"2

the hands of the husband of the woman first maltreated.1 The only excuse, if such it be, for this conduct, is to be found in the character of the women themselves. According to Sir George Grey, "the ferocity of the women, when they are excited, exceeds that of the men; they deal dreadful blows at one another with their long sticks, and if ever the husband is about to spear or beat one of his wives, the others are certain to set on her, and treat her with great inhumanity." The exhibition of extreme cruelty by one wife towards another is often observable among the Kafirs,3 and other African peoples, and it is not merely a result of polygamy. It is only one of the accompaniments of the low state of moral culture of the people who exhibit it, and which is evidenced also by the refined cruelty so often practised on prisoners and criminals under the influence of passion or superstition. That which has been said as to the absence from the minds of the primitive peoples of Australia and Polynesia of any notion of morality or immorality, as we understand these terms, is true also of the aborigines of India. and of most of the native inhabitants of the African and American continents. Certain actions may sometimes be considered inexpedient, but as to being "wrong" in the abstract, it is impossible to believe that such a notion could be entertained, except, perhaps, occasionally by individuals far superior to their fellows, who do undoubtedly sometimes make their appearance among uncultured peoples. The subject will be considered further in the next chapter, but to show how inde

1 Sir Geo. Grey, op. cit. ii. p. 254. 3 Shooter, op. cit. p. 79.

2 Do. ii., 314.

Some of these aboriginal tribes make the nearest approach perhaps of any existing people to the "innocence of Eden," but a consideration of the phenomena they present shows clearly that their actions are not governed by notions of morality.

finite is the idea of "immorality" usually entertained by such peoples, reference may here be made to the Aymara notion, that it could not be a sin for a man to commit incest on Good Friday, "as on that day God was dead, and consequently could not possibly on the next day remember anything which happened the day before."1

That the condemnation of certain actions is not due to any sense of moral wrong is shown conclusively, moreover, by the fact that it is only under certain conditions that they are disapproved of. Severely punished when perpetrated against a member of the tribe, unless (as in the case of adultery) by consent; they are considered innocent, or if condemned at all only as inexpedient, when directed against a stranger. To what cause, then, are we to refer this distinction ? It can only have arisen from the idea of personal right. When considering the instincts of animals, it was shown that one of the most important in relation to the moral sense, is that which is at the foundation of the notion of property. The bird which has built a nest, or obtained certain food, instinctively feels that it has secured an exclusive interest in the object as against all other creatures. It can easily be shown that the instinct which thus operates must in the human mind give rise to the sense of right, with the co-relative feeling of wrong. That which I have acquired a property in, I intuitively feel that I have a right to retain, and, therefore, that it is wrong for anyone else to deprive me of. Animals instinctively act on this principle, and it must have been that which guided primeval man, as it does the lowest savages of the present day, when they repel invasions on their property, and revenge the injuries they sustain at the hands of others by inflicting similar 1 See supra, p. 219.

injuries on the offender. It cannot be objected that property acquired may have been wrongfully taken from others; since in this case the sense of right could not be aroused against the original owner, but only in opposition to a third person, as against whom the claim of the intruder would be perfectly legitimate. The latter has acquired a certain "property" in the object, although it may be only temporary, and liable at any moment to be defeated.

The sense of right, arising from the possession of property, entertained by one individual, is perfectly consistent with the recognition of an analogous right in others. The notions of right and wrong are dependent on each other, and they may in fact be taken as two phases the affirmative and the negative-of but one idea. Thus, the savage who has certain "property," which implies a right, would instinctively judge that it is not right to interfere with such property. This negative idea must indeed have been formed in the mind before its affirmative co-relative. No doubt, when property was first acquired in pursuance of a primitive instinct, a dormant sense of right would accompany its possession. In the absence, however, of antagonism, there would not necessarily be any actual formation of the idea of "property" as clothed with a certain right. In fact, there could not be the formation of any such idea until what might be termed the instinct of right was interfered with, by the attempt to appropriate the property which it sanctioned. Nor would the positive idea of right be even then immediately formed. The first thought which would instinctively be entertained would relate to the negative phase of that idea, that is the notion of not-right, or wrong, would be the first to be formed. Of course, the affirmative idea of "right" would instinctively be associated with its

negative since the latter derives all its force from the instinct, from the operation of which the former arisesbut there could be no definite notion of right in the absence of wrongful interference with the property to which it has relation.

When once, however, the idea of wrong was entertained, there would be a link to connect the right of self with that of others. Hitherto there was no ground for believing it wrong to appropriate the property of another; as, by the requirements of the selfish nature of primitive man, the only right he could recognise was personal. When, however, this appropriation aroused in the minds of others a sense of wrong leading to retribution, which in its turn formed the same idea in the mind of the original offender, it is clear that there would not be much difficulty in transferring the correlative idea of right from self to others. Sooner or later the inference would be sure to be made that, if it is wrong for others to interfere with the property of self, it must be wrong to interfere with that of others, and therefore that others have rights analogous to those which self possesses. That the notion of morality is really founded on that of property rights, is evident enough from the fact that, among peoples of a comparatively high degree of culture, nearly all crimes have a material price, the payment of the fine fixed for the offence being considered a sufficient satisfaction. The case of adultery may be thought to differ from others. It is, however, not so; since it is only at an advanced stage of social progress that woman, whether a wife or daughter, is viewed as anything more than the "property" of the husband or father. Interference with it is no doubt sometimes punished with death, but this only because woman is 1 See supra, p. 270 and infra.

2 Theft is usually punished equally severely.

usually considered to be the most valuable property that a man possesses; and although she may be bartered, she is not allowed to be appropriated without the consent of her proprietor.

Although the formation of the idea of right, and the recognition of the rights of others which succeeds it, was thus founded on the instinct of "property," yet the latter at least would be aided by the operation of the social instincts. Man is unquestionably a social being. It is true that the semi-civilised man not unfrequently spends much of his time away from his fellows. Such is the case with many of the wild Indians of South America, such as the Caishánas, of the forest of the Tunantins, described by Mr Bates. But even these men are not really exceptions to the rule of human sociability. Notwithstanding their low social condition, they have regular meetings for festival-keeping. Moreover, they can be said to live a "solitary" life only in a relative sense of the word. Although they do not live in villages, like the more cultivated peoples belonging to the same stock, yet the solitary hut shelters a family, and abundant opportunity is thus provided for the gratification of the social wants of so mild a people as the Caishánas.1

Dr Semper has some remarks on the apparent unsociability of man in his primitive state, in relation to the Irayas of the Philippines, which are deserving of being quoted. He says:-"Great, unconquerable love for their homes and for their wandering life, is frequently expressed in the narratives of the Spaniards concerning negroes caught and educated in Manilla. Yet we should probably err if we regarded this untame

1 Bates, op. cit., vol. ii., p. 373. For other examples of "unsociability" among the Indians of South America, see Marcoy, op. cit., vol. i., p. 578, as to the Antis, and supru, p. 218, as to the Aymaras.