very

mankind are poffeft of, and sometimes even that degree is not neceffary. Thus, to give a low inftance, to eat when we are hungry, is certainly, upon ordinary occafions, perfectly right and proper, and cannot mifs being approved of as fuch by every body. Nothing, however, could be more abfurd than to say it was virtuous.

On the contrary, there may frequently be a confiderable degree of virtue in those actions, which fall fhort of the most perfect propriety; because they may still approach nearer to perfection than could well be expected upon occafions in which it was fo extremely difficult to attain it and this is very often the cafe upon those occafions which require the greatest exertions of felf-command. There are fome fituations which bear fo hard upon human nature, that the greatest degree of felf-government, which can belong to fo imperfect a creature as man, is not able to ftifle, altogether, the voice of human weakness, or reduce the violence of the paffions to that pitch of moderation, in which the impartial ípectator can entirely enter into them. Though in those cafes, therefore, the behaviour of the fufferer fall fhort of the most perfect propriety, it may ftill deferve fome applause, and even, in a certain fenfe, may be denominated virtuous. It may ftill manifeft an effort of generofity and magnanimity of which the greater part of men are incapable; and though it fails of abfolute perfection, it may be a much nearer approximation towards perfec

tion, than what, upon fuch trying occafions, is commonly either to be found or to be expected.

In cafes of this kind, when we are determining the degree of blame or applause which feems due to any action, we very frequently make use of two different ftandards. The firft is the idea of complete propriety and perfection, which, in those difficult fituations, no human conduct ever did, or ever can come up to; and in comparison with which the actions of all men must for ever appear blameable and imperfect. The fecond is the idea of that degree of proximity or distance from this complete perfection, which the actions of the greater part of men commonly arrive at. Whatever goes beyond this degree, how far foever it may be removed from abfolute perfection, seems to deferve applause; and whatever falls fhort of it, to deferve blame.

It is in the fame manner that we judge of the productions of all the arts which addrefs themselves to the imagination. When a critic examines the work of any of the great masters in poetry or painting, he may fometimes examine it by an idea of perfection, in his own mind, which neither that nor any other human work will ever come up to; and as long as he compares it with this standard, he can fee nothing in it but faults and imperfections. But when he comes to confider the rank which it ought to hold among other works of the fame kind, he neceffarily compares it with a very different standard, D 2

the

the common degree of excellence which is ufually attained in this particular art; and when he judges of it by this new measure, it may often appear to deserve the highest applaufe, upon account of its approaching much nearer to perfection than the greater part of those works which can be brought into competition with it.

SECTION

SECTION II.

Of the degrees of the different paffions which are confiftent with propriety.

INTRODUCTION.

T

HE propriety of every paffion excited by objects peculiarly related to ourfelves, the pitch which the fpectator can go along with, must lye, it is evident, in a certain mediocrity. If the paffion is too high, or if it is too low, he cannot enter into it. Grief and refentment for private misfortunes and injuries may eafily, for example, be too high, and in the greater part of mankind they are fo. They may likewise, though this more rarely happens, be too low. We denominate the excefs, weakness, and fury: and we call the defect, stupidity, infenfibility, and want of fpirit. We can enter into neither of them, but are aftonished and confounded to fee them.

This mediocrity, however, in which the point of propriety confifts, is different in different paffions. It is high in fome, and low in others. There are some paffions which it is indecent to express very strongly, even upon those occafions, in which it is acknowledged that we cannot avoid feeling them in the highest degree. And there

D. 3

Part I. there are others of which the strongest expreffions are upon many occafions extremely graceful, even though the paffions themselves do not, perhaps, arife fo neceffarily. The firft are thofe paffions with which, for certain reasons, there is little or no fympathy: the fecond are thofe with which, for other reafons, there is the greateft. And if we confider all the different paffions of human nature, we shall find that they are regarded as decent, or indecent, juft in proportion as mankind are more or lefs difpofed to fympathise with them.

.amvi

CHAP. I.

Of the paffions which take their origin from the body.

I. T is indecent to exprefs any ftrong degree of thofe paffions which arife from a certain fituation or difpofition of the body; because the company, not being in the fame difpofition, cannot be expected to sympathise with them. Violent hunger, for example, though upon many occafions not only natural, but unavoidable, is always indecent, and to eat voraciously is univerfally regarded as a piece of ill manners. There is, however, fome degree of fympathy, even with hunger. It is agreeable to see our companions eat with a good appetite, and all expreffions of loathing

are