which make it improbable that such should ever be the case, and which render this a very unfit mode of carrying on any process of reasoning. A work, where fancy must have such ample scope, can hardly be conducted according to strict logical rules. Nature will seldom be closely followed; and incidents may easily be so arranged as to give them, on a superficial view, the appearance of supporting some favourite tenet. On a closer examination, the leading events will be generally found to have proceeded from foreign and accidental causes, altogether different from those which the point to be proved requires them to have proceeded from. The judgment also is frequently biassed by the author's ascribing every good quality to such personages as are of his own manner of thinking; and, to the opposite party, every thing which can render them the object of ridicule or hatred. With regard to the reader, it cannot be expected that he should be much occupied in following out the train of reasoning. The likelihood is, either that be will pay no attention to the opinions in

culcated, or, if he does, that he will adopt them implicitly, and without due examination. Pleased with interesting narrative, or brilliant description, he will not be much disposed to search for defects in the argument.

Upon the whole, then, it would appear, that truth is still to be found out, as formerly, by philosophical discussion, by arranging and generalizing facts, not by any fable, however ingenious or well constructed. Perhaps it may be otherwise where opinions are introduced with the view of spreading, and rendering them familiar to the unlearned. Where they happen, indeed, to be of a peculiar and paradoxical nature, this certainly is not the proper place for bringing them forward. But if they be such as are generally agreed upon by well-informed and thinking men, and he himself be satisfied of their truth, there appears to be no impropriety in representing them as believed and acted upon by his favourite characters..

The second order of reasoning fictions, are those, whose object it is to shew the motives of prudence, which bind to the observation

of some particular moral duty. This they generally attempt, by exhibiting the calamities which ill-conduct occasions to the person who is guilty of it. They may also shew the happy effects which virtue produces. But this is more rarely their aim; and, where it is, they coincide, in a great measure, with the class which we are next to notice. Wherever the term moral fiction occurs in the course of the present essay, it is to be understood in this limited sense, not as signifying, in general, works whose tendency is favourable to morality.

Tales, written with a view to instruction, are generally of this kind; insomuch, that when we speak of the moral of a tale, we mean always some maxim which may be inferred from it.

The same objections which were stated under the former head, seem to apply here with nearly equal force. It is only by a review of the actual course of events, that we can trace with certainty that connection, which, even in this world, exists between virtue. and happiness. Now, fiction either

does, or does not, represent this course as more favourable to virtue than it really is. On the former supposition, it tends to raise expectations, of which a little acquaintance with the world will quickly shew the fallacy. The disappointment which this occasions, may then, very probably, throw those who have suffered it into an opposite extreme. Should it, on the other hand, give a just view of human affairs, it will still possess no superiority over the narrative of real events.

Besides the objections to which this species is liable in common with the former, there appear to be others peculiar to itself. To fulfil the object in view, it is necessary that the principal character should be not only. imperfect, but in a great degree criminal. But a character, that was uniformly and throughout bad, would form an unpleasant, and even a disgusting, object. He must, therefore, be at the same time invested with certain amiable and brilliant qualities, which may render him an object of interest to the reader. Moral turpitude is thus frequently united with those superficial talents and ac

complishments, which are so dazzling in the eyes of the bulk of mankind. There seems thus to be no small danger, that, by a too natural association of ideas, the one part of this character may be confounded with the other, and the whole be considered as a proper object of imitation. This is particularly apt to be the case in young and unexperienced readers, who must form here a very large proportion. Every one has heard of the young nobleman, who, having witnessed the representation of a play, called the Libertine destroyed, declared, on leaving the house, that he would be the libertine destroyed, and actually proved so.

This objection acquires still greater force, when we consider, that whatever attention may be paid by the author to what is called the moral of his work, he may depend upon its being little, if at all regarded, by the reader. His mind, while perusing it, will probably be quite otherwise occupied, than in considering the maxims of conduct which may be drawn from it. According to the view, indeed, which has been given above,