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a law-giver, however, this, perhaps, is that which it requires the greateft delicacy and referve to execute with propriety and judgment. To neglect it altogether exposes the commonwealth to many grofs disorders and fhocking enormities, and to push it too far is deftructive of all liberty, fecurity, and juftice.

Though the mere want of beneficence feems to merit no punishment from equals, the greater exertions of that virtue appear to deferve the higheft reward. By being productive of the greatest good, they are the natural and approved objects of the livelieft gratitude. Though the breach of juftice, on the contrary, exposes to punishment, the obfervance of the rules of that virtue feems fcarce to deferve any reward. There is, no doubt, a propriety in the practice of juftice, and it merits, upon that account, all the approbation which is due to propriety. But as it does no real pofitive good, it is entitled to very little gratitude. Mere juftice is, upon moft occafions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from

hurting

hurting our neighbour. The man who barely abftains from violating either the perfon, or the eftate, or the reputation of his neighbours, has furely very little pofitive merit. He fulfils, however, all the rules of what is peculiarly called juftice, and does every thing which his equals can with propriety force him to do, or which they can punish him for not doing. We may often fulfil all the rules of justice by fitting still and doing nothing.

As every man doth, fo it fhall be done to him, and retaliation feems to be the great law which is dictated to us by Nature. Be neficence and generosity we think due to the and beneficent. Those whose generous hearts never open to the feelings of humanity, should, we think, be fhut out in the fame manner, from the affections of all their fellow-creatures, and be allowed to live in the midst of society, as in a great defert where there is nobody to care for them, or to inquire after them. The violator of the laws of juftice ought to be made to feel himself that evil which he has done

to

to another; and fince no regard to the fufferings of his brethren is capable of reftraining him, he ought to be over-awed by the fear of his own. The man who is barely innocent, who only obferves the laws of justice with regard to others, and merely abftains from hurting his neighbours, can merit only that his neighbours in their turn fhould respect his innocence, and that the same laws should be religiously observed with regard to him.

CHA P. II.

Of the fenfe of Justice, of Remorse, and of the confcioufness of Merit.

TH

HERE can be no proper motive for hurting our neighbour, there can be no incitement to do evil to another, which mankind will go along with, except juft indignation for evil which that other has done to us. To disturb his happiness merely because it ftands in the way of our own, to take from him what is of real use to him merely because it may be of equal

ог

or of more use to us, or to indulge, in this manner, at the expence of other people, the natural preference which every man has for his own happiness above that of other people, is what no impartial spectator can go along with. Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter to take care of himself, than of any other person, it is fit and right that it should be fo. Every man, therefore, is much more deeply interested in whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what concerns any other man: and to hear, perhaps, of the death of another perfon, with whom we have no particular connexion, will give us lefs concern, will spoil our ftomach, or break our reft much less than a very infignificant difafter which has befallen ourfelves. But though the ruin of our neighbour affect us much less than a very

may

fmall misfortune of our own, we must not ruin him to prevent that fmall misfortune, nor even to prevent our own ruin. We muft, here, as in all other cafes, view ourfelves not fo much according to that light

in which we may naturally appear to ourfelves, as according to that in which we naturally appear to others. Though every man may, according to the proverb, be the whole world to himself, to the rest of mankind he is a moft infignificant part of it. Though his own happiness may be of more importance to him than that of all the world besides, to every other perfon it is of no more confequence than that of any other man. Though it may be true, therefore, that every individual, in his own breast, naturally prefers himself to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts according to this principle. He feels that in this preference they can never go along with him, and that how natural foever it may be to him, it must always appear exceffive and extravagant to them. When he views himself in the light in which he is conscious that others will view him, he fees that to them he is but one of the multitude in no respect better than any other in it. If he would act so as that the impartial spectator may enter into the principles of his conduct,

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which

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