fit conceives gratitude or not, cannot, it is evident, in any degree alter our fentiments with regard to the merit of him who has bestowed it. No actual correfpondence of fentiments, therefore, is here required. It is fufficient that if he was grateful, they would correfpond; and our fense of merit is often founded upon one of those illufive fympathies, by which, when we bring home to ourfelves the cafe of another, we are often affected in a manner in which the perfon principally concerned is incapable of being affected. There is a fimilar difference between our disapprobation of demerit, and that of impropriety.

SECTION II.

Of Justice and Beneficence.

A

CHAP. I.

Comparison of those two virtues.

CTIONS of a beneficent tendency, which proceed from proper motives, feem alone to require a reward; because such alone are the approved objects of gratitude, or excite the sympathetic gratitude of the spectator.

Actions of a hurtful tendency, which proceed from improper motives, seem alone to deserve punishment; because such alone are the approved objects of resentment, or excite the sympathetic refentment of the spectator.

VOL. I.

Benefi

Beneficence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force, the mere want of it exposes to no punishment; because the mere want of beneficence tends to do no real pofitive evil. It may disappoint of the good which might reasonably have been expected, and upon that account it may justly excite diflike and disapprobation: it cannot, however, provoke any resentment which mankind will go along with. The man who does not recompenfe his benefactor, when he has it in his power, and when his benefactor needs his affiftance, is, no doubt, guilty of the blackest ingratitude. The heart of every impartial fpectator rejects all fellow-feeling with the selfishness of his motives, and he is the proper object of the highest disapprobation. But ftill he does no pofitive hurt to any body. He only does not do that good which in propriety he ought to have done. He is the object of hatred, a paffion which is naturally excited by impropriety of fentiment and behaviour; not of refentment, a paffion which is never properly called forth but by actions which tend to do real and

pofitive

pofitive hurt to fome particular persons. His want of gratitude therefore cannot be punished. To oblige him by force to perform what in gratitude he ought to perform, and what every impartial fpectator would approve of him for performing, would, if poffible, be still more improper than his neglecting to perform it. His benefactor would difhonour himself if he attempted by violence to constrain him to gratitude, and it would be impertinent for any third perfon, who was not the fuperior of either, to intermeddle. But of all the duties of beneficence, thofe which gratitude recommends to us approach nearest to what is called a perfect and complete obligation. What friendship, what generofity, what charity, would prompt us to do with univerfal approbation, is ftill more free, and can still less be extorted by force than the duties of gratitude. We talk of the debt of gratitude, not of charity, or generosity, nor even of friendship, when friendship is mere esteem, and has not been enhanced and complicated with gratitude for good offices.

Refentment seems to have been given us by nature for defence, and for defence only. It is the fafeguard of juftice and the fecurity of innocence. It prompts us to beat off the mischief which is attempted to be done to us, and to retaliate that which is already done; that the offender may be made to repent of his injustice, and that others, through fear of the like punishment, may be terrified from being guilty of the like offence. It must be referved therefore for these purposes, nor can the spectator ever go along with it when it is exerted for any other. But the mere want of the beneficent virtues, though it may disappoint us of the good which might reasonably be expected, neither does, nor attempts to do, mifchief from which we can have ocany cafion to defend ourselves.

There is however another virtue, of which the obfervance is not left to the freedom of our own wills, which may be extorted by force, and of which the violation exposes to refentment, and confequently to punishment. This virtue is juftice: the

violation