causes idiocy for life. Childhood, maturity, dotage, which have such differences of bodily powers, have corresponding differences of mental faculty and as no two bodies, so no two minds, in their external manifestation, are quite alike. Fever, or a blow on the head, will change the most gifted individual into a maniac, causing the lips of virgin innocence to utter the most revolting obscenity, and those of pure religion, to speak the most horrible blasphemy: and most cases of madness and eccentricity can now be traced to a peculiar state of the brain." (Introduction, p. xxiii.) Let it be observed that these authors are nowise inclined to support Phrenology.

The fact that the mental phenomena of which we are conscious are the result of mind and brain acting together, is farther established by the effects of swooning, of compression of the bram, and of sleep. In profound sleep, consciousness is entirely suspended: this fact is explicable on the principle of the organ of the mind being then in a state of repose; but altogether inconsistent with the idea of the inmaterial principle, or the mind itself, being capable of acting independently of the brain; for if this were the case, thinking should never be interrupted by any material cause. In a swoon, blood is rapidly withdrawn from the brain, and consciousness is for the moment obliterated; again, where part of the brain has been laid bare by an injury inflicted on the skull, it has been found that consciousness could be suspended at the pleasure of the surgeon, by merely pressing on the brain with his fingers, and that it could be restored by withdrawing the pressure.

A valuable authority on this point is furnished by the Edinburgh Review. The author of the article on the nervous system in the 94th Number of that work, says, "Almost from the first casual inspection of animal bodies, the brain was regarded as an organ of primary dignity, and more particularly in the human subject-the seat of thought and feeling, the centre of all sensation, the messenger of intellect, the presiding organ of the bodily frame." "All this superiority (of man over the brutes,) all these faculties which elevate and dignify him, this reasoning power, this moral sense, these capacities of happiness, these high aspiring hopes, are felt, and enjoyed, and manifested, by means of his superior nervous system. Its injury weakens, its imperfection limits, its destruction (humanly speaking) ends them."

In addition to these authorities, I may remark, that consciousness or feeling localizes the mind in the head, and gives us a full conviction that it is situated there; but it does not reveal what substance is in the interior of the skull. It does not tell whether the mind occupies an airy dome; a richly furnished mansion; one apartment, or many; or in what state or condition it resides in its appointed place. It is only on opening the head that we discover the skull to contain brain; and then, by an act of the understand

ng, we infer that the mind must have been connected with it in its operations.

It is worthy of observation also, that the popular notions of the independence of the mind on the body are modern, and the offspring of philosophical theories that have sprung up chiefly since the days of Locke. In Shakspeare, and our older writers, the brain is frequently used as implying the mental functions; and, even in the present day, the language of the vulgar, which is less affected by philosophical theories than that of polite scholars, is more in accordance with nature. "A stupid person is vulgarly called a numb-skull, a thick-head, or said to be addle-pated; badly furnished in the upper-story; while a clever person is said to be strong-headed, to have plenty of brains; a madman is called wrong in the head, touched in the noddle, &c. When a catarrh chiefly affects the head, we complain of stupidity, because we have such a cold in the head," &c. (Elliotson's Blumenbach, 4th edit. p. 66.)

The principle which I have so much insisted on, that we are not conscious of the existence and functions of the organs by which the mind acts, explains the source of the metaphysical notion which has affected modern language, that we know the mind as an entity by itself. The acts which really result from the combined action of the mind and its organs, appear, previous to anatomical and pathological investigation, to be produced by the mind exclusively; and hence have arisen the neglect and contempt with which the organs have been treated, and the ridicule cast upon those who have endeavored to speak of them as important to the philosophy of mind. After the explanations now given, the reader will appreciate the real value of the following statement by Mr. Jeffrey, in his strictures on the second edition of this work, in the 88th number of the Edinburgh Review. His words are, “The truth is, we do not scruple to say it, that there is not the smallest reason for supposing that the mind ever operates through the agency of any material organs, except in its perception of material objects, or in its spontaneous movements of the body which

it inhabits." And, "There is not the least reason to suppose that any of our faculties, but those which connect us with external objects, or direct the movements of our bodies, act by material organs at all;" that is to say, that feeling, fancy, and reflection, are acts so purely mental, that they have no connexion with organization.

Long before Mr. Jeffrey penned these sentences, however, Dr. Thomas Brown had written, even in the Edinburgh Review, that "Memory, imagination, and judgment, may be all set to sleep by a few grains of a very common and simple drug ;" and Dr. Cullen, Blumenbach, Dr. Gregory, Magendie, and, in short, all physiological authors, had published positive statements that the mental faculties are connected with the brain.

What, then, does the proposition that the brain is the organ of the mind imply? Let us take the case of the eye as somewhat analogous. If the eye be the organ of vision, it will be conceded, first, That sight cannot be enjoyed without its instrumentality; secondly, That every act of vision must be accompanied by a corresponding state of the organ; and, vice versa, that every change of condition in the organ must influence sight; and, thirdly, That the perfection of vision will be in relation to the perfection of the organ. In like manner, if the brain be the organ of the mind, it will follow that the mind does not act in this life independently of its organ; and hence, that every emotion and judgment of which we are conscious, are the result of mind and its organ acting together. Secondly, That every mental affection must be accompanied with a corresponding state of the organ; and, vice versa, every state of the organ must be attended by a certain condition of the mind. And, thirdly, That the perfection of the manifestations of the mind will bear a relation to the perfection of its organ, just as perfection of vision bears a relation to the perfection of the eye. These propositions appear to be incontrovertible; and to follow as necessary consequences, from the simple fact that the mind acts by means of organization. But if they be well-founded, how important a study does that of the organ of the mind become'

It is the study of mind itself, in the only condition in which it is known to us. And the very fact that in past ages, mind has been studied without reference to organization, accounts for the melancholy truth, that up to the present day no philosophy of mind suited to practical purposes exists.

Holding it then as established by the evidence of the most esteemed physiologists, and also by observation, that the brain is the organ of the mind, and that the state of the brain influences its state, the next question which presents itself is, Whether the mind in every act employs the whole brain as one organ, or whether separate faculties of the mind are connected with distinct portions of the brain as their respective organs? The following considerations may enable us to solve this question :

1st, In all ascertained instances, different functions are never performed by the same organ, but, the reverse: each function has an organ for itself: thus, the stomach digests food, the liver secretes bile, the heart propels the blood, the eyes see, the ears hear, the tongue tastes, and the nose smells. Nay, on analysing these examples, it is found that wherever the function is compound, each element of it is performed by means of a distinct organ; thus, to accomplish taste there is one nerve, whose office is to move the tongue, another nerve whose duty it is to communicate the ordinary sense of feeling to the tongue, and a third nerve which conveys the sensations of taste. A similar combination of nerves takes place in the hands, arms, and other parts of the body, which are the organs of feeling; namely, one nerve gives motion, another feeling, and a third conveys to the mind a knowledge of the state of the organ; and, except in the case of the tongue, all these nerves are blended in one common sheath.

In the economy of the human frame, there is no ascertained example of one nerve performing two functions, such as feeling and communicating motion, or seeing and hearing, or tasting and smelling. In the case of the brain, therefore, analogy would lead us to expect, that if reasoning be an act different from loving or hating, there will be one organ for reasoning, another for loving, and a third for hating.