II.

Modern psychology has arrived at much more ample and diversified results. Some twenty years since, an eminent French psychologist, whom many contemporary thinkers regard as their master-M. Taine -published a masterly work on the nature of ideas. First of all (refining upon the conclusions of preceding philosophers) M. Taine distinguishes between ideas and images, and shows that the idea is only an abstract image. The definition M. Taine "An gives of the image is as follows:image is a spontaneously recurring sensation, which in general is less vivid and less precise than the sensation properly so called."

In order to arrive at this conclusion, M. Taine did not solely employ the method of introspection. Instead of being content with the study of his own sensations, he looked about him, and carefully inquired into cases of remarkably developed memory, among, more especially, mental calculators, chess-players and persons subject to hallucinations.

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"Children who are taught to calculate in their heads," says M. Taine, mentally write with chalk upon an imaginary blackboard the figures given them, then proceed in similar fashion with regard to the partial operations of the sum and its final result. They see clearly and continuously with their mind's eye the various rows of white figures. Mathematical infant prodigies all confess to the truth of this. Young Colburn, who never went to school, and could neither read nor write, said that when he did his sums he saw them plainly before him. Another declared that he saw the numbers as if they had been written on a slate."

The case is the same with chess champions who play long and complicated games when blindfolded.

"It is clear," M. Taine remarks," that at

each move the image of the chessboard, with every piece upon it, is reflected in their mind as in a mirror. Thus they can calculate the consequences of their moves with no more difficulty than if the board itself were before

them."

The truth of this opinion is confirmed by the players themselves.

All such examples go to show how truly it may be said that the idea or image is the substitute of the visual sensation. When the images in one's mind are exceedingly precise and clear, one can modify them exactly as real sensations are

modified, like the blindfolded chess-player who at each move sees the whole board,

with every change effected, just as he would see the real board with his eyes. Thus the real presence of objects is not essentially necessary for the mind to be able to act upon them. But phenomena of the above description occur only with a limited number of persons.

The close connection between image and sensation becomes still more plainly visible in cases where the person affected cannot distinguish one from the other, and takes the image for reality. This is what takes place in hallucinations. M. Taine has studied carefully, from the psychological point of view, these singular perversions of exterior perception. Persons suffering from hallucinations are constantly known to declare that they have seen and heard things proved to have no existence-except in their imagination—as distinctly as they see and hear things existing around them.

What is the cause of such illusions?

At once a vision

They can only be explained by the extraordinary intensity of images previously impressed upon the mind. The image, in the ordinary mind, remains always more or less vague and feeble, and is thus easily distinguished from the sensation itself. At the present moment, for example, I am writing in my study; it occurs to me to think of my laboratory, now awaiting my daily visit. arises in my mind of the furniture and apparatus, and I see the pupils writing at their desks. But all these images are comparatively dim and fleeting. I have no difficulty in recognizing that they constitute only an internal condition, or image, which I could not possibly mistake for present reality. In the case of those who suffer from optical delusions the mental presentment, though of the same nature as in a normally constituted mind, has infinitely more intensity. It acts as a thus becomes a reality for the patient. sensation, is projected, as it were, and

These facts have led M. Taine to state, in very striking terms, what was long regarded as a paradox, namely, that "Perception is an act of hallucinatory nature. By these words the famous French philosopher means that whenever we imagine we perceive the exterior world we are only feeding on an interior simulacrum. flere is the table I am writing on; I see it, I

touch it; at least, I believe that I see and touch it; but, in reality, it is not of the table itself, as an object outside of myself, that I become aware, but of the seusations of touch and sight which this object provokes within my organisın. A modification of the organism:,-such is the real object of our perceptions, which consequently are always dealing with simulacra. Every act of perception contains an element of illusion, seeing that it gives us the erroneous notion that we enter directly into relation with the material objects that surround us. In other words, "Percep tion is an act of hallucinatory nature. Mr. Taine, however, adds, and rightly, that perception, though hallucinatory, is yet in one respect real and true; it differs from ordinary hallucination by reason of the correspondence which exists between the internal simulacrum and the exterior reality. The seer of visions thinks he sees and touches that which has no actual existence; behind his mental images there is only a void; but with the sane man, who perceives normally, the mental image

and the sensation which occasions it correspond to a real exterior object. This is the element of truth in bis hallucination.

III.

After quoting M. Taine, we may now mention, in connection with this question, the name of Mr. Francis Galton. Mr. Galton has inaugurated a novel process of psychological investigation, that of statistical observation. As every one will remember, he framed a series of questions on the nature of visual images, to which he elicited replies from many and divers quarters. He asked his correspondents to think as distinctly as they could of some particular object for instance, the breakfast as they had seen it before them that morning-and to describe the exact nature of the operations of their mind under these circumstances. The most important fact, perhaps, brought out by this experiment of Mr. Galton's was that persons of a scientific habit of mind, who are accustomed mainly to regard questions in the abstract, have, as a rule, much less tendency to "visualize" than others. This would tend to prove both that a great variety exists in the matter of mental constitution, and that intellectual habits influence the other operations of the mind.

"To my astonishment," says Mr. Galton, "I found that the great majority of the men mental imagery was unknown to them, and of science to whom I applied protested that they looked on me as fanciful and fantastic in supposing that the words 'mental imagery' really expressed what I believed everybody supposed them to mean. They had no more

notion of its true nature than a color-blind man who has not discerned his defect has of the nature of color. . . . To illustrate this

mental attitude, it will be sufficient to quote a few lines from the letter of one of my correspondents, who writes :

"These questions presuppose assent to some sort of a proposition regarding the "mind's eyes," and the image" which it sees. This points to some initial fallacy.

It is only by a figure of speech that I can detal image," which I can "see" with my

scribe my recollection of a scene as a "men

"mind's eye." I do not see it any more than a man sees the thousand lines of Sophocles, which, under due pressure, he is ready to repeat, etc.'

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On the other hand," continues Mr. Galton, "when I spoke to persons whom I met in general society, I found an entirely different disposition to prevail. Many men, and a yet larger number of women, and many boys and girls, declared that they habitually saw mental imagery, and that it was perfectly dis

tinct to them, and full of color."

From this it may be concluded that it is well for psychological inquirers not to despise the opinions of people of little or no knowledge, which may often be found to throw more light on a question than those of their intellectual betters.

IV.

The question of mental imagery, once brought to the point attained by the remarkable researches of M. Taine and Mr. Galton, advanced but little for some years. The study of hypnotism again revived it.

The rise of hypnotism marks a most important epoch in psychology, which it has gifted with means of exact and searching investigation unparalleled hitherto. Introspection, as practised by the Id psychologists, observation, as conducted by Taine and Galton, were superseded, through hypnotism, by direct experimentation. It has been very truly said that hypnotism is a sort of intellectual and moral dissection.

To enumerate all the new opinions on the subject of mental imagery which are the outcome of hypnotical research would exceed the limits of an article. It will suffice to mention two most important facts.

The first of these is the possibility of occasioning in a person under the influence of hypnotism all kinds of visual hallucinations through the mere effect of suggestion. The hypnotizer, standing in front of the patient whom he has thrown into slumber, points, for example, to the ground with a look and attitude expressing horror. The patient instantly rises, looks in the direction of the pointing finger, and declares that he or she perceives some noxious creeping animal, a serpent or a rat, which is rapidly drawing nearer. Pleasant suggestions can be produced with equal ease and certainty by gesticulations of a different nature. To suggest by verbal affirmation is naturally a still more complete and effective method. Verbal suggestions, indeed, can, as every one knows, be made to subsist and take effect after the re-awakening of the patient.

It is easy to gain some knowledge of the mechanism of these phenomena by inquiring what effect the same means of suggestion would have upon persons in a normal condition. At once it will become apparent that the same act which in a hypnotized patient produces hallucinations would only occasion in a normal mind the very simple phenomenon of an "idea." Let us, for example, try to persuade a friend who has a book in his hand that it is not a book, but a knife. He will simply smile. We have, consequently, not succeeded in communicating any hallucination to his mind. He knows he has a book in his hand, and does not take it for anything else. Yet our attempt at suggestion has produced a certain effect upon him. He has understood what we were speaking of-we have spoken of a knife, and have, therefore, given him the idea of one. If only for one brief instant, he has conceived the idea, has seen the image, of a knife in somebody's hand. The sole difference between him and the

hypnotized patient is that the image in one case has been very slight, and has not been acompanied by anything in the nature of conviction; whereas in the other it has taken full possession of the mind, has been projected, and has for the nonce appeared to constitute a material reality.

Thus it may be said that our minds are always filled with the germs of hallucinations, as it were, and that these germs are what we call our ideas. Hypnotic experiments clearly demonstrate the close con

nection which exists between images, perceptions, and hallucinations. Here, then, is one important fact established by hypnotical researches and study.

The second fact is much less frequent, and can only be observed in certain hysterical patients who have been carefully trained beforehand to give account of their impressions. The experiment consists in provoking visual sensations which, by their nature and the method of their production, serve to explain the processes of mental imagery. But, before entering into further details, it may be well to describe what physiologists term consecutive imagery.'

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Let us suppose that a sinall cross has been cut out of a piece of red paper. If this red cross be placed upon a white ground, and the eyes be fixed on it for some seconds and then removed, and again fixed upon a different part of the white ground, the image of a pale green cross becomes visible, to disappear after a few moments. This is called a "consecutive image." The same result may be ob tained if, instead of an actual cross cut out of red paper, the image of a red cross be fixedly contemplated in the mind; the pale green cross will again become visible on subsequently casting the eye on a white surface. M. Wundt, the eminent physiologist of Leipzig, confirms this fact, that certain persons can so strongly figure to themselves any given color that they can afterward see its consecutive image. Such persons, however, are, in the normal state, very rare, so that Wundt's experiment is best verified by means of hypnotism and suggestion. The hypnotized patient is caused to believe that he perceives a red image; he is then told to look at a white surface, and immediately declares, of his own accord, that he sees the green consecutive image.

This experiment might be considered to show that the seat of mental imagery in

the brain is the same as that of sensation. There is, however, another possible conclusion, namely, that as a consequence of the infinite number of times of our having unconsciously perceived consecutive images (for whenever we have looked long at anv red object, a green "consecutive" has afterward arisen for a moment, though our conscious attention may not have dwelt upon the phenomenon) some obscure mental association may have been formed be

tween the idea of red and that of green, which would suffice, under the hypnotic circumstances mentioned above, to call up one as the corollary of the other.

"

V.

We have seen that first introspection, then the analysis of mental maladies, then statistical observation, and finally hypnotism have been employed as means of studying the true nature of mental imagery. Of late years still another method of investigation has been employed, consisting in the study of the aberrations of the faculty of speech, to which the generic name of aphasia" is given. M. Ribot is one of the first writers who have regarded the phenomena of aphasia from the psychological standpoint. M. Charcot has followed in M. Ribot's footsteps, and his experiments in this connection have enabled him to construct the remarkable theory of the different types of memory which has attracted so much attention in the scientific world. The chief result of these researches of M. Charcot's has been to demonstrate the number of different forms assumed by human thought. Roughly speaking, it might almost be said that no human being thinks in exactly the same way as any other, so that evidently the results of introspection as a method of psychological inquiry can have only an individual and not a general or typical value. A few examples will make our meaning clearer.

In all our foregoing observations, only one style of thought has been considered, that of the visual image. We have taken it for granted that most persons see, as it were, the thing they think of. But the sense of sight is not the only one which affects the consciousness. The other senses may also serve as the basis of complex psychological operations. There is, for example, a nemory connected with the sense of hearing, as appears in the case of musicians. Auditive imagery must exist, therefore, as well as visual, and there may also be a certain process of auditive reasoning, that is to say, a process of thought having sound for its object, as other mental processes have for their object things which come within the scope of vision. Having said thus much, let us suppose that the word "bell" is pronounced in some one's hearing. What will be the effect of

this word upon this person's mind? If in the habit of using visual memory he or she will form a notion of the bell as a visible object, with its contour and its color. But if the nature of the memory be auditive the idea of a bell will connect itself with the remembrance of the sound a bell gives forth. The latter would naturally be the case with a blind person, and, indeed, it need not be said that memory in the blind must always be of the auditive type. And, finally, though this third case is undoubtedly much rarer than either of the other two, the word "bell" may provoke in the mind of the hearer a reminiscence of the sensations of contact and pression experienced in touching a bell with the hand.

Thus it appears that there are at least three different ways of representing to one's self a material object. But this does not exhaust the number of different types of memory; among which the verbal type is the most important. It has been ascertained that some persons think entirely by means of words. They employ the word as a substitute for the image, which is not evoked at all, or is evoked very indistinctly. This fact it is which has led M. Charcot and his pupils, who have had so many cases of aphasia under their observation, to study the question of "interior speech. If we closely examine the operations of our mind while we are thinking we shall perceive that a sort of interior voice spoke within us while we thought. This voice does not accompany our thought simply, but is, in fact, our thought itself. Its action and nature have been carefully studied by the sagacious psychologist, M. Egger, and he has shown beyond a doubt that the interior voice is only the reflection, or repetition, of the real voice. With many persons interior speech is more than a simple phenomenon of mental audition; it is accompanied by a sensation in the mouth and lips, as though words were about to be spoken; and sometimes whispered words will accompany the act of meditation.

Other persons, again, do not thus speak their thought when thinking, but as it were write it. Words appear to them under the guise of written symbols. they think of a hat, for example, they will see the word "hat" in written or printed letters.

If

Altogether it may be said that there are two principal modes of thought that which deals with material objects, and that which deals with words. Under either of these two general divisions various styles of memory may occur, and thus we obtain the four following types :

(1) The visual, characterized by the use of visual images in all the operations of the mind and memory. This probably exists in the case of painters who can execute a person's portrait after having seen that person only once.

(2) The auditive, which implies a special memory for sounds, as in the case of most musicians.

(3) The motive, marked by the special use made of images derived from motion.

(4) The indeterminate, which exists when the different varieties of imagery are employed alternately, according to occasion.

It is practically a matter of some difficulty to determine with anything like accuracy the particular type of memory in each individual. No very exact methods of inquiry exist at present in this respect. We have lately had in France the opportunity of observing a very peculiar case of auditive memory, in the person of a young mathematical prodigy, Jacques Inaadi, who was brought before the Academy of Sciences by M. Darboux, M. Charcot having been a member of the committee appointed

to examine into the case. The conclusion was promptly arrived at by M. Charcot that Inaudi's memory is not of the visual, but of the auditive type. Other mathematical prodigies, such as Mondeux, Colburn, and Bidder, saw the figures before them as they solved their problems. Inaudi hears his figures, as though they were being whispered into his ear. It would always have been deemed impossible prior to the observation of this particular case, that mental calculations of the most enormous extent could be carried out solely by means of auditive images.

VI.

Upon reaching the conclusion of this brief sketch or summary of a very compli cated and interesting question, it will be seen at a glance what progress has been made in the study of mental imagery since the period when Hobbes described thought as being simply a state of inward vision.

The whole present tendency of psychological research is to show not that the mental operations of all persons are of a similar nature, but that immense psychological differences exist between different individuals. In a word, the study of mind has entered of late years upon a new phase which may lead to singularly interesting and important results.—Fortnightly Review.

"THEN," I said, "you decline telling me about the three Kings, when their procession wound round and round these hillocks; all the little wooden horses with golden bridles and velvet holsters out of the toy-boxes, and the camelopard, and the monkeys and the lynx, and the little doll pages blowing toy trumpets. And still, I know it happened here, because I recognize the place from the pictures: the hillocks all washed away into breasts like those of Diana of the Ephesians, and the rows of cypresses and spruce pines, also out of the toy-box. I know it happened in this very place, because Benozzo Gozzoli painted it all at the time; and you were already about the place, I presume?"

I knew that by her dress, but I did not like to allude to its being old-fashioned. It was the sort of thing, muslin all embroidered with little nosegays of myrtle and yellow broom, and tied into odd bunches at the elbows and waist, which they wore in the days of Botticelli's Spring; and on her head she had a garland of eglantine and palm-shaped hellebore leaves which was quite unmistakable.

The nymph Terzollina (for of course she was the tutelary divinity of the narrow valley behind the great Medicean Villa) merely shook her head and shifted one of her bare feet, on which she was seated under a cypress tree, and went on threading the yellow broom-flowers.