Antitrust Bulletin, Volumen35Federal Legal Publications, 1990 |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-3 de 60
Página 102
... Reagan administra- tion , with a more pronouncedly regulatory stance taking its place . As the Reagan administration took office , a number of factors suggested further changes in the Division's posture and methods . Among these were ...
... Reagan administra- tion , with a more pronouncedly regulatory stance taking its place . As the Reagan administration took office , a number of factors suggested further changes in the Division's posture and methods . Among these were ...
Página 174
... Reagan's first Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division , and his counterpart James C. Miller ... Reagan era . While not minimizing the impor- tance of President Reagan's appointments to the enforcement agencies ...
... Reagan's first Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division , and his counterpart James C. Miller ... Reagan era . While not minimizing the impor- tance of President Reagan's appointments to the enforcement agencies ...
Página 383
The Reagan administration yesterday rewrote the antitrust guide- lines that have governed business since the Johnson administration signaling a more permissive era for corporate mergers . " There is no question they are somewhat more ...
The Reagan administration yesterday rewrote the antitrust guide- lines that have governed business since the Johnson administration signaling a more permissive era for corporate mergers . " There is no question they are somewhat more ...
Contenido
A Symposium on the 100th Anniversary of | 1 |
Introduction | 13 |
The Sherman Act and the Economic Power Problem | 25 |
Derechos de autor | |
Otras 3 secciones no mostradas
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Términos y frases comunes
actions activity administration agencies agreement American analysis anticompetitive Antitrust Division antitrust enforcement antitrust laws antitrust policy banks barriers cartel challenge Clayton Act coal collusion competition competitors concentration Cong Congress conspiracy consumer contestable markets Corp costs dealer decision defendant Department of Justice deregulation Division's doctrine dominant firm ECON economic economists effect efficiency enforcement policy entry evidence federal antitrust Federal Trade Commission horizontal mergers illegal increase industry issues Judiciary legislation litigation manufacturer market power market share ment merger enforcement Merger Guidelines monopoly Monsanto Nashville oligopoly plaintiff political predatory pricing price-fixing private antitrust profits Reagan recent regulation regulatory resale price maintenance restrictions result retail rule of reason Sherman Act significant standards Stat structure summary judgment Supp supplier supra note Supreme Court theory tion Trade Reg transactions treble damages trust United vertical restraints violation wholesalers