Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

author, may almost be said to be the starting point for any good criticism whatsoever. Facts of vogue, of contemporary opinion, of what people have said, are, of course, the basis of all good historical criticism. In passing, however, it may be said that what has been called the "collective" estimate of books and authors receives, on the whole, too little attention from critics. Critics usually prefer theorizing and airing their own views to looking up the facts. It is one of Coleridge's claims to distinction as a critic that he makes the vogue of Wordsworth the starting point for his account, though he quickly becomes transcendental. Mr. Robertson's critique of Poe is largely an analysis of the collective estimate of Poe, with comments of his own. It is one of the best specimens of that type that we have. An even more matter of fact example is in Mr. Sidney Lee's Life of William Shakespeare, a chapter (20) entitled Shakespeare's Posthumous Reputation. Questions of influence, when treated as matters of fact, and other such topics come under this head. But one who looks into the matter will be amazed to see how little critical writing, comparatively, there is of this sort. Careful literary historians are usually much more concerned with their own views and those of their fellow-critics than with strictly contemporary opinion. Even modern critics, dealing with modern authors, go into the rationale, the æsthetics, the personality, or what not, to the exclusion of this important source of material.1 This is a field in which an enormous amount of literary work remains to be done.

Facts relating to the class or type of writer to which an author belongs are another well-recognized kind of material. Johnson's exposition of the metaphysical poets is an example of this interest. Many of the great classes or types have become more or less set, and we have the commonly accepted categories of epic, dramatic,

1 See, for example, Mr. A. C. Benson's Life of Pater in the English Men of Letters series. Mr. Benson devotes much time to summarizing Pater's works (a totally unnecessary thing for one who has read them and not very inspiriting for one who has not) and much time to comment on Pater's style, personality, etc. Perhaps Mr. Benson did not mean to give us more, and his attitude is surely worshipful and decorous, but one would welcome a word about Pater's actual influence. In contrast are to be named Professor Lounsbury's studies in the vogue of Shakespeare (Shakesperian Wars). A conscientious endeavour to state a method which shall account for all possible sources and hence be a "collective" criticism is to be found in E. Hennequin's La Critique Scientifique. This is summarized by Mr. Robertson in New Essays towards a Critical Method (The Theory and Practice of Criticism).

elegiac, lyric poetry, etc., and, in prose, such things as the essay and the novel. It is the aim of much modern criticism to study these types, and criticism characteristically goes beyond mere study of the form and tries to ascertain the further fact of the comparative value of each class, with a view to confining judicial comment to intra-, rather than inter-, class comparisons. Why attempt to compare a lyric and a novel? They are in different media and are not susceptible of real comparison except as representatives of alleged higher and lower classes. Facts of treatment, of method, of art, of form, occupy a very conspicuous place in the history of criticism Modern rhetorical study, for example, is merely a practical application of some of the critical results obtained in the study of this medium. Of the essays in this volume those of Poe, Mr. Harrison, and Mr. Robertson will be found to contain material of this sort.

An exceedingly prolific source of actual critical commentary lies in the interpretation of an author's meaning. The love of literary interpretation seems to be deep seated in the human heart; the hidden meaning, the underlying mystery, is always a charming thing to conjure with, and it offers possibilities of interest and further mystification that no accurate scientific study can ever hope to equal. "Whole rivulets of ink," as Swift would say, have been expended in the yet unsettled question of what Shakespeare meant Hamlet to mean; and an equally prolific study could be made of the different interpretations that have been put on Dante's Divina Commedia. Lowell's essay on Dante, for example, is mainly one of interpretation, designed to convey to the then somewhat untutored American audience a proper conception of Dante's meaning and to correct some of the mistakes of interpretation of a preceding volume by Maria Francesca Rossetti.? A good example of not too solemn interpretation is Mr. Bernard Shaw's The Perfect Wagnerite, and it is a good subject for study in that the author gives evidence of an apparently definite sort for his interpretations. In general, the literary interpreter, like the critic who neglects the collective view, does not much trouble himself with a historical aspect of the subject, but reads his own meanings into it. Browning, perhaps, more than any modern Englishman has been the prey of interpreters, scientific, philosophical, theosophical, neoplatonic, symbolistic. The truth of the matter is that interpreta2 A Shadow of Dante.

1 Prose Works, Vol. IV.

tion is much more a matter of creation than of argumentative science, and hence it is one of the most winning forms that the critical process can follow.

Akin to interpretation is much of the criticism that seeks its material in moral values and in significance. It is, of course, about this attitude that the fierce discussions of art for art's sake have arisen. To some critics a writer like Poe is insignificant and meretricious because he did not in the least care to inculcate a moral and "significant" view of the universe, but preferred to work as skilfully from any premises that he chose to assume to a perfect conclusion from those premises. The comparative admiration that the French have for Poe, the scorn which those of us who are more used to Emerson and Hawthorne feel for him, is both an illustration and a proof of the fact that such differences of opinion are temperamental and racial rather than demonstrable and rational. Arnold, of the writers in this volume, most sternly held to the moral view of literature; Poe to the artistic. Shelley, of course, is a critic who attempts to ground the morality of his position in the innate yearning of humanity for the ideal.

There are other sources of material, but the matter need be no further illustrated. Besides the material and the point of view from which it is approached, there are naturally a great many questions connected with the personality, the predilection, and the training of the critic. These all modify the result, so that, as a matter of fact, of the categories of material named above, not one can be found, actually, to exist in a pure state. A critic presumably writes what he feels, what he deems it good for people to know, and does not think of the categories. The combination of the elements just spoken of the material, the personality, the point of view, the animus, the training, etc., of the critic result, for purposes of convenience, in several classes or types of criticism. They should be called tendencies rather than types, since the line of separation between any two classes cannot be surely drawn. Though the classifications are not very satisfactory, some of the main types may be briefly indicated.

The primary, the most elementary, and by all means the safest, is impressionism. It is elementary because it is concerned merely with what the critic happens to think at the moment, and because the critic's reaction, though often expressed with much charm, is never other than a variably personal one. It is safe, for a critic may always take refuge in the phrase which there is no gainsaying,

"So it seems to me," and may, if he be impolite and a Capulet, bite his thumb at other critics. It is not wholly a matter of regret that from the writings of an impressionistic critic it usually is impossible to make out a consistent theory of the universe or of criticism. A case in point is the brilliant contemporary English critic, Mr. Chesterton, who seems occasionally to contradict his premises in his conclusions or in succeeding premises. To differ, eternally to differ, from previous opinion, to have intuitions and to express them with a vigorous air of finality, is the one principle that lends coherence and form to his stimulating and often admirable suggestions. Probably M. Jules Lemaitre, the distinguished French critic, is the classic exponent of this type of criticism. In this volume Lamb is perhaps the best example.

The type has many opposites. The one nearest to it is probably the so-called "interpretative" or "appreciative" frame of mind. As these names imply, criticism of this sort strives to throw light on the real meaning or character of the author or to weigh and measure him at his just value. Like any criticism, it may deal with different kinds of material personality, work, style, etc. -but its essence is an attempt justly to appreciate the subject, to weigh it at its proper worth. It is the opposite of the impressionistic type in that it aims to take into consideration the author and his work from his point of view and not merely from that of the personal reaction of the critic. Pater is perhaps the most systematic exponent of the appreciative tendency in English literature, but such critics as Bagehot, Arnold, and Coleridge often deal with appreciative categories.

An opposite of both of these is the so-called judicial type, now happily, in its extreme forms, tending to pass out of existence. Characteristically it consists in setting up or strongly implying a standard- philosophical, political, religious, commercial, sociological, or what not- and rating literature by it. Alleged "canons of criticism" derived from the practice of "Tully, Lord Kames, and other elegant writers,” are examples of a fashion that has been persistent since the days of Aristotle. All criticism, in some way, implies a standard, but in criticism of the judicial type, the standard is found, not in the critic's likes and dislikes, as with im pressionism, nor in the author's own purpose, as in appreciation, but in something external to both. The best example of judicial criticism that we have, alike of its manner and of its final impotence, is to be found in the work of Francis Jeffrey, whose stand

ards, derived from the canons of the eighteenth century and the Whiggism of the time, proved inadequate to cope with the outburst of imaginative literature at the opening of the nineteenth century.1 It is critics of this type whom Mr. Howells has in mind, and their name is legion. Every critic in this volume is to some degree an example of it. Most conspicuous is Arnold, whose standard is a literary-moral one. The æsthetic critic who, like Hazlitt or Mr. Harrison, showers adjectives of characterization upon us, may belong to this class. Or he may be an impressionist or an appre ciator.

There is also a type known as the scientific, the opposite of all those that have preceded, but most strikingly opposed to impressionism. This operates by collecting, comparing, and weighing of all possible data, with a view to arriving at a stricter and less personal and prejudiced view of the subject than the other methods furnish. The tests are argumentative, but there can never be hope of reaching so accurate results as are obtained in more strictly scientific work. Good inductive criticism of literature is scarce. The data are too complicated, the personal equation too much in the way, to make possible any fixed result. Mr. Robertson's valuable work is a good instance of this type, and the essay on Poe is, in his own opinion, the best example of his method. To a certain degree, of course, writers like Bagehot are "scientific" in that they expound facts which in a large measure are not open to question.

A distinction frequently drawn is that between destructive and constructive criticism. Destructive criticism is, as its name implies, that which aims to overthrow what has been regarded as established and accepted, a theory, a set of ideas, a fair reputation, without any palpable substitution. Macaulay's essay on Montgomery does this and does it very effectively, much more so than the destructive criticism of Jeffrey, whose work, as a matter of historical fact, in the long run failed of its purpose. What gives destructive criticism its effect is an interesting problem for study; it will probably be found to reside, like most of the sanctions for critical opinion, in the consensus of opinion of which more later Destructive criticism will be found usually on the side of conservatism, and, like satire, it gains its force from being substantially in accord with some sort of prevailing sentiment. Much

on.

[ocr errors]

1 1 See L. E. Gates, Selections from the Essays of Francis Jeffrey, Introduction.

« AnteriorContinuar »