SECTION II

OF THE DIFFERENT ACCOUNTS WHICH HAVE BEEN GIVEN OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

INTRODUCTION.

THE different accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue, or of the temper of mind which constitutes the excellent and praise-worthy character, may be reduced to three different classes. According to some, the virtuous temper of mind does not consist in any one species of affections, but in the proper government and direction of all our affections, which may be either virtuous or vicious, according to the objects which they pursue, and the degree of vehemence with which they pursue them. According to these authors, therefore, virtue consists in propriety.

According to others, virtue consists in the judicious pursuit of our own private interest and happiness, or in the proper government and direction of those selfish affections which aim solely at this end. In the opinion of these authors, therefore, virtue consists in prudence.

Another set of authors make virtue consist in those affections only which aim at the happiness of others, not in those which aim at our own. According to them, therefore, disinterested benevolence is the only motive which can stamp upon any action the charac ter of virtue.

The character of virtue, it is evident, must either be ascribed indifferently to all our affections, when under

proper government and direction, or it must be confined to some one class or division of them. The great division of our affections is into the selfish and the benevolent. If the character of virtue, therefore, cannot be ascribed indifferently to all our affections, when under proper government and direction, it must be confined either to those which aim directly at our own private happiness, or to those which aim directly at that of others. If virtue, therefore, does not consist in propriety, it must consist either in prudence or in benevolence. Besides these three, it is scarce possible to imagine that any other account can be given of the nature of virtue. I shall endeavour to show hereafter how all the other accounts, which are seemingly different from any of these, coincide at bottom with some one or other of them.

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miy that acuity or winch we wire d run aisenovi, but hat i which veure he procre y or impropriety of desires and unfections.

The inferent passions and appetites the mural subjects of this ring principle, but which are so apt to rebel against her master, he reduced to TM éf ferent classes or orders. The first consisted those passions which are founded in pride and reseat ment, or in what the schoolmen call the irascible part of the soul: ambition, animosity, the love of honver and the dread of shame, the desire of victory, supe

we Plato le Rep. lib. ir.

riority, and revenge; all those passions, in short, which are supposed either to rise from, or to denote what, by a metaphor in our language, we commonly call spirit or natural fire. The second consisted of those passions which are founded in the love of pleasure, or in what the schoolmen called the concupiscible part of the soul. It comprehended all the appetites of the body, the love of ease and security, and of all sensual gratifications.

It rarely happens that we break in upon that plan of conduct which the governing principle prescribes, and which in all our cool hours we had laid down to ourselves as what was most proper for us to pursue, but when prompted by one or other of those two different sets of passions; either by ungovernable ambition and resentment, or by the importunate solicitations of present ease and pleasure. But though these two orders of passions are so apt to mislead us, they are still considered as necessary parts of human nature; the first having been given to defend us against injuries, to assert our rank and dignity in the world, to make us aim at what is noble and honourable, and to make us distinguish those who act in the same manner; the second, to provide for the support and necessities of the body.

In the strength, acuteness, and perfection of the governing principle was placed the essential virtue of prudence, which, according to Plato, consisted in a just and clear discernment, founded upon general and scientific ideas, of the ends which were proper to be pursued, and of the means which were proper for attaining them.

When the first set of passions, those of the Tescile part of the sock had that degree of strength ani ireness which enabled them under the reciva i rz son, to despise al dangers in the pursuit o' win VS bonourable and mode: it constituted in vrue if it

titude and magnanimity. This scher a passions, se cording to this system, was of a mirt generous and noble nature than the other. Thes were ROSOF upon mary occasions as the acclacus if reason check and restrain the inferior and bruni appetites. We are often ang at ourselves, it was observed we often become the objects of our own resentment and indignation, when the love of pleasure prone to do what we disapprove of: and the irascine part of our nature is in this manner called in to assis; tur raboral against the concupiscible.

When all those three different parts of our nature wert in perfect concord with one another, wher Dethat the irascible nor concupiscible passions ever aimed at any gratification which reason die ma ap prove of and when reason never commander ay thing, but what these of their own accord were wh Fac y perform: this happy composure, tus perfed a complete harmony of soul, constituted that virter which ther language, is expressed by a word which

comment translate temperance. but which might mare proper be translated good temper, or sobriety and moderation of mind.

Justice, the las: and greatest of the four cardinal virtues, took place, according to this system when each of those three faculties of the mind confined it el is proper office, without attempting to e 4. that of any other, when reason directii