I

ceffarily regard as in the wrong. Whatever
this laft, therefore, may have fuffered, while
it is no more than what we ourselves fhould
have wished him to fuffer, while it is no
more than what our own sympathetic indig-
nation would have prompted us to inflict
upon him, it cannot either displease or pro-
voke us.
When an inhuman murderer is

brought to the scaffold, though we have
fome compaffion for his mifery, we can
have no fort of fellow-feeling with his re-
fentment, if he should be fo abfurd as to ex-
press any against either his profecutor or
his judge. The natural tendency of their
juft indignation against fo vile a criminal is
indeed the most fatal and ruinous to him.
But it is impoffible that we fhould be dif-
pleafed with the tendency of a fentiment,
which, when we bring the cafe home to
ourfelves, we feel that we cannot avoid
adopting.

1.

CHA P. IV.

Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters.

WE

E do not, therefore, thoroughly and heartily fympathize with the gratitude of one man towards another, merely because this other has been the cause of his good fortune, unless he has been the cause of it from motives which we entirely go along with. Our heart must adopt the principles of the agent, and go along with all the affections which influenced his conduct, before it can entirely fympathize with, and beat time to, the gratitude of the perfon who has been benefited by his actions. If in the conduct of the benefactor there appears to have been no propriety, how beneficial foever its effects, it does not feem to demand, or neceffarily to require, any proportionable recompenfe.

But

But when to the beneficent tendency of the action is joined the propriety of the affection from which it proceeds, when we entirely fympathize and go along with the motives of the agent, the love which we conceive for him upon his own account, enhances and enlivens our fellow-feeling with the gratitude of thofe who owe their profperity to his good conduct. His actions feem then to demand, and, if I may say so, to call aloud for a proportionable recompense. We then entirely enter into that gratitude which prompts to bestow it. The benefactor feems then to be the proper object of reward, when we thus entirely fympathize with, and approve of, that fentiment which prompts to reward him. When we approve of, and go along with, the affection from which the action proceeds, we muft neceffarily approve of the action, and regard the perfon towards whom it is directed as its proper and fuitable object.

2. In the fame manner, we cannot at all fympathize with the refentment of one man against another, merely because this other has been the caufe of his misfortune, unless

he has been the cause of it from motives which we cannot enter into. Before we can adopt the refentment of the sufferer, we must disapprove of the motives of the agent, and feel that our heart renounces all fympathy with the affections which influenced his conduct. If there appears to have been no impropriety in thefe, how fatal foever the tendency of the action which proceeds from them to thofe against whom it is directed, it does not feem to deferve any punishment, or to be the proper object of refentment.

any

But when to the hurtfulness of the action is joined the impropriety of the affection from whence it proceeds, when our heart rejects with abhorrence all fellow-feeling with the motives of the agent, we then heartily and entirely fympathize with the refentment of the fufferer. Such actions feem then to deferve, and, if I may say so, to call aloud for, a proportionable punishment; and we entirely enter into, and thereby approve of, that refentment which prompts to inflict it. The offender necef

farily feems then to be the proper object of punishment, when we thus entirely fympathize with, and thereby approve of, that fentiment which prompts to punish. In this cafe too, when we approve, and go along with, the affection from which the action proceeds, we muft neceffarily approve of the action, and regard the perfon against whom it is directed, as its proper and fuitable object.

I.

CHAP. V.

The analysis of the fenfe of Merit and

A

Demerit.

s our fenfe, therefore, of the propriety of conduct arifes from what I fhall call a direct fympathy with the affections and motives of the person who acts, fo our fenfe of its merit arifes from what I fhall call an indirect fympathy with the gratitude of the perfon who is, if I may say so, acted upon.