the French were to be assaulted by such supe rior numbers.

Such was the flattering picture of affairs that was presented to the view of Sir John Moore, before he commenced his march, and was enabled to judge for himself.

In passing through the Portuguese territory, the troops behaved with order and regularity, which formed a striking contrast to the cruelty and rapine that of late years disgrace the French armies. The people were civil; but considerable difficulties occurred respecting provisioning the troops. Setaro, a contracter at Lisbon, had agreed to supply the divisions with rations on the march through Portugal. But this man failed in his contract; and the divisions of General Fraser and Beresford were obliged to be halted; and, had it not been for the great exertions of the Generals, the troops would have been long delayed.

There was also a great want of money, from which excessive inconveniences resulted. It had been supposed that Government bills would'. have been accepted; but promissory notes do not obtain credit in Spain and Portugal, as in England. At Guarda, the Chief Magistrate refused to procure provisions without regular

payments, and the peasantry had a dread of paper money. These difficulties were, however, surmounted, but not without great expence.

The Commander of the Forces was usually entertained with politeness at the houses of the Nobility. He saw little appearance of a French party, but was surprised to observe the slight interest the Portuguese took in public affairs. They were generally well inclined, but luke

warm.

As Sir John Moore was approaching the scene of action, he gradually acquired just notions of Spanish affairs; for he was in close correspondence with men of candour and discernment who resided on the spot. Little was written by them of Spanish ardour and enthusiasm: their letters, on the contrary, were filled with details of the weakness and tardiness of the Central Junta.

This assembly consisted of thirty-two persons with equal powers. So numerous an executive body was ill calculated for prompt decisions. Self-interest, mutual jealousy, and discord, distracted their councils. There was no predominant leader to give uniformity to their acts, no animating passions to elevate

their minds. By cold languor, and foggy dulness, they chilled and damped the spirits of the Nation.

The love of independence and hatred of a tyrant so instantaneously excite all the energies of Britons, that they can hardly credit the sluggish indifference that pervaded the Spanish nation, when menaced by the rapid approach of the vietorious armies of Buonaparte.

Judging what he could do, by what Spaniards were capable of, they thought it almost impossible for his army to traverse the Pyrennees in winter. But should the French have the temerity to effect such a passage, it was believed they would soon be famished. These notions were applicable to the resources formerly possessed by France. But the magnitude of the military preparations of their present enemy, and the celerity of his movements, confounded all such calculations.

"I am

Lord William Bentinck saw clearly the error committed by the Spaniards. In a dispatch about the beginning of October he observes, with a melancholy presage, "every moment more and more convinced, "that a blind confidence in their own strength, ❝and natural slowness, are the rocks upon

which this good ship runs the risk of being "wrecked."

It was wondered at in England, why the bold patriots, who were believed to be swarming in Spain, did not charge the discomfited remains of the French armies lurking behind the Ebro: Why are they not exterminated before they are reinforced ?

The Marquis de Castanos and General Blake could have answered these enquiries very satisfactorily to all intelligent military men: for it is clear from existing documents, that the Spanish armies were so weak in numbers, and so wretchedly equipped, as to be incapable of encountering the French, even before their reinforcements arrived. This deplorable deficiency was carefully concealed, to prevent its sinking the nation into despair.

Notwithstanding the extensive correspondence which Sir John Moore carried on, he could obtain no certain accounts of the numbers or condition of the Spanish forces, before the arrival of Buonaparte. But after that event, when they had assembled all their new levies, it was found that the Armies of the Centre and Right united, under the Generals Castanos and Palafox, formed only a force of 40,000 men. And the following extract from the Re

solutions of a Council of War composed of the principal Spanish Generals, which was held at Tudela on the 5th of November, exposes part of the distresses of these armies. At this period General Blake's army, called the Army of the Left, was known to be in the utmost danger; yet the Council came to this Resolution:

"Attention being had to the actual state of penury and want, which the Army of the Centre, destitute of the most necessary means, "is suffering; considering also that this ef"fective force is much less than had been sup"posed; it is agreed that in the present mo"ment it cannot be of assistance to the Army “of the Left, notwithstanding the conviction "of the urgency of such assistance," &c.*

To give a further view of the state of the principal Spanish Army, I shall extract a short passage from the Marquis of Castanos's dispatches to the Secretary of the Central Junta, Nov. 25, 1808.

"I leave to your Excellency to conceive the "critical situation of an army immoveable from "its few resources, and the greatest part of "which was composed of new levies, badly "clothed, and badly provisioned."

* Vide Appendix, H. p. 26.