Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary ExplanationOxford University Press, 2007 M06 27 - 272 páginas Cooperation among humans is one of the keys to our great evolutionary success. Natalie and Joseph Henrich examine this phenomena with a unique fusion of theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation, ethnographic descriptions of social behavior, and a range of other experimental results. Their experimental and ethnographic data come from a small, insular group of middle-class Iraqi Christians called Chaldeans, living in metro Detroit, whom the Henrichs use as an example to show how kinship relations, ethnicity, and culturally transmitted traditions provide the key to explaining the evolution of cooperation over multiple generations. |
Contenido
Evolutionary Theory and the Social Psychology of Human | |
History and the Community Today | |
Kinship Explains Most Cooperative Behavior | |
Cooperation through Reciprocity and Reputation | |
Social Norms and Prosociality | |
Culturally Evolved Social Norms Lead to ContextSpecific | |
InGroup Preferences and Cooperation | |
Cooperative Dilemmas in the World Today | |
The Underlying Structure of Cooperation | |
Constructing the Ethnicity and Cooperation Indices | |
Index | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Vista previa limitada - 2007 |
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Natalie Henrich,Joseph Patrick Henrich Vista previa limitada - 2007 |
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Natalie Henrich,Joseph Henrich Vista de fragmentos - 2007 |
Términos y frases comunes
altruism American Arabs beliefs benefits biases Chaldean community Chaldean language chapter close kin coethnics conformist transmission context cooperative dilemmas costly costs cues cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural learning cultural transmission defect Detroit Dictator Game domains donations Dual Inheritance Theory economic effect environment ethnic group ethnic identity ethnic psychology ethnographic Evolution of Cooperation evolved example experimental experiments explained favor Fehr freeriding friends genes give gossip grocers Henrich imitation immigrants important indirect reciprocity individuals influence interaction interview involving Iraq Journal kin psychology kinship Machiguenga markers metro Detroit models Natalie natural selection nonChaldean offer one’s oneshot parents partners patterns person players population predictions preferences preferentially prosocial Public Goods Games punish norm violators reciprocitybased recycling relatedness relationship relatives reputational information responder round selfinterested share situations smallscale social groups social norms success Telkaif theoretical thirdparty punishment Ultimatum Game vaccination variables