most occafions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our neighbour. The man who barely abftains from violating either the perfon, or the estate, or the reputation of his neighbours, has furely very little positive merit. He fulfils, however, all the rules of what is peculiarly called justice, and does every thing which his equals can with propriety force him to do, or which they can punish him for not doing. We may often fulfil all the rules of juftice by fitting still and doing nothing.

As every man doth, fo fhall it be done to him, and retaliation feems to be the great law. which is dictated to us by nature. Beneficence and generofity we think due to the generous and beneficent. Those whose hearts never open to the feelings of humanity, should, we think, be fhut out in the fame manner, from the affections of all their fellow-creatures, and be allowed to live in the midst of society, as in a great defart where there is no-body to care for them, or to enquire after them. The violator of the laws of juftice ought to be made to feel himself that evil which he has done to another; and fince no regard to the fufferings of his brethren is capable of reftraining him, he ought to be over-awed by the fear of his own. The man who is barely innocent, who only observes the laws of juftice with regard to others, and meerly abstains from hurting his neighbours, can merit only that his neighbours in their turn should refpect

refpect his innocence, and that the fame laws should be religiously observed with regard to him.

CHA P. II.

Of the fenfe of justice, of remorse, and of the confciousness of merit.

T

HERE can be no proper motive for hurting our neighbour, there can be no incitement to do evil to another, which mankind will go along with, except just indignation for evil which that other has done to us. To disturb his happiness meerly because it stands in the way of our own, to take from him what is of real use to him meerly because it may be of equal or of more use to us, or to indulge, in this manner, at the expence of other people, the natural preference which every man has for his own happiness above that of other people, is what no impartial fpectator can go along with. Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter to take care of himself than

of any other perfon, it is fit and right that it fhould be fo. Every man, therefore, is much more deeply interested in whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what concerns any other man and to hear, perhaps, of the death of another person, with whom we have no particular connection, will give us lefs concern, will spoil our ftomach, or break our

reft

reft much less than a very infignificant difafter which has befallen ourselves. But though the ruin of our neighbour may affect us much less than a very small misfortune of our own, we must not ruin him to prevent that small misfortune, nor even to prevent our own ruin. We must, here, as in all other cafes, view ourselves not fo much according to that light in which we may naturally appear to ourselves, as according to that in which we naturally appear to others. Though every man may, according to the proverb, be the whole world to himself, to the reft of mankind he is a moft infignificant part of it. Though his own happiness may be of more importance to him than that of all the world befides, to every other perfon it is of no more confequence than that of any other man. Though it may be true, therefore, that every individual, in his own breast, naturally prefers himself to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts according to this principle. He feels that in this preference they can never go along with him, and that how natural foever it may be to him, it must always appear exceffive and extravagant to them. When he views himself in the light in which he is conscious that others will view him, he fees that to them he is but one of the multitude in no respect better than any other in it. If he would act fo as that the impartial fpectator may enter into the principles of his conduct, which is what of all things he has the greatest de

fire to do, he muft, upon this, as upon all other occafions, humble the arrogance of his felf-love, and bring it down to fomething which other men can go along with. They will indulge it fo far as to allow him to be more anxious about, and to pursue with more earnest affiduity, his own happiness than that of any other person. Thus far, whenever they place themselves in his fituation, they will readily go along with him. In the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outftrip all his competitors. But if he should juftle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the fpectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of. This man is to them, in every respect, as good as he: they do not enter into that felf-love by which he prefers himself so much to this other, and cannot go along with the motive from which he hurt him. They readily, therefore, fympathise with the natural refentment of the injured, and the offender becomes the object of their hatred and indignation. He is fenfible that he becomes fo, and feels that those fentiments are ready to burst out from all fides against him.

As the greater and more irreparable the evil that is done, the refentment of the fufferer runs naturally the higher, fo does likewife the fympathetic indignation of the spectator, as well as the fenfe of guilt in the agent.

Death

Death is the greateft evil which one man can inflict upon another, and excites the highest degree of refentment in those who are immediately connected with the flain. Murder, therefore, is the most atrocious of all crimes which affect individuals only, in the fight both of mankind, and of the person who has committed it. To be deprived of that which we are poffeffed of, is a greater evil than to be disappointed of what we have only the expectation. Breach of property, therefore, theft and robbery, which take from us what we are poffeffed of, are greater crimes than breach of contract, which only disappoints us of what we expected. The most facred laws of justice, therefore, those whofe violation feems to call loudeft for vengeance and punishment, are the laws which guard the life and person of our neighbour; the next are those which guard his property and pof

feffions; and laft of all come those which guard what are called his perfonal rights, or what is due to him from the promises of others.

The violator of the more facred laws of justice can never reflect on the fentiments which mankind must entertain with regard to him, without feeling all the agonies of fhame and horror, and confternation. When his paffion is gratified, and he begins coolly to reflect on his paft conduct, he can enter into none of the motives which influenced it. They appear now as detestable to him as they did always to other people. By fympa

thifing