CONTENTS OF THE FIRST PART.

INTRODUCTION.

PAGE
9

PART I.—Of the Nature and Object of the Philosophy of the Human Mind

PART II. SECT. I.-Of the Utility of the Philosophy of the Human Mind 18

II. Continuation of the same subject

32

CHAPTER I.-OF THE POWERS OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION.

SECT. I. Of the Theories which have been formed by Philosophers to ex-

plain the manner in which the Mind perceives external Objects . 43

II.—Óf certain natural Prejudices, which seem to have given rise to

the common Theories of Perception

III.-Of Dr. Reid's Speculations on the Subject of Perception

IV. Of the Origin of our Knowledge

CHAPTER II.-OF ATTENTION

CHAPTER III.-OF CONCEPTION

CHAPTER IV.-OF ABSTRACTION.

97

SECT. I.-General Observations on this Faculty of the Mind

II. Of the Objects of our Thoughts, when we employ general Terms 101

III.-Remarks on the opinions of some modern Philosophers on the Sub-

ject of the foregoing Section

IV.-Continuation of the same Subject.-Inferences with respect to the

Use of Language as an Instrument of Thought, and the Errors

in Reasoning to which it occasionally gives rise

V.

VI.

Of the Purposes to which the Powers of Abstraction and General-

ization are subservient

116

125

Of the Errors to which we are liable in Speculation, and in the

Conduct of Affairs, in consequence of a rash Application of gen-

eral Principles

VII.—Continuation of the same Subject.-Differences in the Intellectual

Characters of Individuals arising from their different Habits of

Abstraction and Generalization

VIII.-Continuation of the same Subject-Use and Abuse of general

Principles in politics

136

141

147

CHAPTER V.-OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS

PART I.-OF THE INFLUENCE OF ASSOCIATION IN REGULATING THE SUCCES-

SION OF OUR THOUGHTS.

SECT. I.-General Observations on this Part of our Constitution, and on the

Language of Philosophers with respect to it

PAGE

170

171

. 177

II. Of the Principles of Association among our Ideas.

III. Of the Power which the Mind has over the Train of its Thoughts 181

IV. Illustrations of the Doctrine stated in the preceding Section

1. Of Wit

2. Of Rhyme

3. Of Poetical Fancy

4. Of Invention in the Arts and Sciences

V.-Application of the Principles stated in the foregoing Sections of

this Chapter, to explain the Phenomena of Dreaming

PART II.-OF THE INFLUENCE OF ASSOCIATION ON THE INTELLECTUAL

AND ON THE ACTIVE POWERS.

SECT I. Of the Influence of casual Associations on our speculative Con-
clusions

II. Of the Influence of the Association of Ideas on our Judgments in

Matters of Taste

184

ibid.

5 187

€ 190
193

. 198

211

227

237

III. Of the influence of Association on our active Principles and on

our moral Judgments

IV.-General Remarks on the Subjects treated in the foregoing Sections

of this Chapter

SECT. I.-General Observations on Memory

II. Of the Varieties of Memory in different Individuals

III. Of the Improvement of Memory-Analysis of the Principles on

which the Culture of Memory depends

IV.-Continuation of the same Subject.Of the Aid which the Memo-

ry derives from Philosophical Arrangement

V.-Continuation of the same Subject.-Effects produced on the Mem-

. 248

. 261

282

286

.291

. 296

ory by committing to Writing our acquired Knowledge

VI.-Continuation of the same Subject.-Of Artificial Memory

VII. Continuation of the same Subject.-Importance of making a proper

Selection among the Objects of our Knowledge, in order to de-

rive Advantage from the Acquisitions of Memory

VIII. Of the Connexion between Memory and Philosophical Genius . 305

II. Of Imagination considered in its Relation to some of the Fine Arts 316

III. Continuation of the same Subject.-Relation of Imagination and

of Taste to Genius .

IV.Of the Influence of Imagination on Human Character and Hap-

piness

V.-Continuation of the same Subject.-Inconveniencies resulting

from an ill-regulated Imagination

330

VI.-Continuation of the same Subject.-Important Uses to which the

Power of Imagination is subservient

328

CONTENTS OF THE SECOND PART.

PAGE

OF REASON, OR THE UNDERSTANDING, PROPERLY SO CALLED; AND THE VARI-

OUS FACULTIES AND OPERATIONS MORE IMMEDIATELY CONNECTED WITH IT 341

Preliminary Observations on the Vagueness and Ambiguity of the common

Philosophical Language relative to this part of our Constitution.-Reason

and Reasoning, Understanding, Intellect, Judgment, &c.

CHAPTER I.-OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF HUMAN BELIEF; OR

THE PRIMARY ELEMENTS OF HUMAN REASON

SECT. I.-Of Mathematical Axioms

II. Continuation of the same Subject

ibid.

.353

. 367

II. Of certain Laws of Belief, inseparably connected with the exer-

cise of Consciousness, Memory, Perception, and Reasoning

III. Continuation of the Subject.-Critical Remarks on some late Con-

troversies to which it has given rise. Of the Appeals which Dr.

Reid and some other Modern Writers have made, in their Philo-

sophical Discussions, to Common Sense, as a Criterion of Truth 375

CHAPTER II.-OF REASONING AND OF DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE

393

SECT. I.

ibid.

1. Doubts with respect to Locke's Distinction between the Powers

of Intuition and of Reasoning.

ibid.

2. Conclusions obtained by a Process of Deduction often mistaken

for Intuitive Judgments

. 397

II.—Of General Reasoning

. 401

1. Illustrations of some Remarks formerly stated in treating of Ab-

straction

2. Continuation of the Subject.-Of Language considered as an

Instrument of thought

3. Continuation of the Subject.-Visionary Theories of some Logi-

cians, occasioned by their inattention to the Essential Distinc-

tion between Mathematics and other Sciences

4. Continuation of the Subject.-Peculiar and supereminent Ad-

vantages possessed by Mathematicians, in consequence of

their definite Phraseology

III. Of Mathematical Demonstration

1. Of the circumstance on which Demonstrative Evidence essen-

tially depends

2. Continuation of the Subject.-How far it is true that all Mathe-

matical Evidence is resolvable into Identical Propositions

3. Continuation of the subject.-Evidence of the Mechanical Phi-

losophy, not to be confounded with that which is properly call-

ed Demonstrative or Mathematical.-Opposite Error of some

late Writers

ibid.

413

417

IV. Of our Reasonings concerning Probable or Contingent Truths

1. Narrow Field of Demonstrative Evidence.-Of Demonstrative

Evidence, when combined with that of Sense, as in Practical

Geometry and with those of Sense and of Induction, as in the

Mechanical Philosophy.-Remarks on a Fundamental Law of

Belief, involved in all our Reasonings concerning Contingent

Truths

:

2. Continuation of the Subject. Of that Permanence or Stability

in the Order of Nature, which is presupposed in our Reason-

ings concerning Contingent Truths

4.

PAGE

3. Continuation of the Subject.-General Remarks on the Differ-

ence between the Evidence of Experience, and that of Analogy 469

Continuation of the Subject.-Evidence of Testimony tacitly

recognized as a ground of Belief, in our most certain Conclu-

sions concerning Contingent Truths.-Difference between the

logical and the popular meanings of the word Probability

CHAPTER III.-OF THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC

SECT. I.—Of the Demonstrations of the Syllogistic Rules given by Aristotle

and his Commentators

477

479

ibid.

II.—General Reflections on the Aim of the Aristotelian Logic, and on

the Intellectual Habits which the study of it has a tendency to

form. That the improvement of the power of Reasoning ought

to be regarded as only a secondary Object in the culture of

the Understanding

494

III.-In what respects the study of the Aristotelian Logic may be useful

to Disputants. A general acquaintance with it justly regarded

as an essential accomplishment to those who are liberally edu-

cated. Doubts suggested by some late Writers, concerning

Aristotle's claims to the invention of the Syllogistic Theory 504.

CHAPTER IV. OF THE METHOD OF INQUIRY POINTED OUT IN THE

EXPERIMENTAL OR INDUCTIVE LOGIC

SECT. I.-Mistakes of the Ancients concerning the proper object of Philoso-

phy.-Ideas of Bacou on the same subject.-Inductive Reason-

ing-Analysis and Synthesis.-Essential difference between

Legitimate and Hypothetical Theories

II.-Continuation of the Subject.-The Induction of Aristotle com-

pared with that of Bacon

III. Of the import of the words Analysis and Synthesis in the lan-

guage of Modern Philosophy

1. Preliminary Observations on the Analysis and Synthesis of the

515

ibid.

535

543

ibid.

Greek Geometricians

2. Critical Remarks on the vague Use among Modern Writers, of

the terms Analysis and Synthesis

. 550

IV. The Consideration of the inductive Logic resumed

V.

1. Additional Remarks on the distinction between Experience and

Analogy. Of the grounds afforded by the latter for Scientific

Inference and Conjecture

2. Use and Abuse of Hypothesis in Philosophical Inquiries.-Differ-

ence between Gratuitous Hypotheses, and those which are sup-

ported by presumptions suggested by Analogy.-Indirect Evi-

dence which a Hypothesis may derive from its agreement with

the Phenomena.-Cautions against extending some of these con-

clusions to the Philosophy of the Human mind

3. Supplemental Observations on the words Induction and Analogy,

as used in Mathematics

Of certain misapplications of the words Experience and Induction

in the phraseology of Modern Science.-Illustrations from Me-

dicine and from Political Economy

VI. Of the speculation concerning Final Causes

2. Opinion of Lord Bacon on the subject. Final Causes rejected by

Des Cartes, and by the majority of French Philosophers.-Re-

cognized as legitimate Objects of research by Newton.-Tacitly

acknowledged by all as a useful Logical Guide, even in Sciences

which have no immediate relation to Theology

2. Danger of confounding Final with Physical Causes in the Philoso-

phy of the Human Mind

Conclusion of Part Second

559

ibid.

570

585

590

. 601

ibid.

. 613

621

INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

Of the Nature and Object of the Philosophy of the Human Mind.

THE prejudice which is commonly entertained against metaphysical speculations, seems to arise chiefly from two causes: First, from an apprehension that the subjects about which they are employed are placed beyond the reach of the human faculties; and, secondly, from a belief that these subjects have no relation to the business of life.

The frivolous and absurd discussions which abound in the writ ings of most metaphysical authors, afford but too many arguments in justification of these opinions; and if such discussions were to be admitted as a fair specimen of what the human mind is able to accomplish in this department of science, the contempt, into which it has fallen of late, might with justice be regarded, as no inconsiderable evidence of the progress which true philosophy has made in the present age. Among the various subjects of inquiry, however, which, in consequence of the vague use of language, are comprehended under the general title of Metaphysics, there are some, which are essentially distinguished from the rest, both by the degree of evidence which accompanies their principles, and by the relation which they bear to the useful sciences and arts: and it has unfortunately happened, that these have shared in that general discredit, into which the other branches of metaphysics have justly fallen. To this circumstance is probably to be ascribed, the little progress which has hitherto been made in the PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND; a science, so interesting in its nature, and so important in its applications, that it could scarcely have failed, in these inquisitive and enlightened times, to have excited a very general attention, if it had not accidentally been classed, in the public opinion, with the vain and unprofitable disquisitions of the schoolmen.

In order to obviate these misapprehensions with respect to the subject of the following work, I have thought it proper, in this preliminary chapter, first, to explain the nature of the truths which I propose to investigate; and, secondly, to point out some of the more important applications of which they are susceptible. In stating these preliminary observations, I may perhaps appear to some to be minute and tedious; but this fault, I am confident, will be readily pardoned by those, who have studied with care the prin