him of the respect of others, the punishment never will. He has no fufpicion that his fituation is the object of contempt or derifion to any body, and he can, with propriety, affume the air, not only of perfect ferenity, but of triumph and exultation.

"Great dangers," fays the Cardinal de Retz, "have their charms, because there "is fome glory to be got, even when we "mifcarry. But moderate dangers have

nothing but what is horrible, because the "lofs of reputation always attends the "want of fuccefs." His maxim has the fame foundation with what we have been. juft now observing with regard to punish

ments.

Human virtue is fuperior to pain, to poverty, to danger, and to death; nor does it even require its utmost efforts to despise them. But to have its mifery expofed to infult and derifion, to be led in triumph, to be fet up for the hand of fcorn to point at, is a fituation in which its conftancy is much

VOL. I.

L

more

more apt to fail. Compared with the contempt of mankind, all other external evils are easily supported.

CHAP. III.

Of the corruption of our moral fentiments, which is occafioned by this difpofition to admire the rich and the great, and to defpife or neglect perfons of poor and mean condition.

HIS difpofition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to defpife, or, at least, to neglect perfons of poor and mean condition, though neceffary both to establish and to maintain the diftinction of ranks and the order of fociety, is, at the fame time, the great and moft univerfal caufe of the corruption of our moral fentiments. That wealth and greatnefs are often regarded with the respect and admiration which are due only to wisdom and virtue; and that the contempt, of

which vice and folly are the only proper objects, is often moft unjustly beftowed upon poverty and weakness, has been the complaint of moralifts in all ages.

We defire both to be refpectable, and to be refpected. We dread both to be contemptible and to be contemned. But, upon coming into the world, we foon find that wisdom and virtue are by no means the fole objects of respect; nor vice and folly, of contempt. We frequently fee the respectful attentions of the world more strongly directed towards the rich and the great, than towards the wife and the virtuous. We fee frequently the vices and follies of the powerful much less despised than the poverty and weakness of the innocent. To deserve, to acquire, and to enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind, are the great objects of ambition and emulation. Two different roads are prefented to us, equally leading to the attainment of this fo much defired object; the one, by the study of wisdom and the practice of virtue; the other, by the acquifition of wealth and

.

greatness.

Two different characters are presented to our emulation; the one, of proud ambition and oftentatious avidity; the other, of humble modefty and equitable juftice. Two different models, two different pictures, are held out to us, according to which we may fashion our own character and behaviour; the one more gaudy and glittering in its colouring; the other more correct and more exquifitely beautiful in its outline: the one forcing itself upon the notice of every wandering eye; the other, attracting the attention of scarce any body but the moft ftudious and careful obferver. They are the wife and the virtuous chiefly, a felect, though, I am afraid, but a small party, who are the real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers, and, what may feem more extraordinary, moft frequently the difinterested admirers and worshippers, of wealth and greatness.

The refpect which we feel for wisdom and virtue is, no doubt, different from that which we conceive for wealth and great

nefs;

nefs; and it requires no very nice difcernment to diftinguish the difference. But, notwithstanding this difference, thofe fentiments bear a very confiderable resemblance to one another. In fome particular features they are, no doubt, different, but, in the general air of the countenance, they feem to be so very nearly the fame, that inattentive observers are very apt to mistake the one for the other.

In equal degrees of merit there is scarce any man who does not respect more the rich and the great, than the poor and the humble. With most men the prefumption and vanity of the former are much more admired, than the real and folid merit of the latter. It is fcarce agreeable to good morals, or even to good language, perhaps, to say, that mere wealth and greatness, abftracted from merit and virtue, deserve our respect. We must acknowledge, however, that they almost constantly obtain it; and they may, therefore, be confidered as, in some respects, the natural objects of it. Those exalted stations may, no doubt, be L 3 completely