were such as gave to Rome small cause of boast, though much of joy: for those opposites [opponents] were as base of courage, as the lands which they held were abundant of riches. Sicily, Spain, and all Greece fell into her hands; by using her aid to protect them against the Carthaginians and Macedonians.

I shall not need to speak of her other conquests. It was easy to get more, when she had gotten all this. It is not my purpose to disgrace Roman valour; which was very noble or to blemish the reputation of so many famous victories. I am not so idle. This I say, That among all their wars I find not any; wherein their valour hath appeared comparable to the English.

If my judgment seem over-partial: our wars in France may help to make it good.

First therefore, it is well known that Rome or perhaps all the world besides, had never any so brave a commander in war as JULIUS CÆSAR; and that no Roman army was comparable unto that which served under the same CAESAR. Likewise, it is apparent that this gallant army, which had given fair proof of the Roman courage in the good performance of the Helvetian war, when it first entered into Gaul; was nevertheless utterly disheartened, when CESAR led it against the Germans. So that we may justly impute all that was extraordinary in the valour of CESAR'S men; to their long exercise, under so good a leader, in so great a war.

Now let us in general compare with the deeds done by these best of Roman soldiers, in their principal service; the things performed in the same country by our common English soldiers, levied in haste from following the cart or sitting on the shop-stall: so shall we see the difference. Herein will we deal fairly, and believe CÆSAR in relating the acts of the Romans; but will call the French historians to witness what actions were performed by the English.

In CESAR'S time, France was inhabited by the Gauls, a stout people; but inferior to the French, by whom they were subdued, even when the Romans gave them assistance. The country of Gaul was rent in sunder, as CÆSAR witnesseth, into many Lordships: some of which were governed by petty kings and others by the multitude; none ordered in such sort as might make it appliable to the

nearest neighbour. The factions were many and violent; not only in general through the whole country, but between petty states-yea, in every city; and almost in every house. What greater advantage could a conqueror desire?

Yet there was a greater. ARIOVISTUS, with his Germans, had overrun the country; and held much part of it in subjection, little different from mere slavery. Yea, so often had the Germans prevailed in war upon the Gauls; that the Gauls who had sometimes been the better soldiers-did hold themselves no way equal to those daily invaders.

Had France been so prepared unto our English kings, Rome itself by this time, and long ere this time-would have been ours. But when King EDWARD III. began his war upon France, he found the whole country settled in obedience to one mighty King. A King, whose reputation abroad was no less than his puissance at home. Under whose ensign, the King of Bohemia did serve in person; at whose call, the Genoese and other neighbouring states were ready to take arms: finally, a King unto whom one Princethe Dauphin of Viennois-gave away his dominion, for love; and another-the King of Majorca-sold away a goodly city and territory, for money.

The country lying so open to the Romans; and being so well fenced against the English: it is noteworthy, not who prevailed most therein for it were mere vanity to match the English purchases with the Roman conquest; but whether of the two gave the greater proof of military virtue ?

CESAR himself doth witness, that the Gauls complained of their own ignorance in the art of war; and that their own hardiness was overmatched by the skill of their enemies. Poor men! they admired the Roman towers and engines of battery raised and planted against their walls, as more than human. What greater wonder is it, that such people were beaten by the Romans; than that the Caribs-a naked people, but valiant as any under the sky-are commonly put to the worse by the Spaniards?

Besides all this we are to have regard of the great difficulty that was found in drawing all Gauls or any great part of them to one head; that with joint forces they might oppose their assailants: as also the much more [greater] difficulty of holding them long together. For hereby it came to pass,

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that they were never able to make use of Opportunity but, sometimes compelled to stay for their fellows; and sometimes driven to give or take battle upon extreme disadvantages, for fear lest their companies should fall asunder-as indeed, upon any little disaster, they were ready to break, and return every one to the defence of his own.

All this, and-which was little less than all this great odds in weapon; gave to the Romans the honour of many galiant victories.

What such help? or what other worldly help, than the golden mettle of their soldiers, had our English Kings against the French? Were not the French as well experienced in feats of war? Yea, did they not think themselves therein our superiors? Were they not in arms, in horse, and in all provisions, exceedingly beyond us. Let us hear what a French writer-JEAN DE SERRES-saith of the inequality that was between the French and English, when their King JOHN was ready to give the onset upon the Black Prince, at the battle of Poitiers, "JOHN had all advantages over EDWARD, both in number, force, show, country, and concert-the which is commonly a consideration of no small importance in worldly affairs-and withal, the choice of all his horsemen, esteemed then the best in Europe, with the greatest and wisest captains of his whole realm.” And what could he have more?

I think it would trouble a Roman antiquary to find the like example in their histories-the example, I say, of a King brought prisoner to Rome by an army of 8,000; which he had surrounded with 40,000 better appointed and no less expert warriors. This I am sure of, that neither SYPHAX the Numidian followed by a rabble of half scullions, as LIVY rightly terms them; nor those cowardly kings PERSEUS and GENTIUS are worthy patterns.

All that have read of Cressy and Agincourt will bear me witness that I do not allege the battle of Poitiers for lack of other as good examples of the English virtue: the proof whereof, hath left many a hundred better marks in all quarters of France, than ever did the valour of the Romans.

If any man impute these victories of ours to the longbow, as carrying further, piercing more strongly, and quicker of discharge than the French crossbow; my answer is ready. That in all these respects, it is also, being drawn with a

strong arm, superior to the musket: yet is the musket a weapon of more use. The gun and the crossbow are of like force when discharged by a boy or woman, as when by a strong man weakness, or sickness, or a sore finger makes the longbow unserviceable. More particularly, I say, that it was the custom of our ancestors to shoot, for the most part, point blank: and so shall he perceive that will note the circumstances of almost any one battle. This takes away all objection, for when two armies are within the distance of a butt's length only one flight of arrows, or two at the most, can be delivered before they close. Neither is it in general true, that the longbow reacheth further, or that it pierceth more strongly than the crossbow; but this is the rare effect of an extraordinary arm, whereupon can be grounded no common rule.

If any man shall ask, How then, came it to pass that the English won so many great battles, having no advantage to help them? I may-with best commendation of modestyrefer him to the French historian; who relating the victory of our men at Crevant, where they passed a bridge in face of the enemy, useth these words, "The English come with a conquering bravery-as he that was accustomed to gain everywhere without any stay. He forceth our guard placed upon the bridge to keep the passage." Or I may cite another place of the same author, where he tells how the Bretons, being invaded by CHARLES VIII., King of France; thought it good policy to apparel 1,500 of their own men in English cassocks; hoping that the very sight of the English Red Cross would be enough to terrify the French. But I will not stand to borrow of the French historians-all which, except DE SERRES and PAULUS EMILIUS, report wonders of our Nation-the proposition which first I undertook to maintain, "That the military virtue of the English, prevailing against all manner of difficulties; ought to be preferred before that of the Romans, which was assisted with all advantages that could be desired."

If it be demanded, Why, then, did not our Kings finish the conquest, as CESAR had done? my answer may be (I hope without offence), that our Kings were like to the race of EACIDE; of whom the poet ENNIUS gave this note, Bellipotentes sunt magis quam sapientipotentes, "They were more war

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like than politic." Whoso notes their proceedings, may find that none of them went to work like a conqueror, save only HENRY V.; the course of whose victories, it pleased GOD to interrupt by his death.

But this question is the more easily answered: if another be first made. "Why did not the Romans attempt the conquest of Gaul, before the time of CESAR? Why not after the Macedonian war? Why not after the third Punic? or after the Numantian?" At all these times, they had good leisure. And then, especially, had they both leisure and fit opportunity; when, under the conduct of MARIUS, they had newly vanquished the Cimbri and Teutones; by whom the country of Gaul had been piteously wasted. Surely, the words of TULLY were true, "That with other nations, the Romans fought for dominion; with the Gauls, for the preservation of their own safety!" Therefore they attempted not the conquest of Gaul, until they were Lords of all other countries to them known.

We, on the other side, held only the one half of our own island; the other half, being inhabited by a Nation-unless perhaps in wealth and numbers of men, somewhat inferior-every way equal to ourselves; a nation anciently and strongly allied to our enemies, the French; and in that regard, enemy to us. So that our danger lay both before and behind us: and the greater danger at our backs, where we commonly felt it. Always, we feared a stronger invasion by land; than we could make upon France, transporting our forces over sea.

It is usual with men that have pleased themselves in admiring the matters which they find in ancient histories; to hold it a great injury done to their judgment, if any one take upon him, by way of comparison, to extol the things of later ages. But I am well persuaded, that as the divided virtue of this our island, hath given more noble proof of itself, than under so worthy a leader, the Roman army could do; which afterwards could win Rome and all her empire, making CESAR a monarch: so hereafter, by GOD's blessing, who hath converted our greatest hindrance into our greatest help; the enemy that shall dare to try our forces, will find cause to wish; that, avoiding us, he had rather encountered as great a puissance as was that of the Roman Empire.