fon happens to occafion fome damage to another, he is often by the law obliged to compenfate it. Thus, by the Aquilian law, the man, who not being able to manage a horse that had accidentally taken fright, fhould happen to ride down his neighbour's flave, is obliged to compensate the damage. When an accident of this kind happens, we are apt to think that he ought not to have rode fuch a horse, and to regard his attempting it as an unpardonable levity; though without this accident we should not only have made no fuch reflection, but should have regarded his refufing it as the effect of timid weakness, and of an anxiety about merely poffible events, which it is to no purpose to be aware of. The perfon himself, who by an accident even of this kind has involuntarily hurt another, feems to have fome sense of his own ill defert, with regard to him. He naturally runs up to the fufferer to exprefs his concern for what has happened, and to make every acknowledgment in his power. If he has any fenfibility, he neceffarily defires to compenfate the damage,

and

and to do every thing he can to appease that animal refentment, which he is fenfible will be apt to arife in the breast of the fufferer. To make no apology, to offer no atonement, is regarded as the highest brutality. Yet why fhould he make an apology more than any other perfon? Why should he, fince he was equally innocent with any other by-ftander, be thus fingled out from among all mankind, to make up for the bad fortune of another? This task would furely never be impofed upon him, did not even the impartial fpectator feel fome indulgence for what may be regarded as the unjust resentment of that other.

CHA P. III.

Of the final caufe of this Irregularity of

SUCH

Sentiments.

CH is the effect of the good or bad confequence of actions upon the fentiments both of the person who performs them, and of others; and thus, Fortune, which governs the world, has fome influence where we should be leaft willing to allow her any, and directs in fome measure the fentiments of mankind, with regard to the character and conduct both of themselves and others. That the world judges by the event, and not by the defign, has been in all ages the complaint, and is the great difcouragement of virtue. Every body agrees to the general maxim, that as the event does not depend on the agent, it ought to have no influence upon our fentiments, with regard to the merit or propriety of his conduct.

But

But when we come to particulars, we find that our sentiments are scarce in any one inftance exactly conformable to what this equitable maxim would direct. The happy or unprofperous event of any action, is not only apt to give us a good or bad opinion of the prudence with which it was conducted, but almost always too animates our gratitude or refentment, our sense of the merit or demerit of the design.

Nature, however, when she implanted the feeds of this irregularity in the human breast, seems, as upon all other occafions, to have intended the happiness and perfection of the fpecies. If the hurtfulness of the defign, if the malevolence of the affection, were alone the causes which excited our refentment, we should feel all the furies of that paffion against any person in whose breast we suspected or believed fuch defigns or affections were harboured, though they had never broke out into any actions.. Sentiments, thoughts, intentions, would: become the objects of punishment; and if the indignation of mankind run as high against

4

against them as against actions; if the basenefs of the thought which had given birth to no action, seemed in the eyes of the world as much to call aloud for vengeance as the baseness of the action, every court of judicature would become a real inquifition. There would be no fafety for the moft innocent and circumfpect conduct. Bad wishes, bad views, bad defigns, might ftill be fufpected; and while these excited the fame indignation with bad conduct, while bad intentions were as much refented as bad actions, they would equally expose the perfon to punishment and refentment. Actions, therefore, which either produce actual evil, or attempt to produce it, and thereby put us in the immediate fear of it, are by the Author of nature rendered the only proper and approved objects of human punishment and refentment. Sentiments, defigns, affections, though it is from these that according to cool reafon human actions derive their whole merit or demerit, are placed by the great Judge of hearts beyond the limits of every human jurifdiction, and are reserved for the cognizance of his own

unerring