only condition; namely, if it can be shown that the vis representativa, or the Sentient, is itself a species of being; that is, either as a property or attribute, or as an hypostasis or self subsistence. The former-that thinking is a property of matter under particular conditions,-is, indeed, the assumption of materialism; a system which could not but be patronized by the philosopher, if only it actually performed what it promises. But how any affection from without can meta borrowed passages marked in italics. The last sentence is borrowed in chapter ix. of B. L. 66 The act, through which the I limits itself, is no other than that of the self-consciousness, at which, as the explanationground of all Limitedness (Begrüntztseyns) we come to a stand, and for this reason, that how any affection from without can transform itself into a representing or knowing is absolutely inconceivable. Supposing even that an object could work upon the I, as on an object, still such an affection could only bring forth something homogeneous, that is only an objective determinateness (Bestimmtseyn) over again. Thus how an original Being can convert itself into a Knowing would only be conceivable in case it could be shown that even Representation itself (die Vorstellung selbst) is a kind of Being; which is indeed the explanation of Materialism, a system that would be a boon to the philosopher, if it really performed what it promises. But Materialism, such as it has hitherto been, is wholly unintelligible; make it intelligible, and it is no longer distinguished in reality from transcendental Idealism. To explain thinking as a material phœnomenon is only possible in this way, that we reduce matter itself to a spectre,―to the mere modification of an Intelligence whose common functions are thinking and matter. Consequently Materialism itself is carried hack to the Intelligent (das Intelligente) as the original. And assuredly just as little can we succeed in an attempt to explain Being out of Knowing, so as to represent the former as the product of the latter; seeing that betwixt the two no causal relationship is possible, and they could never meet together, were they not originally one in the I. Being (Matter), considered as productive, is a Knowing; Knowing considered morphose itself into perception or will, the materialist has hitherto left, not only as incomprehensible as he found it, but has aggravated it into a comprehensible absurdity. For, grant that an object from without could act upon the conscious self, as on a consubstantial object; yet such an affection could only engender something homogeneous with itself. Motion could only propagate motion. Matter has no Inward. We remove one surface, but to meet with another. We can but divide a particle into particles; and each atom as product, a Being. If Knowing is productive in general, it must be wholly and throughout productive, not in part only. Nothing can come from without into the Knowing, for all that is is identical with the Knowing, and without it is nothing at all. If the one Factor of Representation lies in the I, so must the other also; for in the object the two are inseparable, Let it be supposed, for example, that the stuff (or material) belongs to the things, it follows that this stuff, before it arrives at the I, at least in the transition from the thing to the representation, must be formless, which without doubt is inconceivable." S. C.] 7 [Abhandlungen. Phil. Schrift. p. 240-241. Translation. "What matter, that is the object of the external intuition, is, we may analyse for ever—may divide it mechanically or chemically: we never get further than to the surfaces of bodies. That alone in matter which is indestructible is its indwelling power, which discovers itself to feeling through impenetrability. But this is a power which goes merely ad extra-only works contrary to the outward impact; thus it is no power that returns into itself. Only a power that returns into itself makes to itself an Inward. Thence to matter belongs no Inward. But the representing being beholds an inner world. This is not possible except through an activity which gives to itself its own sphere, or, in other words, returns into itself. But no activity goes back into itself, which does not, on this very account and at the same time, also go outward. There is no sphere without limitation, but just as little is there limitation without space, which is limited." See also Schelling's Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. Introd. 2nd edit. Landshut, 1803, p. 22. S. C.] 8 comprehends in itself the properties of the material universe, Let any reflecting mind make the experi-s ment of explaining to itself the evidence of our sene syous intuitions, from the hypothesis that in any givend perception there is a something which has been come municated to it by an impact, or an impression ab ex tra. In the first place, by the impact on the percipient, [ [For great part of the remainder of this paragraph seer Schelling's Transfe, Id. pp. 149-50. Compare also with Ideen, Introd. p. 22. Schelling concludes the former passage in the Transfe. Id. as follows: Transl. "The most consistent proceeding of Dogma tism,”—(that is, the old method of determining upon supersensible objects without a previous inquiry into the nature and scope of the faculties by which the inquiry is to be carried on, without "a pre-inquisition into the mind,")" is to have re course to the mysterious for the origin of representations of external things, and to speak thereof as of a revelation, which ren- .: ders all further explanation impossible; or to make the inconceivable origination of a thing so dissimilar in kind, as the representation from the impulse of an outward object, conceivable: through a power, to which, as to the Deity, (the only immediate object of our knowledge, according to that system,) even the impossible is possible." Schelling seems to have had in his mind such doctrine as that which is thus stated by Professor Stewart: "It is now, I think, 4. pretty generally acknowledged by physiologists, that the influence of the will over the body is a mystery, which has never s yet been unfolded; but, singular as it may appear, Dr. Reid was the first person who had courage to lay completely aside all the common hypothetical language concerning perception, and to exhibit the difficulty in all its magnitude, by a plain statement of the fact. To what then, it may be asked, does this statement te amount? Merely to this; that the mind is so formed, that certain impressions produced on our organs of sense by external ob-ì jects, are followed by correspondent sensations; and that these sensations, (which have no more resemblance to the qualities of matter, than the words of a language have to the things they denote,) are followed by a perception of the existence and quali " or ens représentans, not the object itself, but only its action or effect, will pass into the same. Not the iron tongue, but its vibrations, pass into the metal of the bell. Now in our immediate perception, it is not the mere power or act of the object, but the object itself, which is immediately present. We might indeed at tempt to explain this result by a chain of deductions ties of the bodies by which the impressions are made; that all the steps of this process are equally incomprehensible; and that, for any thing we can prove to the contrary, the connexion between the impression and the sensation may be both arbitrary : that it is therefore by no means impossible, that our sensations may be merely the occasions on which the correspondent pers ceptions are excited; and that, at any rate, the consideration of these sensations, which are attributes of mind, can throw no light on the manner in which we acquire our knowledge of the existence and qualities of body. From this view of the subject it follows, that it is external objects themselves, and not any species or images of these objects, that the mind perceives; and that, although, by the constitution of our nature, certain sensations are rendered the constant antecedents of our perceptions, yet it is just as difficult to explain how our perceptions are ob tained by their means, as it would be, upon the supposition, that the mind were all at once inspired with them, without any concomitant sensations whatever." Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, pp. 69-70. Such statements, in the view of the Transcendentalist, involve a contradiction,-namely, that the soul can penetrate, by perception, into that which is without itself: or that the human soul, by divine power, has present to it, or takes in essential properties not of mind, but of something alien from mind and directly contrary to it; which is impossible. The exploded bypothesis of species and images was an attempt to do away the contradiction; the doctrine found wanting by Schelling shows the futility of that attempt; but in assuming the real outness or separateness of the objects of perception, that they are, as things in themselves, apart from and extrinsic to our mind, appears to set up the contradiction again, or at least to keep it up. S. C.] I 1 and conclusions; but that, first, the very faculty of deducing and concluding would equally demand an explanation; and secondly, that there exists in fact no such intermediation by logical notions, such as those of cause and effect. It is the object itself, not the product of a syllogism, which is present to our consciousness. Or would we explain this supervention of the object to the sensation, by a productive faculty set in motion by an impulse; still the transition, into the percipient, of the object itself, from which the impulse proceeded, assumes a power that can permeate and wholly possess the soul, And like a God by spiritual art, Be all in all, and all in every part.9 And how came the percipient here? And what is become of the wonder-promising Matter, that was to perform all these marvels by force of mere figure, weight and motion? The most consistent proceeding of the dogmatic materialist is to fall back into the common rank of soul-and-bodyists; to affect the mysterious, and declare the whole process a revelation given, and not to be understood, which it would be profane to examine too closely, Datur non intelligitur. But a revelation unconfirmed by miracles, and a faith not commanded by the conscience, a philosopher may venture to pass by, without suspecting himself of ligious tendency. any irre Thus, as materialism has been generally taught, it is utterly unintelligible, and owes all its proselytes to the propensity so common among men, to mistake distinct images for clear conceptions; and vice versa, to reject as inconceivable whatever from its own nature [Altered from Cowley's All over Love. II. Ed.] |