"barbarous and faithlefs wife? From the

height of his greatness ought God to be"hold thofe melancholy events as a fan"taftical amusement, without taking any "fhare in them? Because he is great, "fhould he be weak, or unjuft, or barba"rous? Because men are little, ought they << to be allowed either to be diffolute wich

out punishment, or virtuous without re"ward? O God! if this is the character "of your Supreme Being; if it is you "whom we adore under fuch dreadful "ideas; I can no longer acknowledge you "for my father, for my protector, for the "comforter of my forrow, the support "of my weaknefs, the rewarder of my "fidelity. You would then be no more "than an indolent and fantastical tyrant, "who facrifices mankind to his infolent

vanity, and who has brought them out "of nothing, only to make them ferve "for the fport of his leifure and of his caprice."

When the general rules which determine the merit and demerit of actions, come thus

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to be regarded as the laws of an Allpowerful Being, who watches over our conduct, and who, in a life to come, will reward the obfervance, and punish the breach of them; they neceflarily acquire a new facredness from this confideration. That our regard to the will of the Deity ought to be the fupreme rule of our conduct, can be doubted of by nobody who believes his existence. The very thought of difobedience appears to involve in it the most fhocking impropriety. How vain, how abfurd would it be for man, either to oppofe or to neglect the commands that were laid upon him by Infinite Wisdom, and Infinite Power! How unnatural, how impiously ungrateful not to reverence the precepts that were prescribed to him by the infinite goodness of his Creator, even though no punishment was to follow their violation! The fenfe of propriety too is here well fupported by the strongest motives of felf-intereft. The idea that, however we may escape the obfervation of man, or be placed above the reach of human punishment, yet we are always acting under the

eye,

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eye, and exposed to the punishment of God, the great avenger of injuftice, is a motive capable of reftraining the most headstrong paffions, with those at leaft who, by conftant reflection, have rendered it familiar to them.

It is in this manner that religion enforces the natural fenfe of duty: and hence it is, that mankind are generally difpofed to place great confidence in the probity of those who seem deeply impreffed with religious fentiments. Such perfons, they imagine, act under an additional tie, befides thofe which regulate the conduct of other men. The regard to the propriety of action, as well as to reputation, the regard to the applause of his own breast, as well as to that of others, are motives which they fuppofe have the fame influence over the religious man, as over the man of the world. But the former lies under another reftraint, and never acts deliberately but as in the presence of that Great Superior who is finally to recompenfe him according to his deeds. A greater truft is reposed, upon

this account, in the regularity and exactness of his conduct. And wherever the natural principles of religion are not corrupted by the factious and party zeal of fome worthlefs cabal; wherever the firft duty which it requires, is to fulfil all the obligations of morality; wherever men are not taught to regard frivolous obfervances, as more immediate duties of religion, than acts of justice and beneficence; and to imagine, that by facrifices, and ceremonies, and vain fupplications, they can bargain with the Deity for fraud, and perfidy, and violence, the world undoubtedly judges right in this refpect, and juftly places a double confidence in the rectitude of the religious man's behaviour.

CHAP. VI.

In what cafes the Senfe of Duty ought to be the fole principle of our conduct; and in what cafes it ought to concur with other motives.

R

ELIGION affords fuch ftrong motives to

the practice of virtue, and guards us by fuch powerful restraints from the temptations of vice, that many have been led to fuppofe, that religious principles were the fole laudable motives of action. We ought neither, they said, to reward from gratitude, nor punish from refentment; we ought neither to protect the helpleffness of our children, nor afford fupport to the infirmities of our parents, from natural affection. All affections for particular objects, ought to be extinguished in our breaft, and one great affection take the place of all others, the love of the Deity, the defire of rendering ourselves agreeable to him, and of directing