felves, as it were, from our own natural ftation, and endeavour to view them as at a certain diftance from us. But we can do this in no other way than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to view them. Whatever judgment we can form concerning them, accordingly, muft always bear fome fecret reference, either to what are, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to what, we imagine, ought to be the judgment of others. We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine. any other fair and impartial fpectator would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves in his fituation, we thoroughly enter into all the paffions and motives which influenced it, we approve of it, by fympathy with the approbation of this fuppofed equitable judge. If otherwife, we enter into his disapprobation, and condemn it.

Were it poffible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in fome folitary place, without any communication, with his own fpecies, he could no more think of

his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own fentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot easily fee, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him into fociety, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of thofe he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they difapprove of his fentiments; and it is here that he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own paffions, the beauty and deformity of his own mind. To a man who from his birth was a ftranger to fociety, the objects of his paffions, the external bodies which either pleased or hurt him, would occupy his whole attention. The paffions themselves, the defires or averfions, the joys or forrows, which thofe objects excited, though of all things the most immediately prefent to him, could fcarce

scarce ever be the objects of his thoughts. The idea of them could never intereft him fo much as to call upon his attentive confideration. The confideration of his joy. could in him excite no new joy, nor that of his forrow any new forrow, though the confideration of the causes of those paffions might often excite both. Bring him into society, and all his own paffions will immediately become the causes of new paffions. He will obferve that mankind approve of fome of them, and are difgufted by others. He will be elevated in the one cafe, and caft down in the other; his defires and averfions, his joys and forrows, will now often become the causes of new defires and new averfions, new joys and new forrows: they will now, therefore, intereft him deeply, and often call upon his most attentive confideration.

Our first ideas of perfonal beauty and deformity, are drawn from the shape and appearance of others, not from our own. We foon become fenfible, however, that others

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others exercise the fame criticism upon us. We are pleased when they approve of our figure, and are disobliged when they seem to be difgufted. We become anxious to know how far our appearance deserves either their blame or approbation. We examine our perfons limb by limb, and by placing ourselves before a looking-glass, or by fomne fuch expedient, endeavour, as much as poffible, to view ourselves at the distance and with the eyes of other people. If, after this examination, we are fatisfied with our own appearance, we can more eafily fupport the most disadvantageous judgments of others. If, on the contrary, we are fenfible that we are the natural objects of diftafte, every appearance of their difapprobation mortifies us beyond all meafure. A man who is tolerably handsome, will allow you to laugh at any little irregularity in his perfon; but all fuch jokes are commonly unfupportable to one who is really deformed. It is evident, however, that we are anxious about our own beauty and deformity, only upon account of its

effect

effect upon others. If we had no connexion with fociety, we fhould be altogether indifferent about either.

In the fame manner our firft moral criticifms are exercised upon the characters and conduct of other people; and we are all very forward to obferve how each of these affects us. But we foon learn, that other people are equally frank with regard to our own. We become anxious to know how far we deserve their cenfure or applause, and whether to them we muft neceffarily appear those agreeable or difagreeable creatures which they reprefent us. We begin, upon this account, to examine our own paffions and conduct, and to confider how these must appear to them, by confidering how they would appear to us if in their fituation. We suppose ourselves the fpectators of our own behaviour, and endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in; this light, produce upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in + fome measure, with the eyes of other people, fcrutinize the propriety of our own! conduct.

+. Is not the word of God in this case the Christian's budge in this a as well as the rough his neighbour? but these two principles when. justly applied ever disagree?