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and this with regard to your army, and with regard to the army under M. de Soubise, that they may have it in their power to take possession of Cassel, and much less to march to Marpourg, or to the quarters which he will have along the Lahn, or to those which you will Occupy, from the lower part of the left side of the Roer, and on the right side of the Rhine, as far as Dusseldorp and at Cologne."

"You know the necessity of consuming, or destroying, as far as is possible, all the subsistence, especially the forage, betwixt the Weser and the Rhine on the one hand, and on the other, betwixt the Lippe, the bishoprick of Paderborn, the Dymel, the Fulda, and the Nerra; and so make a desart of Westphalia and Hesse.".

"Altho' the Prince of Waldeck appears outwardly neutral, he is very ill disposed, and deserves very little favour. You ought, therefore, to make no scruple of taking all you find in that territory; but this must be done in an orderly man ner, giving receipts, and observing the most exact discipline. All the subsistence you leave in his country will fall to the enemy's share, who will, by that means, be enabled to advance to the Lahn, and towards the quarters which you are to occupy on the left side of the Roer. It is therefore a precaution, become in a manner indispensibly necessary to carry it all away from thence."

"The question now is, what plan you shall think most proper for accomplishing, in the quick, est and surest manner, our great purpose; which must be to consume, carry off, or destroy all the forage or subsistence of the country

which we cannot keep possession of."

"The upper part of the Lippe, and the country of Paderborn, are the most plentiful; they must therefore be eat to the very roots."

"You did mighty well to talk in the most absolute. tone with regard to the necessaries Racroth and Duysbourg must furnish our troops; it is necessary to speak in that tone to Germans; and you will find your account in using the same to the regencies of the Elector of Cologne, and still more to that of the Palatine."

"After using all becoming cere. mony, as we have the power in our hands, we must make use of it, and draw from the country of Bergue what shall be necessary for the subsistence of the garrison of Dusseldorp, and of the light troops, and reserve what may be brought thither from Alsace and the bishop-, ricks for a case of necessity."

It appears by the following letter, written by the French King's agent, at Cologne, to M. l'Abbe Bernis, that the accounts which have from time to time been published of the dissolute and irregular behaviour of the French troops were not without foundation.

"Sir, I must not conceal from you what the chancellor told me ; that the Elector was extremely surprised to see how little the French were on their guard. The French,. said he to me, have neither guards, out-posts, nor centinels; there is no order in their camp, every body lives there in the utmost security; strangers walk there at pleasure, no body asks them any questions; they are suffered to go everywhere, even among your batteries; spies have nothing to fear there; they

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say, likewise, that Hanoverian of ficers in disguise come there every day, hear every thing that is said, see every thing that passes, and observe all your posts: your councils of war are held in a tent, where they speak so loud, that the peo-ple in the field, if they be any thing nigh, hear every thing that is treated in them. We hear, how ever, that your army, after this day (which was the sixth) will encamp in one line; this gives us some security; but you see how much this exposes you, and us at the same time. Every day there is almost a third of your army taking their pleasure in Cologne, who frequently return to the camp drunk; and, it is said, that instead of paying your spies liberally, you think it enough to make them drink.

I have observed that within these two days that people have been informed of these particulars, fear and disquiet have very much increased at this court.

The exhausted state of the French finances, and the exigences to which they were driven long before the late stoppage of their payments, appears from the following extract.

"I am going to write a long

letter to M. Gayot on the article of expences; they are insupportable; and as I am incessantly asking money from the comptroller general, who has none to give me, we must, at least, do our endeavour, and I beg you, Sir, to help me, as well as M. Gayot, to save, otherwise we shall want money for the most essential articles."

It appears also from the following passage, that the clamour of a corrupt and disappointed faction against our expedition on the French coast was the effect either of igno

rance or of enmity to their country.

"You don't doubt how much I desire to procure you the pleasure of having your son and nephew with you. I had taken some steps towards it; but the new enterprise with which the English again threaten us, has obliged me to retain all the troops on the coasts. All the orders were already expedited. I have been obliged to dispatch couriers into Normandy, Bretagne, Poitou, and Annis, to draw all the troops nearer the coasts. How was it possible then for me, during the winter, to call back regiments which were posted on the most western parts of the coast, and order them to join your army? Those regiments must have come to you quite harassed and ruined, especially as they have had, and have still, many sick.".

The following reflections on the publication of Belleisle's letter by the English ministry, are published in the Brussels Gazette, the author says, by desire.

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Ist of August, a part of the allied army carried off, among other papers of the marshal de Contades of little importance, a dispatch of the marshal de Belleisle, dated July 23, which turned chiefly on the measures which it might perhaps be proper to take for making a barrier, at the end of the campaign, between the quarters of the [French] King's army, and those of his Britannic majesty's forces.

consequence of the affair of the

A few days after, a part of the letter in question appeared in the Gazette that is printed at London

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by authority; and several papers, dispersed in England, have sufficiently shewn what was the design of the English ministry in publishing this passage. They flat ered them selves that every body would, as they had done, take in the literal sense that passage, which mentions, that perhaps it might be necessary to make a downright desart before the line of the quarters, which it might be thought proper to keep during the winter; and that they should thereby be able to convict France of adopting a plan of devastation, which that crown will ever hold in abhorrence. We should not be surprized that it should be natural for the court of London, as if it were in spite of themselves, to give such a false and odious interpreta, tion to the expression just mentioned: the unheard-of vexations exercised by their ally the King of Prussia in Saxony, in Mecklenbourg, and in Franconia, have accustomed them to think that there is no other method of making a barrier before the quarters to be kept but total devastation; but this sense will never enter into the heads of the impartial public on reading the passages, who know how repugnant such a conduct would be to that system of equity, disinterestedness and moderation, from which France has never once departed. It is easy to conceive, that a country may be made a downright desart for an army, without making a desart for the inhabitants. To make a desärt which may serve for a barrier against any enemy, is to leave in it no tenable post, nor any subsist ence which may draw them thither: and in this sense the expression in the marshal de Belleisle's

letters, of a downright desart, will be generally understood.

It is, moreover, sufficiently evident, from the very part of the letter which is published, that only subsistence proper for an army is meant; for it expressly says, reserving for ourselves a bare subsistence on the route which may be most convenient for us to take in the middle of winter. It should seem that this reflection escaped the English ministry. It were to be wished, for the sake of their honour, that the same supposition could be made with regard to some other passages, which they have not thought proper to publish: they may recollect one, in which M. de Contades is commended for the rigid discipline which he causes to be observed, and for the measures taken by him in relation to some outrages committed at Osnaburgh against the Eng lish prisoners; and another passage, wherein it is expressly recommended to him, to see that every body be satisfied, and that the country be not laid waste; and that nothing be taken by pillage, or any other kind of exaction. This may suffice to shew the design of the English in pub lishing a part only of the marshal de Belleisle's letter.

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sail he could make, came athwart me within gun shot, about four o'clock, and poured a furious broadside into me, which I returned, and my shot were so well aimed, that his mizen-mast, was carried away, this main-top-sail yard came in two upon the deck, the spritsail yard and the jack-staff were cut away, all his sails were torn, and he sheared off to be out of the reach of my fire. I was struck at this time with a piece of iron, which made a large wound in my right leg, and broke my left leg, so that I was forced to leave the count de Carne to fight the ship. Never was such a fire seen as my squadron kept up. I have all the reason in the world to believe, that if I had all my ships, I should have beat them. The English admiral, on leaving me, fell upon the Centaur, and made the fifth ship which she had to engage; so that she was forced to strike, after performing prodigies of valour. At night the engagement ceased, the enemy kept the wind under an easy sail.

of August, with twelve ships of the line, and three frigates. I was. not afraid of meeting Admiral Boscawen, though his squadron was stronger than mine; but by an unaccountable fatality, five of my ships and three frigates parted from me, so that next morning at day break I found I had only seven with, me fortunately they were the largest, viz. the Ocean, the Redoubtable, the Centaur, the Guerrier, the Souverain, the Temeraire, and the Modeste. At sun-rising we discovered eight sail to windward; I believed them to be my ships, and waited for them, keep ing as near the wind as possible, with very little sail. In a little time their number increased so much that we counted eighteen. I made no doubt of their being the enemy's fleet. I immediately determined to make all the sail I could to gain the weather gage, and made the proper signal to my ships, but I was obliged to wait for the Souverain, which is a heavy sailer, and by that means the enemy got up with me sooner than I cannot express to your excelthey would otherwise have done. lency the valour and courage shewn Whilst the wind blew a brisk gale, by our ships companies, which did they had no advantage over us: not slacken one moment. The but at noon the wind dying away, enemy's superiority did not frightI found that they sailed much bet- en them. This was, no doubt, ter than we. At half an hour after owing to the example of the of...... two, the Centaur, Capt. de Sa- ficers, who discovered a courage bran, which was in the rear, was truly heroic. My ship fired 2500. attacked by two ships, one on the cannon-shot. I judge that we had larboard, the other on the starboard about 100 killed on the spot, and. side, and defended herself with un-seventy dangerously wounded; one common bravery. The Guerrier was attacked soon after; then the Ocean and the Souverain. The heat of the action was with these four ships, each of which fought both sides of the ship without intermission. Admiral Boscawen, who came down upon me with all the

garde pavillon was killed, and se-:: val officers were wounded. We employed the night in preparing for a second engagement; but the. count de Panat, who commanded the Souverain, and M. de Rochmore, captain of the Guerrier, left me in the night, which greatly

dimi

diminished the force of my squadron, and daunted the courage of my people.

On the 18th, at day-break, the enemy crowded sail to come up with me. I then judged my ruin unavoidable. Finding myself on the coast of Portugal, I determined to burn the king's ships there, rather than surrender them to the enemy. I ran the Ocean ashore two leagues from Lagos, under the fort called Almandana, and sent notice to the commander of that fort, who fired three cannon shot at the English, but they paid no regard to them. The marquis de St. Aignan also ran his ship on shore, and both of us endeavoured to land our men, but the sea being rough, this took up a great deal of time. M. de Castillon, captain of the Temeraire, and M. de Mouvre, captain of the Modeste, did not follow my example, but anchored as near as they could to forts Exavier and Lagres, hoping that the English would respect these forts; but they paid no regard to them, and came and anchored close by the two French ships, which they fought until they struck.

One of the enemy's ships eame and anchored behind the Ocean, and fired into her, and into the boats that were carrying the men ashore. The count de Carne, finding he could not get out of the ship, was forced to strike his colours, and to surrender prisoner, with M. Darbaud, and the Chevalier de Glandeves, M. de Sufrim, the Chevalier de Damas, and 5 inferior officers; the rest were soldiers, with some

sed the night with the officers and the wounded men, without either bread or water. On the 19th the governor of Lagos sent to invite me to that place. I was carried thither, and all my people followed me; he gave us all the assistance that wretched country could afford. Our people had no more than a quarter of a pound of bread a day, each day, for two days; nor could I procure straw for the sick and wounded. I and the wounded officers are lodged with the Capuchins; these good fathers take great care of us. I am infinitely obliged to the Corregidor for his civilities.

We have sent all our ships companies to Cadiz, chiefly by sea: I remain here with three. wounded officers, the Chevalier Beaucour, and my nephew, who stays to bear me company; he serves me for secretary, and presents his compliments to your excellency.

My wounds are in a very good way; but I know not when I shall be able to leave this place. I am uneasy about the domestic I sent to you, on account of the difficulties which, I hear, attend travelling in this country. If you have not seen him, I desire you would cause enquiry to be made about him.

Abridgement of the placart published by his excellency Gen. James Wolfe, commander in chief of the troops of his Britannic majesty, on his arrival in the river St. Laurence, in the month of August, 1759.

gunners, making in all about 60, Tinst France, has set on HE King, justly exasperated

whom the English took on board, and set fire to the vessel, which burnt in the night.

I was carried on shore, and pas

foot a considerable armament by land and sea, to bring down the haughtiness of that crown. His

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