conduct. If in this view it pleases us, we are tolerably fatisfied. We can be more indifferent about the applause, and, in fome measure, despise the censure of the world; fecure that, however misunderstood or mifrepresented, we are the natural and proper objects of approbation. On the contrary, if we are doubtful about it, we are often, upon that very account, more anxious to gain their approbation, and, provided we have not already, as they fay, fhaken hands with infamy, we are altogether distracted at the thoughts of their cenfure, which then ftrikes us with double severity.

When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass fentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cafes, I divide myself, as it were, into two perfons; and that I, the examiner and judge, reprefent a different character from that other I, the perfon whofe conduct is examined into and judged of. The first is the fpectator, whofe fentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter

into, by placing myself in his fituation, and by confidering how it would appear to me, when feen from that particular point of view. The second is the agent, the perfon whom I properly call myself, and of whofe conduct, under the character of a fpectator, I was endeavouring to form fome opinion. The firft is the judge; the fecond the perfon judged of. But that the judge fhould, in every respect, be the fame with the person judged of, is as impoffible, as that the cause should, in every respect, be the fame with the effect.

To be amiable and to be meritorious ; that is, to deserve love and to deserve reward, are the great characters of virtue; and to be odious and punishable, of vice. But all these characters have an immediate reference to the fentiments of others. Virtue is not faid to be amiable, or to be meritorious, because it is the object of its own love, or of its own gratitude; but becaufe it excites those fentiments in other men. The consciousness that it is the object of fuch favourable regards, is the fource of that

inward tranquillity and self-fatisfaction with which it is naturally attended, as the fufpicion of the contrary gives occafion to the torments of vice. What fo great happiness as to be beloved, and to know that we deferve to be beloved? What fo great mifery as to be hated, and to know that we deferve to be hated?

CHA P. II. C.

Of the love of Praife, and of that of Praiseworthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness.

M

AN naturally defires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of love. He naturally dreads, not only to be hated, but to be hateful; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of hatred. He defires not only praise, but praife-worthiness; or to be that thing which, though it fhould be praised by no

body,

body, is, however, the natural and proper object of praise. He dreads, not only blame, but blame-worthinefs; or to be that thing which, though it fhould be blamed by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of blame.

The love of praife-worthiness is by no means derived altogether from the love of praise. Those two principles, though they resemble one another, though they are connected, and often blended with one another, are yet, in many refpects, diftinct and independent of one another.

The love and admiration which we na-. turally conceive for those whose character and conduct we approve of, neceffarily difpofe us to defire to become ourselves the objects of the like agreeable sentiments, and to be as amiable and as admirable as those whom we love and admire the moft. Emulation, the anxious defire that we ourselves fhould excel, is originally founded in our admiration of the excellence of others. Neither can we be fatisfied with being merely admired

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admired for what other people are admired. We muft at leaft believe ourselves to be admirable for what they are admirable. But, in order to attain this fatiffaction, we must become the impartial spectators of our own character and conduct. We must endeavour to view them with the of other people, or as other people are likely to view them. When seen in this light, if they appear to us as we wish, we are happy and contented. But it greatly confirms this happiness and contentment when we find that other people, viewing them with those very eyes with which we, in imagination only, were endeavouring to view them, fee them precifely in the fame light in which we ourselves had feen them. Their approbation neceffarily confirms our own felf-approbation. Their praise neceffarily ftrengthens our own fenfe of our own praife-worthinefs. In this cafe, fo far is the love of praife-worthinefs from being derived altogether from that of praise; that the love of praise feems, at leaft in a great measure, to be derived from that of praife-worthinefs.

The