Philofophical Treatife, concerning cannot by the Help of Reafon be Human Understanding is. 3. What an Reafon is. 6. What Truth is. 7. That there are feveral Degrees of Certitude, and that the Certainty of Faith doth perfect the Certainty of Human Nature. Page 9 CHAP. 2. Proving both from Holy Scriptures and Fathers, that Man cannot attain to a certain and perfect Knowledge of Truth, by the Help of Reafon. p. 17 CHAP. 3. Proof. ii. That Man cannot be perfectly and intirely certain, that an external Object doth exactly answer the imprinted Idea he has of it. Because ift. The Images, Forms or Shadows, which emanate from external Bodies, are no Ways like them. 2d. We may justly doubt of the Fidelity of the interpofing Medium, through which the Images or Shadows pass from the outward Object to the Organs of our Senfation. 3d. The Fidelity of our Senfes is doubtful. 4th. The Fidelity of the Nerves and animal Spirits is doubtful. sth. The Fidelity of the Brain is doubtful. 6th. The Fidelity of our Mind or Understanding is doubtful, and its Nature unknown to P. 25 CHAP. 4. Proof iii. That Human UnderStanding cannot know the Nature of Things with a perfect Certainty, P.40 CHAP. 5. Proof iv. That Things can never be perfectly and certainly known by reason of their continual Changes. P. 45 CHAP. 6. Proof v. That Nothing can be certainly known by reason of the Difference of Men. P. 48 CHAP. CHAP. 7. Proof vi. That Things cannot be perfectly and certainly known, because CHAP. 9. Proof viii. Wherein ft. the Evidence of Senfe and Reafon, is con- futed. 2d. Shewing that the Objects which prefent themselves to the Minds of thofe that are asleep, drunk or mad, are as evident as the Objects which pre- fent themselves to the Minds of thofe who are awake, fober and in their CHAP. 10. Proof ix. Containing, ift. The Reasons propos'd by Des Cartes, for our doubting of every Thing; viz. That we don't know whether God has not created us of fuch a Nature, as that we shall be always mistaken. Whence it follows, 2d. That our internal Perception of Things is uncertain and doubtful. p. 64 CHAP. 11. Proof x. That it is a Petitio Principii, or begging of the Question, to raclitus. critus. my. CHAP. 14. Proof xiii. That the Law of doubting has been established by many excellent Philofophers. 1. By Anacharfis. 2. Pherecydes. 3. Pythagoras. 4. Empedocles, s. Gorgias Lcontinus. 6. Xenophancs. 7. Epicharmes. 7. Epicharmes. 8. Parmenides. 9. Xeniades. 10. Zeno Elenfis. 11. He12. Anaxagoras. 13. Demo14. Protagoras. IS. Socrates. 16. Plato, Author of the firft Acade17. Ariftotle. 18. Arcefilaus, Author of the fecond Academy. 19. Lacides. 20. Carneades, Author of the third Academy. 21. Clitomachus. 22. Philo, Author of the fourth Academy. 23. Antiochus, Author of the fifth Academy. 24. Cicero. 25. Varro, Pifo, Lucullus and Brutus. 26. The Origin of Pyrrho. nifm. 27. Metrodorus. 28. Anaxarchus. 29. Pyrrho. 30. How many real Academies there have been, and the Dif ference between the Academy and Pyrrhonism. 31. That there have been but two Academies, the Ancient and the Modern, which last was a real Pyrrhonifm. 32. Wherein the Difference between the new Academy, and the Sect of the Scepticks, is fhewn, and reconciled. Firft Difference. 33. Second Dif-· ference. 34. Third Difference. 35. Fourth Difference. 36. Fifth Difference. 37. Sixth Difference. 38. Seventh Diffe rence. 39. Why thofe Philofophers, who made |