fuitable temper, we cannot avoid conceiving a confiderable degree of efteem and admiration for one who appears capable of exerting so much self-command over one of the most ungovernable paffions of his nature. When indeed the animofity of the fufferer exceeds, as it almost always does, what we can go along with, as we cannot enter into it, we neceffarily difapprove of it. We even disapprove of it more than we should of an equal excess of almost any other paffion derived from the imagination. And this too violent refentment, inftead of carrying us along with it, becomes itself the object of our refentment and indignation. We enter into the oppofite refentment of the perfon who is the object of this unjust emotion, and who is in danger of fuffering from it. Revenge, therefore, the excess of refentment, appears to be the most deteftable of all the paffions, and is the object of the horror and indignation of every body. And as in the way in which this paffion commonly discovers itself among mankind, it is exceffive a hundred times for once that it is moderate, we are very apt to confider it as altogether odious and deteftable, because in its moft ordinary appearances it is fo. Nature, however, even in the prefent depraved state of mankind, does not seem to have dealt fo unkindly with us, as to have endowed us with any principle which is wholly in every refpect evil, or which, in no degree and in no direction, can be the proper object of praise and approbation. Upon fome occafions we are fenfible that this paffion, which is generally too ftrong, may likewife be too weak. We fometimes complain that a particular perfon shows too little fpirit, and has too little fenfe of the injuries that have been done to him; and we are as ready to despise him for the defect, as to hate him for the excess of this paffion.

The infpired writers would not furely have talked fo frequently or fo ftrongly of the wrath and anger of God, if they had regarded every degree of thofe paffions as vicious and evil, even in fo weak and imperfect a creature

as man.

Let it be confidered too, that the prefent enquiry is not concerning a matter of right, if I may fay fo, but concerning a matter of fact. We are not at present examining upon what principles a perfect being would approve of the punishment of bad actions; but upon what principles fo weak and imperfect a creature as man actually and in

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fact approves of it. The principles which I have juft now mentioned, it is evident, have a very great effect upon his fentiments; and it seems wifely ordered that it fhould be fo. The very exiftence of fociety requires that unmerited and unprovoked malice fhould be reftrained by proper punishments; and confequently, that to inflict thofe punishments should be regarded as a proper and laudable action. Though man, therefore, be naturally endowed with a defire of the welfare and prefervation of fociety, yet the author of nature has not entrusted it to his reafon to find out that a certain application of punishments is the proper means of attaining this end; but has endowed him with an immediate and inftinctive approbation of that very application which is most proper to attain it. The œconomy of nature is in this refpect exactly of a piece with what it is upon many other occafions. With regard to all thofe ends which, upon account of their peculiar importance, may be regarded, if fuch an expreffion is allowable, as the favourite ends of nature, fhe has conftantly in this manner not only endowed mankind with an appetite for the end which the proposes, but likewife with an appetite for the means by which alone this end can be brought about, for their own fakes, and independent of their tendency to produce it. Thus self-prefervation, and the propagation of the fpecies, are the great ends which nature seems to have proposed in the formation of all animals. Mankind are endowed with a defire of those ends, and an averfion to the contrary; with a love of life, and a dread of diffolution; with a defire of the continuance and perpetuity of the fpecies, and with an averfion to the thoughts of its intire extinction. But though we are in this manner endowed with a very strong defire of those ends, it has not been intrusted to the flow and uncertain determinations of our reafon, to find out the proper means of bringing them about. Nature has directed us to the greater part of thefe by original and immediate inftincts. Hunger, thirft, the paffion which unites the two fexes, the love of pleafure, and the dread of pain, prompt us to apply those means for their own fakes, and without any confideration of their tendency to thofe beneficent ends which the great director of nature intended to produce by them.

Before

Before I conclude this note, I must take notice of a difference between the approbation of propriety and that of merit or beneficence. Before we approve of the fentiments of any perfon as proper and fuitable to their objects, we must not only be affected in the fame manner as he is, but we muft perceive this harmony and correfpondence of fentiments between him and ourselves. Thus, though upon hearing of a misfortune that had befallen my friend, I fhould conceive précisely that degree of concern which he gives way to; yet till I am informed of the manner in which he behaves, till I perceive the harmony between his emotions and mine, I cannot be faid to approve of the fentiments which influence his behaviour. The approbation of propriety therefore requires, not only that we fhould intirely fympathize with the perfon who acts, but that we fhould perceive this perfect concord between his fentiments and our own. On the contrary, when I hear of a benefit that has been bestowed upon another perfon, let him who has received it be affected in what manner he pleases, if, by bringing his cafe home to himfelt I feel gratitude arife in my

own breast, I neceffarily approve of the conduct of his beneyself myself

factor, and regard it as meritorious, and the proper object of reward. Whether the perfon who has received the benefit conceives gratitude or not, cannot, it is evident, in any degree alter our fentiments with regard to the merit of him who has bestowed it. No actual correfpondence of fentiments, therefore, is here required. It is fufficient that, if he was grateful, they would correfpond; and our fenfe of merit is often founded upon one of thofe illufive fympathies, by which, when we bring home to ourselves the cafe of another, we are often affected in a manner in which the person principally concerned is incapable of be ing affected. There is a fimilar difference between our disapprobation of demerit, and that of impropriety.

SECTION II.

Of justice and beneficence.

CHA P. I.

Comparison of those two virtues.

A which

CTIONS of a beneficent tendency which proceed from proper motives feem alone to require reward; because such alone are the approved objects of gratitude, or excite the sympathetic gratitude of the spec

tator.

Actions of a hurtful tendency, which proceed from improper motives, feem alone to deferve punishment; because fuch alone are the approved objects of refentment, or excite the fympathetic refentment of the spectator.

Beneficence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force, the meer want of it exposes to no punishment: because the meer want of beneficence tends to do no real pofitive evil. It may difappoint of the good which might reasonably have been expected, and upon that account it may juftly excite diflike and difapprobation: it cannot, however, provoke any refentment which mankind will go along with. The man who does not recom-pence his benefactor, when he has it in his power, and when his benefactor needs his

affiftance,

affistance, is, no doubt, guilty of the blackest ingratitude. The heart of every impartial fpectator rejects all fellow-feeling with the felfishness of his motives, and he is the proper object of the highest disapprobation. But ftill he does no pofitive hurt to any body. He only does not do that good which in propriety he ought to have done. He is the object of hatred, a paffion which is naturally excited by impropriety of fentiment and behaviour not of refentment, a paffion which is never properly called forth but by actions which tend to do real and pofitive hurt to fome particular perfons. His want of gratitude, therefore, cannot be punished. To oblige him by force to perform what in gratitude he ought to perform, and what every impartial fpectator would approve of him for performing, would, if poffible, be ftill more improper than his neglecting to perform it. His benefactor would difhonour himself if he attempted by violence to constrain him to gratitude, and it would be impertinent for any third perfon, who was not the fuperior of either, to intermeddle. But of all the duties of beneficence, thofe which gratitude recommends to us approach nearest to what is called a perfect and compleat obligation. What friendship, what generofity, what charity, would prompt us to do with univerfal approbation, is still more free, and can ftill lefs be extorted by force than the duties of gratitude. We talk of the debt of gratitude, not of charity, or generofity, nor even of friendship, when friend

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ship