the idea, being to give the latter a clearer definition, and thus to increase its moral influence. Mr Herbert Spencer very justly says, "The genesis of emotion is distinguished from the genesis of ideas in this: that whereas the ideas are composed of elements that are simple, definitely related, and (in the case of general ideas) constantly related, emotions are composed of enormously complex aggregates of elements which are never twice alike, and that stand in relations which are. never twice alike."1 When, however, Mr Spencer traces the origin of the moral sentiments to the genesis of the emotions, he loses sight, as was previously shown,2 of that element of "right" which runs throughout them, and which marks the genesis of an idea. But if the idea of duty in relation to what has been called negative action has had this origin, it is no less true that benevolence, that condition of mind which accompanies "virtuous" action, is due to the genesis of emotions. We have here the altruistic sentiments of Mr Herbert Spencer, which he affirms are grounded in sympathy. This is undoubtedly true; but when Mr Spencer adds that this sympathy and the sentiments which spring from it are due to experiences of utility,3 he is no less incorrect than when he derived the moral sentiments from such experiences. Sympathy would seem to be the last thing that should be referred to such a source as utility, even in the wide sense in which this term is used by Mr Spencer. Pleasurable or painful associations may give rise to a feeling of sympathy, but they could never have first originated sympathy itself. We must look for its origin to a source as fundamental as that from which the idea of right was derived,-in fact, to an instinct of our nature closely connected with the instinct on which that idea is based. Adam 1 Loc cit., p. 422. 2 Supra, p. 39. 3 Do., p. 34 seq. Smith seems to have considered sympathy as originally the same with pity or compassion, "the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner;" the emotion being ascribed to the association in our minds of that misery with our own former states of pain or sorrow. This seems to make sympathy instinctive, and such would appear to have been the intention of Adam Smith when he says, at the opening of his chapter Of Sympathy, "how selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion." Mr Darwin, also, is of opinion that sympathy is an instinct " especially directed towards beloved objects, in the same manner as fear with animals is especially directed against certain enemies;" although, following Mr Bain, he thinks the instinct may have originated in "our strong retentiveness of former states of pain or pleasure." Mr Darwin thus appreciates the importance of sympathy, but that he does not see the full extent of its relations is evident from his statement that with respect to the origin of the parental and filial affections, which apparently lie at the basis of the social affections, it is hopeless to speculate."3 His not having recognised the fact that these affections are rooted in sympathy, is due to his supposing the latter to be wholly distinct from the emotion of love. A mother, says Mr Darwin, "may passionately love her sleeping and passive infant; but she can then hardly be said to feel sympathy for it." This is perfectly true, but she 1Theory of Moral Sentiments" (Bohn), pp. 3, 5. 3 Do., p. Ɛ0. is none the less in sympathy with it, and this is no less the explanation of the love of a man for his dog and of the love of a dog for his master, both of which are equally phases of sympathy. The pity or compassion with which Adam Smith identifies sympathy in its earliest form is also in reality a special phase of this emotion, drawn out towards objects of a particular description. Love and pity are, therefore, intimately allied as manifestations of sympathy, differing between themselves only in the intensity of the emotion, or in the conditions under which it is called into active exercise. If this be so, the social affections which Mr Darwin says are based on the parental and filial affections, must also be intimately connected with sympathy. But it must be noted that none of those feelings can actually spring from sympathy. This is really an emotion of which such affections are varying phases, and although they are thus intimately related, yet there must be something else by which even sympathy itself is preceded. This can only be an instinct, a mental phase which differs from an emotion in that, while the latter is an actual affection of the mind, the former is only a tendency. Sympathy, therefore, is not, as Mr Darwin supposes, an instinct, although it must be referred to one, and if we would find the source of that condition of benevolence which shows itself in "virtuous" action, we must seek for the instinct of which sympathy is the expression. This is analagous to the course adopted, when the idea of duty or moral obligation was traced through the sense of "right" to the instinct of selfpreservation. And let it be noted that in its simplest form the sympathy on which the altruistic sentiments are founded appears, if not quite as early as the sense of right itself, yet as nearly so as the difference between the objects with which they are concerned will allow. The latter is associated with self, and therefore shows itself in germ with the most simple animal organism; while the former is directed towards others, and, therefore, it must be preceded by the recognition of others, not merely as independent existences, but as standing in the particular relation required to call forth the expression of sympathy. What then is the simple instinct called into activity by objects outside of self on which the altruistic sentiments are based? It can be none other than the maternal instinct. Mr Darwin has referred to the agony of remorse a bird possessing the migratory instinct would feel when arrived at the end of her journey, “if from being endowed with great mental activity, she could not prevent the image continually passing before her mind of her young ones perishing in the bleak north from cold and hunger." It has been already shown that this is conditioning an impossibility,1 but the imaginary case is none the less valuable as bearing on the importance of the maternal instinct, which, in another place, Mr Darwin says, is so strong that it leads "even timid birds to face great danger, though with hesitation, and in opposition to the instinct of selfpreservation.' Elsewhere Mr Darwin speaks of the love of offspring as "one of the strongest of all instincts, common to all the lower animals."3 So powerful an instinct must be as prominent as that with which it contends, and we may expect, therefore, to find that it is capable of an equally important development. This is so, and its development has now to be traced, commencing at that stage which the maternal instinct must have reached when man first appeared, supposing him to have been derived from a lower animal form, or 1 Supra, p. 50. 2 Op. cit., vol. i., 13. 3 Do., vol. ii., 367. 1 which it must have exhibited, assuming that when he was specially created he was endowed with the powers and faculties necessary for him to gradually advance towards civilization. We might, indeed, begin at a point still further back; seeing that the maternal instinct itself is based on an earlier natural tendency, the sexual. instinct. This, which has the same relation to the race as the instinct of self-preservation has to the individual, is the true starting-point of the development resulting in the formation of the altruistic sentiments. The sexual instinct is, however, among the primitive races of mankind so purely physical, and its satisfaction is attended by so little emotion other than what can be traced to a merely physical source, that in treating of the natural history of morals, it will be sufficient to start with the maternal instinct as the earliest phase in the development of those sentiments. 1 On any available hypothesis the maternal instinct must have been exhibited among mankind from its very first appearance, but in the earliest stages of human progress it would be partially quenched or rendered nugatory by "the immediate needs of self-preservation," interpreting self-preservation in its widest sense. It is possible that among some uncivilized peoples, as Mackenzie supposes with regard to the Knisteneaux of North America, mothers destroy their infant female children. on account of the hardships they will have to bear if they are permitted to grow up. Even Mackenzie, however, allows another motive-the troubles of maternity—— which leads the woman to practice abortion, and this appears to be the chief reason for infanticide among uncivilised peoples. It is not, however, the only one. Mr Darwin, indeed, seems inclined to assign for its origin, the difficulty barbarians have to support themselves and 1 "Voyages from Montreal through North America," (1801) p. xcviii. |