¿en occasion to fome of the finest and intere.ting fcenes both of the ancient

and of the modern drama.

cious fenfe of guilt, if I

It is this falla

may call it fo, which constitutes the whole distress of Oedipus and Jocafta upon the Greek, of Monimia and Ifabella upon the English, theatre. They are all of them in the highest degree piacular, though not one of them is in the smallest degree guilty.

Notwithstanding, however, all these feeming irregularities of fentiment, if man should unfortunately either give occafion to thofe evils which he did not intend, or fail in producing that good which he intended, Nature has not left his innocence altogether without confolation, nor his virtue altogether without reward. He then calls to his affiftance that juft and equitable maxim, That thofe events which did not depend upon our conduct, ought not to diminish the esteem that is due to us. He fummons up his whole magnanimity and firmness of foul, and strives to regard himself, not in the light in which he at prefent appears,

but

.

but in that in which he ought to appear, in which he would have appeared had his generous defigns been crowned with fuccefs, and in which he would ftill appear, notwithstanding their miscarriage, if the fentiments of mankind were either altogether candid and equitable, or even perfectly confiftent with themselves. The more candid and humane part of mankind entirely go along with the efforts which he thus makes to fupport himself in his own opinion. They exert their whole generofity and greatness of mind, to correct in themselves. this irregularity of human nature, and endeavour to regard his unfortunate magnanimity in the fame light in which, had it been fuccefsful, they would, without any such generous exertion, have naturally been difpofed to confider it.

VOL. I.

THE

THEORY

O F

MORAL SENTIMENTS.

PART III.

Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty.

CHAP. I.

Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-difapprobation.

IN

N the two foregoing parts of this difcourse, I have chiefly confidered the origin and foundation of our judgments concerning the fentiments and conduct of others.

T 2

Part III. others. I come now to confider more particularly the origin of those concerning our

own.

The principle by which we naturally either approve or difapprove of our own conduct feems to be altogether the fame with that by which we exercife the like judgments concerning the conduct of other people. We either approve or disapprove of the conduct of another man according as we feel that, when we bring his cafe home to ourselves, we either can or cannot entirely fympathize with the fentiments and. motives which directed it. And, in the fame manner, we either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we feel that, when we place ourselves in the fituation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes and from his ftation, we either can or cannot entirely enter into and sympathize with the fentiments and motives which influenced it. We can never furvey our own fentiments and motives, we can we can never form any judgment concerning them; unless we remove ourfelves,