which, as we shall see, gives rise to that sense of right which leads not only man but animals to defend what they have acquired or possess.

We are thus brought back again to that point which was reached when considering another objection to Mr Spencer's theory-the ultimate association of the idea of right with the moral sentiment. It was stated, that in the primitive stage of man's existence, this idea would be indefinite. The instinct of "property" would then amply suffice to call into play the combative faculty, and it could have been only after the property was interfered with that the definite idea of right was formulated. It is clear that there is no real mental difference in relation to property between the animal and man in his primitive condition. Both have the sense of right, founded on the instinct of self-preservation, which leads them to resist the appropriation of that which they have acquired, but that alone. This is an extremely important fact. For, we have seen that the same sense, or the instinct of self-preservation of which it is the expression, is exhibited in action by all animals, however simple their organisation. Being thus constant and universal, it is difficult to see how the conclusion can be escaped that the sense of right is the most essential element in those phenomena which accompany the action of the moral faculty in its rudimentary form among primitive peoples. It is true that interference with property gives rise to emotional experiences, and that those experiences become organised, but it is evident that the sense of right underlies them all, and that without it they could not exist. Further, the emotion is in reality purely secondary. However intense may be the anger aroused, and however dire may be its consequences, its only real value is as evidence of the intensity of the idea or feeling of right

in which it has orginated. In fact, the organization of experiences which has resulted in the formation of the moral sense has not been so much emotional as ideal. That which has been generated has been a more and more definite idea of right, which has continually increased its objective range, while subjectively establishing itself as a principle of pure reason instead of a simple natural instinct.

This brings us to another ground of objection to Mr Herbert Spencer's theory. It is clear that there is little room in the genesis of emotions on which that theory is basis for the exercise of thought. There may ultimately be the intellectual recognition of utility, but the moral sentiment is supposed to precede such recognition and to make it possible. Mr Spencer says, in fact, that the young savage does not consciously generalise. "He does not at that age, probably not at any age, formulate his experiences in the general principle, that it is well for him to do things which bring smiles from others, and to avoid doing things which bring frowns. He has no thought of the utility or inutility of the act itself; the deterrent is the mainly vague, but partially definite, fear of evil that may follow."1 But the fact is that the savage is by no means devoid of thought on matters with which the moral sense is concerned. Not, certainly, as to the utility or otherwise of his actions, nor as to the emotions the actions of others may arouse in himself. His thought has relation to the infringement of his rights about which the savage is very jealous. This is the origin of all the wars and blood-feuds which occur among peoples of a low civilisation, as, indeed, it is of most of the wars of peoples of the highest culture. Mr Herbert Spencer's theory provides no place for that 1 loc. cit., p. 427.

thought, and hence it is useless as an explanation of the moral sense, which is more a development of the sense of right of which such thought is the expression than the result of the genesis of emotion. If sentiment be distinguished from obligation, Mr Spencer's theory may explain the existence of certain ideas founded on organised emotional experiences; but, as already shown, these cannot give rise to any feeling but that of expediency. Indeed, in some of the illustrations given by Mr Spencer, there is no room for the exercise of a moral sense. Thus, he says, "from early boyhood the young savage hears recounted the daring deeds of his chiefhears them in words of praise, and sees all faces glowing with admiration. From time to time also he listens, while some one's cowardice is described in tones of scorn, and with contemptuous metaphors. That is to say, one of the things that comes to be strongly associated in his mind with smiling faces, which are symbolical of pleasures in general, is courage, and one of the things that comes to be associated in his mind with frowns and other marks of enmity, which form his symbol of unhappiness, is cowardice." Now, it might be objected to this reasoning that bravery and cowardice are dependent on other circumstances than smiles and tones of scorn, and that, in fact, their basis is chiefly physical. The exigencies of savage life are such, that quite irrespective of the influence of example, and the desire of emulation, which is no doubt usually very strong, men must be brave. If, contrary to the rule of savage life, a man be not brave, the fact is sure to have a physical cause, which no amount of social influence will neutralise. Example and emulation will not make a man positively brave,

1 loc. cit., p. 427.

2 A recognised class of "effeminates appears to exist among many of the tribes of North America and Eastern Asia.

but only render him more or less so than some one else, and in reality the most influential man among savage peoples is as often he who is most cunning, as the one who is the greatest warrior. Bravery and cowardice are in fact simply matters of expediency, having nothing whatever of the moral element. They may affect the action of the moral sense, but in no other way have

they any relation to it. The young savage may be convinced that the only way to attain to eminence, or to obtain property is to be brave, that is, bravery is necessary for such a purpose. If, therefore, he wishes to be eminent or rich, he will be convinced of the expediency of bravery. But supposing the savage to care for neither of these results, he will not necessarily be so convinced, although if he have to defend his own property, or even to aid the tribe generally against a foreign foe, he may display great bravery. If he be constitutionally a coward, the savage may, indeed, attain an eminence equal to that of his bravest associates, by taking to the arts of a sorcerer. Courage may be a virtue in the sense in which this term was used by the Romans, but it certainly has no moral element, and hence its genesis has no bearing on the question of the origin of the moral sense.

The theory propounded by Mr Herbert Spencer fails, just where every form of utilitarianism fails, in its inability to account for the idea of right or obligation which is essential to the moral sense. Mr Darwin has been no more successful than others of his school in overcoming this difficulty. In attempting, however, to discover what light the study of the lower animals will throw on the question of the origin of the moral sense, he has adopted a mode of inquiry which is a great advance on that of any of his predecessors of either school of morals, and one which must be attended with

very important results. It is true that Mr Darwin agrees with those writers "who maintain that, of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense, or conscience, is by far the most important." To this, nevertheless, is added, as highly probable, the proposition, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man." Assuming the propriety of Mr Darwin's explanation of the moral sense, this proposition, however, is almost a truism. Given the same instincts and the same intellectual powers, the effect of their co-operation must be the same; that is, there would necessarily be the formation of a moral conscience, which would differ from the human conscience only in its application, as the latter presents various objective phases among different peoples. It is useless, however, to discuss the circumstances under which animals would acquire a moral sense. It is more to the point when we are told that dogs possess something very like a conscience," This is a question, the answer to which must depend on what is meant by the term " conscience;" but even if, as Mr Darwin supposes, conscience be a feeling of dissatisfaction at having sacrificed the ever-enduring social instincts to the temporary impulses of passion and desire, the dog has not been proved to possess such a feeling. Its use of self-command restraining it from taking food in the absence of its master, certainly shows the possession of one of the elements necessary to the operation of conscience, but, before the existence of this faculty can be admitted, it must also be shown that the

3

1 "The Descent of Man," vol. i., p. 70. 2 do., vol. i., p. 78.

See infra.

D

" 2