CHAPTER II.

Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility bestows upon the Characters and Actions of men; and how far the Perception of this Beauty may be regarded as one of the original Principles of Approbation.

THE characters of men, as well as the contrivances of art, or the institutions of civil government, may be fitted either to promote or to disturb the happiness both of the individual and of the society. The prudent, the equitable, the active, resolute, and sober character promises prosperity and satisfaction, both to the person himself and to every one connected with him. The rash, the insolent, the slothful, effeminate, and voluptuous, on the contrary, forbodes ruin to the individual, and misfortune to all who have any thing to do with him. The first turn of mind has at least all the beauty which can belong to the most perfect machine that was ever invented for promoting the most agreeable purpose: and the second, all the deformity of the most awkward and clumsy contrivance. What institution of government could tend so much to promote the happiness of mankind as the general prevalence of wisdom and virtue? All government is but an imperfect remedy for the deficiency of these. Whatever beauty, therefore, can belong to civil government upon account of its utility, must in a far superior degree belong to these. On the contrary, what civil policy can be so ruinous and destructive as the vices of men? The fatal effects of bad government arise from nothing, but that it does

not sufficiently guard against the mischiefs which human wickedness gives occasion to.

This beauty and deformity which characters appear to derive from their usefulness or inconveniency, are apt to strike, in a peculiar manner, those who consider, in an abstract and philosophical light, the actions and conduct of mankind. When a philosopher goes to examine why humanity is approved of or cruelty condemned, he does not always form to himself, in a very clear and distinct manner, the conception of any one particular action either of cruelty or of humanity, but is commonly contented with the vague and indeterminate idea which the general names of those qualities suggest to him. But it is in particular instances only that the propriety or impropriety, the merit or demerit of actions is very obvious and dis cernible. It is only when particular examples are given that we perceive distinctly either the concord or disagreement between our own affections and those of the agent, or feel a social gratitude arise towards him in the one case, or a sympathetic resentment in the other. When we consider virtue and vice in an abstract and general manner, the qualities by which they excite these several sentiments seem in a great measure to disappear, and the sentiments themselves become less obvious and discernible. the contrary, the happy effects of the one, and te fatal consequences of the other, seem then to rise to the view, and, as it were, to stand out and dist guish themselves from all the other qualities of eithe

The same ingenious and agreeable author w first explained why utility pleases, has been so stru with this view of things, as to resolve our whole

probation of virtue into a perception of this spec

of beauty which results from the appearance of utility. No qualities of the mind, he observes, are approved of as virtuous, but such as are useful or agreeable either to the person himself or to others; and no qualities are disapproved of as vicious, but such as have a contrary tendency. And Nature, indeed, seems to have so happily adjusted our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, to the conveniency both of the individual and of the society, that after the strictest examination it will be found, I believe, that this is universaly the case. But still I affirm, that it is not the view of this utility, or hurtfulness, which is either the first or principal source of our approbation and disapprobation. These sentiments are, no doubt, enhanced and enlivened by the perception of the beauty or deformity which results from this utility or hurtfulness. But still, I say, they are originally and essentially dif ferent from this perception.

For, first of all, it seems impossible that the approbation of virtue should be a sentiment of the same kind with that by which we approve of a convenient and well-contrived building; or, that we should have no other reason for praising a man than that for which we commend a chest of drawers.

And, secondly, it will be found, upon examination, *hat the usefulness of any disposition of mind is sel om the first ground of our approbation; and that the entiment of approbation always involves in it a sense f propriety quite distinct from the perception of utity. We may observe this with regard to all the quaties which are approved of as virtuous, both those hich, according to this system, are originally valued 0's useful to ourselves, as well as those which are steemed on account of their usefulness to others.

The qualities most useful to ourselves are, first of all, superior reason and understanding, by which we are capable of discerning the remote consequences of all our actions, and of foreseeing the advantage or detriment which is likely to result from them: and, secondly, self-command, by which we are enabled to abstain from present pleasure or to endure present pain, in order to obtain a greater pleasure or to avoid a greater pain in some future time. In the union of these two qualities consists the virtue of prudence, of ad De vatues that which is most useful to the indi

With regard to the first of those qualities, it has b.ca observed on a former occasion. that superior reason and anderstanding are originally approved of

ust, and right, and accurate, and not merely as usetal or advantageous. It is in the abstruser sciences, particularly in the higher parts of mathematics, that the greatest and most admired exertions of hu Had reason have been displayed. But the utility of these sciences either to the individual or to the paddie, is not very obvious, and to prove it requires a &scussion walca is not always very easily compre headed. It was not, therefore, their utility which first recommended them to the public admiraton. This quality was but hutie insisted upon, uil it became Eessay to make some reply to the reproaches of hose, who, having themseives no taste for suca sub I me discoveries, endeavoured to depreciate them

Esciess.

That self-command, in the same manner, by which we restrain our prescut appetites, in order to grauj them more fully upon another occasion, is approved

of, as much under the aspect of propriety, as under that of utility. When we act in this manner, the sentiments which influence our conduct seem exactly to coincide with those of the spectator. The spectator does not feel the solicitations of our present appetites. To him the pleasure which we are to enjoy a week hence, or a year hence, is just as interesting as that which we are to enjoy this moment. When for the sake of the present, therefore, we sacrifice the future, our conduct appears to him absurd and extravagant in the highest degree, and he cannot enter into the principles which influence it. On the contrary, when we abstain from present pleasure, in order to secure greater pleasure to come, when we act as if the remote object interested us as much as that which immediately presses upon the senses, as our affections exactly correspond with his own, he cannot fail to approve of our behaviour: and as he knows from experience, how few are capable of this self-command, he looks upon our conduct with a considerable degree of wonder and admiration. Hence arises that eminent esteem with which all men naturally regard a steady perseverance in the practice of frugality, industry, and application, though directed to no other purpose than the acquisition of fortune. The resolute firmness of the person who acts in this manner, and in order to obtain a great though remote advantage, not only gives up all present pleasures, but enlures the greatest labour both of mind and body, necessarily commands our approbation. That view of is interest and happiness which appears to regulate is conduct, exactly tallies with the idea which we aturally form of it. There is the most perfect cor