1 Number of Gin Houfes, left, contrary to the old Obfervation, you fhould have more Chapels for the Devil, than Houfes of Prayer in the King dom. A B My Regard therefore for our Religion, as well as for the Morals of the People, makes me oppofe this Eill; and my Regard for the Sinking Fund confirms me in that Oppofition. The Sinking Fund, my Lords, was, from the Beginning, a Fund devoted to the Payment of our publick Debts: It may be diminished for the Eafe of the People, for freeing them from fuch a ruinous Plague as that of an exceflive and wicked Ufe of Spirituous Liquors, or for difburthening them of fome of thofe Taxes which now fe fo heavy upon their Trade, and, if not abolished, will, I am afraid, foon C put an End to it; but that Fund ought never to be encroach'd on or diminished, for the Sake of providing for the current Service, unless in Cafes of the moft urgent Neceffity. The Duties upon Spirituous Liquors are at prefent appropriated to the D Sinking Fund, and it is justly intitled to them, for it paid very dear for them: It pays now no less than 70,cool. a Year to the Civil Lift as a Confideration for thofe Duties; and confequently, if the People are not eafed of the Plague, the Sinking E Fund has a Right to all that can be raifed by it, while it is allowed to continue. But, fay the Advocates for this Bill, the Duties are to be doubled, and the new Duties only are to be applied to the current Service; fo that the Sinking Fund can be no Lofer. This is the fame as if a Projector fhould fay to me, My Lord, you make now but 20,000l. a Year of your Eftate, but I will fhew you how to make 40, provided you firft make over to me one Half of the whole Produce. What would the G World have Reafon to fay of me, if I should give Ear to fuch a Project? Surely, fuch a Projector could have no Reason to blame me, if I rejecteď, [This JOURNAL to be continued in our next.] EXTRACTS from A Journal of the Expedition to Carthagena, particularly the Notes, in Aufwer to the Account of the faid Expedition, of which we gave fume Extracts in our Magazine for April lal, p. 187, &c. PON its being first debated, whether an Attempt thould be F made on Carthagena, the General declared, that, as he was a Stranger in thofe Seas, he had no Knowledge of the then prefent State of that City; and that he fhould join with the Admiral in his Opinion: not doubting of his being well informed of every Circumstance relating to the Entry into the Harbour, the Strength of the Garifon, &c. Had the Author of the Account been B been prefent on Shore, where proba- D Mr. Moor was of Opinion, that if an Opening fhould be made thro' the Wood from the Camp to the Lagoon, where the Enemy's Ships of War lay at Anchor, it might be a Means of directing their Fire: That the Admiral folicited the General to continue his Coupure, is, I believe, true; but E that it would have answered the Purpofes mentioned in the Pamphlet, is, not fo evident. As the Enemy was in Poffeffion of the Lagoon, they would not furely fend Succours cross the Boca Grande, (where Ships were pofted to obferve their Motions) thence F with Hazard to pafs, the Tierra Bomba; which Succours could be convey'd by the Way of the Harbour, without Danger or Interruption; nor could that Coupure be of the leat Ufe to enable us to obferve what paffed in the Harbour, of which we G daily received Accounts from the abovementioned Ships, or from our fmall Parties; nor, if there was Dan ger to be apprehended from the Enemy's Incursions, (which there was not) could this Coupure have prevented them, as it was not much lefs than 1000 Paces from the Castle of Boca-Chica. The Communication between the Mortar-Battery and the Camp, was covered from the Shot of the Caftle by a rifing Ground, nor was one Man killed during the whole Time in paffing between that and the Camp, nor did one fingle Shot take Place in it from the Fafcine Battery, from which it was in great Meature fecu. red by its natural Situation, which was helped by a Parapet. Several of the Bombs moft certainly broke in the Air, without any Effect; which ́ was poffibly occafioned by the splitting of the Fuzées, in driving them. into the Shells. Nor (notwithstanding what the Author is pleafed to ad vance) did we fuffer much from those thrown by the Enemy; one of which fell near the Mortar-Battery, and killed 6 or 7 Men; a few took Place in the Artillery Park, (whither they were chiefly directed) damaged fome Cafks of working Tools, and two or three Carriages; but the greateft Part of them were either extinguished by falling into the Water, or buried themselves fo deep in the Sand, as to break without any ill Effect whatso ever. Fafcines and Pickets had not only been cut during the Fleet's watering at Hifpaniola, but after our landing on Tierra Bomba, all poffible Diligence was daily ufed, to compleat the Number required for erecting the Batteries. Nothing can be more abfurd than to imagine that fo fkilful an Engineer, as was Mr. Moor, could be fo widely mistaken as to the Quantity. As foon as the Ground was cleared, and proper Works thrown up to cover the Workmen, he began, with fuch Materials as were ready, and had from the Fleet no other Affiftance than 18 Carpenters for lay ing the Platforms; the Seamen were. of little Service. B How far the Author may be qualified to judge of the Knowledge of the Sub-Engineers, Time may difcover; was Mr. Moor ftill living, he could well anfwer for the Conftruction of his Battery. He raised it not exactly parallel to the Face where the Breach was made, for a very powerful Reafon; to prevent its being C flank'd from the Barradera Battery, and by that Means preferved the Lives of a great many Men, who muft otherwife have been loft. It is not improbable, that the Author believed the Line of Communication, between the great Gun Battery and the Camp, to have been exposed to the Enemy's Shot, and therefore never came near it; or he must have known, that it was neither enfiladed from the Caftle, nor the Shipping, and that the few Men who were killed there, fell by Shot which glan. ced from the Trees, and did not exceed 7 or 8 during the whole Time the Troops lay before the Castle. Men to the Forces then on Shore was wanting, to enable him to push on his Works with Vigour, a Demand was made of that Number of Soldiers to be landed from the Fleet, which the Admiral was pleased to refufe, alledging, that we could have no Occafion for them. March 18. During the Night, the Fafcine Battery was attack'd by 300 Sailors, and 200 Soldiers, who poffefs'd themselves of it, with very little Oppofition. is This bold and furprizing Enterprize (as the Author of the Pamphlet pleased to ftile it) feems to be celebrated with all the Rhetorick he is Master of: It is obfervable, that he makes no mention of the 200 Soldiers, who were detach'd on the fame Occafion, which poffibly he may have forgot; as likewife, that, tho' by the Admiral's Difpofition, the Soldiers were posted in the Rear; when landed, they were called for to advance, and a Lane made for their paffing towards the Front, which Dprobably might be occafion'd by their being armed more properly than the Sailors, for returning the Fire of the Enemy's fmall Arms. I cannot, without doing Injustice to Capt. Washington, the Hon. Mr. Murray, and to the reft of the Land Officers, who were detach'd on this Occafion, join with the Author in paffing over their gallant Behaviour in Silence; nor would I be wanting in the Praifes due to Capt. Boscawen, Capt. Watfon, Capt. Coates, &c. who commanded the Sailors, who, as they have ever done, performed their Duty with great Bravery and Refolution, and particularly Lieut. now Capt. Forrest, who, with the foremost, entered the Battery Sword in Hand; the Enemy having fled with Precipitation into the Woods, and the Soldiers being potted upon the Avenues, the Seamen fet about fpiking the Guns, deftroying the Carriages, and tearing up the Platforms; but one of E March the 14th, the Works were carried on with all the Expedition our Circumflances would admit of; but were much retarded, not only F from the Heat of the Climate, which renders Europeans almost unable to fupport the leaft Fatigue, but from the Negroes throwing down their Loads, and working Tools, whenever a Shot came near them. These Difficulties having been reprelented G to a Council of War by the principal Engineer, fignifying at the fame Time, that an Addition of 1600 them them having imprudently put Fire to the Guard Houle, they were difco vered by the Enemy, and confequently expofed to the Fire from the Cafle, &c. the Commandant therefore thought it advifeable to retire, before the Battery could be effectu- A ally demolished. That the Army had work'd to fome Purpofe (tho' the Author infinuates the contrary) plainly appears from their having made two Coupures thro' the Woods, cut the Fafcines and Pickets, raifed the Battery, B and convey'd thither the Stores and Ammunition; in which laft they had fome Affiftance from the Sailors, and not a great deal from the Negroes. Had the Army the leaft Room for Refentment before the fixty Gun Ship was fent in to interrupt the Enemy's repairing the Fafcine Battery, any Thing the perform'd, could by no Means cool it; for the fired at fo great a Distance, as to give the Enemy very little Disturbance. C that the Enemy might not fee the Army; if fuch a Sight would have given the Enemy any Satisfaction, I much doubt; or whether it would have answer'd to have obliged them at the Expence of cutting down 600 or 700 Paces of thick Wood, which intercepted their View of the Camp; but that the Army did not decline, either then, or on any other Occafion, to look the Enemy in the Face, there have been too evident Proofs. No Man, who faw the Pofition of the Battery, could have the leaft Room to doubt of its bearing upon the Caftle, as foon as a narrow Screen of Wood, which cover'd it, fhould be cut away. What is alledged, that no Guns could be brought to bear upon the Enemy's Shipping, is abfolutely falfe; there were no less than feven, of which two, were thought fufficient for that Purpose, which fir'd red-hot Balls, and did good Execution. It is moft certain, that if no Epaulment had been thrown up, the Battery might have been rak'd, which was eafily forefeen, and timely prevented. The Sailors behaved well and would have done better, had they been more under Direction; but they did no more than their Duty, either in affifting to erect the Battery, in which they had but a very fmall Share, or in firing of it, as they were exprefsly order'd fo to do by his Majefty. Without all Doubt it was Mr. Moor's Intention to batter the western Face of the Bastion, and to beat down its Defences, which was evident, not only from the Construction, but from the Effect of the Battery. I must own I cannot but admire at the Author's Conclufion, that the Succefs was owing to Chance, becaufe, if the Enemy had cleared more Ground round the Caftle, the Undertaking would have been more difGficult. I readily join with him, that it would have been fo; tho' in the Beginning of this Note, the Engineers are condemn'd for making the The Author mentions 500 Sailors to have been employ'd in erecting the D Battery, tho' in Fact the Navy contributed to it, only 18 Carpenters: He adds, that, as more Time and Men were employ'd in it than were neceffary, much Execution may be expected therefrom: What more could be expected from it, than forcing the Ene- E my to abandon the Caftle? But the Engineers could not out-do themfelves; they erected the Battery in a Wood. They might not out do themselves, but they certainly did perfectly well; for by erecting their Battery under the Cover of the Wood, many Mens F Lives were faved, and the Work was carried on without the Enemy's being able to interrupt their Progrefs. He is likewife pleafed to condemn them for not clearing more Ground than was neceffary; a Circumftance, which, I fhould think, rather deferves his Approbation, as they avoided, improperly, to fatigue the Workmen; but this Caution, it feems, was used, best beft Advantage of the Wood, which the Enemy had fo imprudently left ftanding. The Engineers could by A no Means out do themfelves; the Battery was conftructed in a Wood.' March the 24th, a Detachment from the Fleet, compofed of Sailors and Soldiers, commanded by Capt. Watfon, made a fecond Attempt on the Fafcine Battery, and enter'd it without the leaf Oppofition; defroy'd the Carriages, Platforms, &c. Early in the Morning the General vifited all the advanced Guards and B Batteries, and towards the Evening reconnoitred the Breach, which he not thinking to be yet practicable, fignify'd the fame by Letter to the Admiral, who had vehemently preffed the Attack. The great Gun Battery fired during the whole Night al- C ternatively with round and Grape Shot. March the 25th, the Breach being enlarged, and reported practicable by an Engineer, who had been fent to reconnoitre. It was refolved, in a Council of War, to make the Attack D the fame Evening. A Difpofition having been prepared for that Purpofe, and approved by the Council of War; at about half. an Hour after Five the Troops advanced towards the Fort. The ForJorn Hope confifted of a Serjeant, E and twelve Grenadiers, who were immediately followed by thirty Voluntiers; next march'd 250 Grena diers (the whole then remaining) under the Cominand of Lieutenant-Colonel Macloud, and afterwards Colonel Daniel at the Head of a Detachment of 500 Men, who had under his Direction fome fmail Parties, carrying Scaling Ladders, broad Axes, Pick Axes and Spades, to be in Rea. dinefs in Cafe of Need: The Whole was fultain'd by 500 Men, under the Command of Lieut. Col. Cochrane; G and Brigadier Blakeney, the Brigadier of the Day, had the Direction of the Hack. Upon a Siguat, which was, F the Firing of three Bombs from the Mortar Battery, a Volley of round Shot was pour'd in upon the Breach from the great Gun Battery, and was Immediately followed by a fecond of Grape Shot, which obliging the Centinels upon the Walls to put themfelves under Cover, probably occafioned their not having perceived the Troops, when they firit began to move to the Attack; but fome Time before they reach'd the Foot of the Walls, the Drums in the Fort beat to Arins, the Top of the Breach was man'd, the Ships began to fire with Grape Shot, and feveral Shots were made from Fort St. Jofeph, tho' without doing any other Execution, than the killing of one Man. The Commandant of the Fort being at that Time on board one of the Ships, the Garifon fell into Confufion, and fled with Precipitation out of the Gate, as foon as the Grenadiers began to mount the Breach The Author's being mistaken as to fome Circumftance relating to the Attack, is eafily to be excufed; for if he faw it at all, it must probably have been at a great Distance thro a Spying Glafs; but, as he is pleated, in the latter Part of his Note, to reaffume his favourite Topick, the throwing out fcurrilous Reflections upon the Land Forces, I cannot pafs them over unobferved This Succefs was undoubtedly, neither difagreeable to the Army, nor to the Nwy; the former having undergone Hardfhips, fuch as no modern Soldiers, or Sailors, had been accustomed to, nor perhaps many in former Times; nor did the Army propofe any Advantage in being poflefied of an Ifland (as the Author infinuates) but imbarked on board their Transports with all poffi ble Expedition, in order to proceed to the Attack of the City. That fo formidable a Flect was employ'd to little other Purpose, but to attend upon the Army, and to convoy their Tranfports, was with Regret |