Antitrust Bulletin, Volumen35Federal Legal Publications, 1990 |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-3 de 85
Página 197
... power in the market for the tying product is used to create additional market power in the market for the tied product . . . . But such extension of market power is unlikely , or poses no threat of economic harm , unless the two markets ...
... power in the market for the tying product is used to create additional market power in the market for the tied product . . . . But such extension of market power is unlikely , or poses no threat of economic harm , unless the two markets ...
Página 513
... market power . The underlying assumption was that if a brand does not wield sufficient power to influence the prices of other brands in the market , or to exclude other brands from the market altogether , then as a matter of law it ...
... market power . The underlying assumption was that if a brand does not wield sufficient power to influence the prices of other brands in the market , or to exclude other brands from the market altogether , then as a matter of law it ...
Página 516
... market share can have a real impact on interbrand competition . The court asserted that the facts before it demonstrated why a market power threshold is not always appropriate : Market share alone in the beer industry does not reflect ...
... market share can have a real impact on interbrand competition . The court asserted that the facts before it demonstrated why a market power threshold is not always appropriate : Market share alone in the beer industry does not reflect ...
Contenido
A Symposium on the 100th Anniversary of | 1 |
Introduction | 13 |
The Sherman Act and the Economic Power Problem | 25 |
Derechos de autor | |
Otras 3 secciones no mostradas
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Términos y frases comunes
actions activity administration agencies agreement American analysis anticompetitive Antitrust Division antitrust enforcement antitrust laws antitrust policy banks barriers cartel challenge Clayton Act coal collusion competition competitors concentration Cong Congress conspiracy consumer contestable markets Corp costs dealer decision defendant Department of Justice deregulation Division's doctrine dominant firm ECON economic economists effect efficiency enforcement policy entry evidence federal antitrust Federal Trade Commission horizontal mergers illegal increase industry issues Judiciary legislation litigation manufacturer market power market share ment merger enforcement Merger Guidelines monopoly Monsanto Nashville oligopoly plaintiff political predatory pricing price-fixing private antitrust profits Reagan recent regulation regulatory resale price maintenance restrictions result retail rule of reason Sherman Act significant standards Stat structure summary judgment Supp supplier supra note Supreme Court theory tion Trade Reg transactions treble damages trust United vertical restraints violation wholesalers