for; they prorogate the time for the petitioners lodging their answers for fourteen days from this date, and ordain the petitioner, William Johnston, to sist himself at the bar upon Monday, the 24th day of Feb. instant.

(Signed) ROBERT M'QUEEN, I. P. D. Answers were accordingly printed, but they do not appear upon record. They were as follows:

ANSWERS, &C.

In making an answer to the petition and complaint exhibited against the respondent, at the instance of his majesty's advocate, the only question to which the respondent has to apply himself, is simply this, whether the particular facts set forth, and the writings therein founded upon, are sufficient to forfeit the bail-bond, by which the respondent and his cautioners stand bound for his good behaviour; which bond was granted by them in consequence of a sentence of this high court, on the 3d of February 1793?

It becomes necessary, therefore, for the respondent, 1st, To consider the nature and terms of the bail-bond itself; 2ndly, To take a view of the facts that are charged against him, as amounting to a forfeiture of this bond; and lastly, To endeavour to show your lordships that the facts charged, are insufficient to operate the forfeiture contended for by the public prosecutor.

The respondent, some time before the sentence of the Court above-mentioned, had engaged in the publication of a newspaper, called the Edinburgh Gazetteer, on which he laid out a considerable sum of money, promising himself a reasonable profit from the adventure.

this convention still more respectable; and none who have the cause at heart, and discerns how much is at stake, will be remiss.

It must occur to your lordships, without any assurance to that effect from the respondent, that it is no easy matter for the best intentioned and most accurate proprietor of a newspaper, in the hurry attending the publication, to prevent improper and offensive paragraphs from finding their way into a repository of so general a nature. At the same time, there can be no doubt that the responsibility for any thing that shall be therein inserted, necessarily attaches on the publisher. Unfortunately for the respondent (though he is conscious owing to no blame on his part), a paragraph of a very improper nature, animadverting upon certain proceedings of this Court, was put into the hands of the person who managed the detail of the publication for the respondent, and which was, without any knowledge or approbation of the respondent, at that time labouring under a severe indisposition, inserted in the Gazetteer.

The public prosecutor having felt it his duty to represent the matter to your lordships, the order of the Court mentioned in the petition, was served upon the respondent, who sisted himself accordingly at the bar of this court, upon the 29th of January 1793. The consequence was, that your lordships found the respondent was guilty, art and part, of publishing the passages complained of; and therefore decerned and ordained him to be carried from the bar to the Tolbooth of Canongate, therein to be detained for the space of three months from that date, ' and thereafter, until he should find sufficient 'caution and surety acted in the books of 'adjournal, for his good behaviour for the and to appoint one of your number to represent you at our meeting of the 19th current, it may soon procure you the thanks of all your fellow citizens, and at any rate must give you personal satisfaction, as tending to unite our country in the bond of fraternity, the chief resource of men in the day of evil.

WILLIAM SKIRVING, Secy.

Edinburgh, Nov. 7, 1793.

good cause, I am, &c.

LETTER, Mr. Johnston to Mr. Scott, or Mr.

Ross.

If you can procure a meeting in your town, though but of 5 or 6, to draw up a declaration in favour of universal suffrage in the election of ministers, magistrates, and legislatures,

to them, to be adopted by the convention, to show its abhorrence of the conduct both of the judge and jury in the trial of Mr. Holt. I don't send you the resolutions as being perfect, but merely as a model.-Do with them as you think proper-shew them to Mr. Callender-at any rate, something you should do.-Can you procure me a copy of the Bill of Rights?-Why, through a false delicacy wait for Mr. Skirving? a public cause requires the active exertions of every man-and delicacy is out of the question.-Your's &c. &c.

(Addressed) Mr. Scott, or Mr. Ross.

W. J.

This sentence of your lordships called the respondent's most serious attention to the predicament in which he stood as proprietor of a newspaper, for every part of which he was responsible; with a view therefore, not only to relieve himself from any such risk in future, but to prevent his being, even ignorantly or inadvertently, the means of conveying to the public any thing that might be offensive or dangerous to the community, the respondent resolved to give up the concern, which he accordingly did at a very considerable loss to his family, as the continuation of the publication had been too short to allow him to get back the sums necessarily expended in the commencement of the work. A fair conveyance of the concern was accordingly made, and from that day to this, the respondent neither directly nor indirectly has had any connexion with the conduct of that paper. During the time the respondent had the conduct of the paper, he has the satisfaction to think, that although it was made the channel of communicating to the public the resolutions of various societies and descriptions of men on the subject of parliamentary reform, it cannot be found to have contained any thing of a seditious nature on that subject. Of this, no better evidence can be adduced than, that notwithstanding the laudable vigilance of the public prosecutor to suppress and punish every publication of a seditious tendency, no judicial measures were by him taken against the respondent, on account of any thing that appeared in that paper. And as it will not be supposed, that while the respondent was called before your lordships, for the offensive publication already mentioned, the public prosecutor would pass over any other irregularity that called for his animadversion, he humbly conceives, that he is entitled to avail himself of this conclusion to the fullest effect.

reform to invigorate and preserve, and who have thereby subjected themselves to the punishment of the law.

The association here alluded to, it will be observed, had no existence at the time when, in consequence of the judgment of the Court, the respondent found caution for his good behaviour. A society of a very different nature, and under a different name, had formerly existed; the object of which was, by the legal mode of application to parliament, to obtain that constitutional reform in the representation of the Commons, which had, on several former occasions been adopted by many of the most respectable men in the nation; and had been repeatedly brought forward in parliament, not only by different members in their places, but even by some of those entrusted at the time with the highest offices in the state, and the most confiden tial situations in administration; particularly by the present first minister, who, both when in and out of office, brought forward in the House of Commons, motions to that effect, and in associations out of doors, formed for the express purpose of obtaining a parliamentary reform, gave the measure his countenance and support.

As mentioned in the petition, on the 29th of October 1793, a certain number of persons began to meet, under the designation of a general convention of the Friends of the People; and it is admitted in the complaint, that the object which they avowed, was an application to parliament for a reform in the representation of the Commons. On the supposition, that their object, as well as the means of pursuing it, were constitutional, the respondent would not have considered his inrolling himself as a member, to be a measure that would justly afford any argument for forfeiting his bail, as no man will pretend to say, that a person's exercising his constitutional privilege of concurring in a petition to parliament, praying for a reform in the representation of the Commons, could be construed to a breach of good behaviour, which could only arise from a breach of the law, tending to subject him to legal censure and punishment. The respondent, however, was perfectly aware, that when men are once met together, even on the most con

better of discretion, and they may be tempted to concur in measures very different from their original intentions, and beyond the pale of law and the constitution; and that, even independent of any error on their part, they may be implicated in the rashness or criminality of others in their proceedings and meetings, where they themselves may not be present. These considerations, joined to the particular situation in which he stood, made the respondent resolve not to become a

member of any such society, at least till he should have a full opportunity of being satisfied, that their views were constitutional, and their proceedings legal and orderly.

The first charge made against the respondent, as a ground for forfeiting his bail-bond, is, his being present at one meeting of this society of the Friends of the People on the 29th October last; and if the charge is well founded, it must be on this ground, that something said by the respondent at that meeting was illegal and seditious, for it is admitted, that the subject of deliberation was a petition to parliament in favour of reform, than which nothing could be more legal and constitutional. It must have been in the sentiment expressed by the respondent, that any wrong existed. What the respondent is said to have expressed, is thus stated in the petition and complaint: "That captain Johnston at last rose and made a short speech, and strongly recommended unanimity, but expressing it as his decided opinion, that it was both illegal and improper to petition the king, and that such a step would actually ruin the cause."

The words in Italics, the respondent has no recollection of having spoken; but taking the passage as it stands, he presumes to maintain, that it contains nothing more than what is perfectly warrantable. It is impossible seriously to deny, that to petition the king for a reform in one of the houses of parliament, would be in the highest degree unconstitutional: It is thought the learned prosecutor will scarcely refuse his assent to this proposition. And even as to the words which are imputed to the respondent, but which he cannot admit his having uttered; they are no more than an opinion, that an unconstitutional mode of pursuing a constitutional object, may be prejudicial to its success. The respondent is confident, therefore, that your lordships cannot entertain the most remote idea, that, taking the fact as charged, it imports the slightest degree of criminality against the respondent, and far less such a degree of misbehaviour, as to forfeit the bailbond, which it is humbly thought, no conduct on the part of the respondent could do, that would not be sufficient to convict him of a crime, or at least to warrant a court of law, to bind him over for his good behaviour. That neither of these are the case with the fact now charged upon, the public prosecutor warrants the respondent to conclude, as not a single step whatever has been taken against any person who was present at that meeting, except Mr. Skirving, and being present at that meeting, was no part of what was laid to his charge; on the contrary, he was convicted on the proceedings of a totally different society, the British convention, who, instead of adopting the constitutional mode of petitioning parliament, totally disclaimed any such idea, and adopted measures, which have justly subjected 'both Mr. Skirving and

others to the punishment of the law for sedition.

This convention, as mentioned in the petition, having broken up, the society known by the name of the British Convention came to be constituted. On the supposition, that its object was also a constitutional reform, the respondent does not conceive, that though he had become a member of it, it would have afforded any ground for forfeiting his bail-bond, as it would have involved no degree of criminality.

With regard to the character and sentiments of the persons who came from England to attend this meeting, the respondent was perfectly ignorant, and it was equally impossible for him to foresee the tone and conduct which the new society were to as

sume.

Mr. Skirving had been a member of the former society; he was understood to be principally concerned in the one about to be instituted; and the respondent being desirous, in confidence to communicate to him what occurred on the subject, he wrote him the letters annexed to the petition and complaint. The letters are unsigned, and it perhaps might be difficult for the public prosecutor, to prove them to be of the respondent's hand-writing. The respondent, however, considers it to be his duty, not to rest any of his defence upon a probable defect of probation, and he therefore readily admits the letters to have been written by him, and sent to Mr. Skirving, to whom they are addressed. It is upon those letters, that the second charge is founded, upon which the public prosecutor seeks to forfeit the respondent's bail-bond.

Before proceeding to consider the import of these letters, and how far they contain any thing criminal, the respondent begs leave to suggest a doubt, whether, as they are mere confidential communications to an individual, not intended for the public eye, and which do not even appear to have been communicated by Mr. Skirving to any person whatever, they would afford a ground for criminating the respondent, even to the effect concluded for, although they had contained exceptionable matter. The respondent, however, wishes by no means to shelter himself on any such ground, and he is humbly hopeful he has no occasion to avail himself of any such plea, as he trusts it will appear to your lordships, that, on a sound construction of these letters, they will not be found to contain any criminal matter, whatever gloss it may be possible to put upon particular passages taken by themselves, independent of the rest, and without regard to the evidence that arises from the proceedings of the societies with which the respondent was formerly connected, which were confined to the legal mode of obtaining a constitutional reform, viz. an application to parliament by petition.

In the first place, then, it falls to be inquired,

the rest of the letters, however strongly expressed, contain no sentiment, or any advice, that may not bear a correspondent construction.

Although, therefore, the respondent heartily regrets that he should have entered into any communication with Mr. Skirving upon the subject, although he disapproves as much as any body of the illegal and seditious proceedings, in which that person, by a total deviation from his former professions, did afterwards engage; yet as at the date of those letters, those views, which afterwards came to light, could not be discovered by the respondent, he trusts that your lordships will be inclined to exculpate him from any illegal or seditious intention in this correspondence, which was finally closed before that infatuated body of men, styling themselves the British Convention, had even begun to meet. The public prosecutor has been pleased to annex to the petition and complaint, a circular letter said to have been written by Mr. Skirving in consequence, as is alleged of the respondent's suggestions and directions, contained in one of his letters. There is not, however, the smallest evidence, that the respondent ever saw or approved of that circular letter, and though he suggested in general terms, that a cire alar letter should be written, it is impossible to make him answerable for the contents of it; especially as it appears to be in a very different style from that pointed at in the respondent's letter, which is confined to a mere communication of the intended meeting. The respondent, therefore, is not under the necessity of attempting any vindication of the circular letter, seeing that whatever blame may be attached to it, it is impossible that any part of it can be thrown upon the respondent, farther than, independent thereof, can be imputed to him from his own letters to Mr. Skirving, upon which he trusts he has already satisfied your lordships, that however rash and ill-advised such a correspondence may appear to be, it cannot fix upon him any criminality sufficient to subject him to any penal consequences in the shape of a trial, and consequently cannot justly be made the ground for forfeiting his bail bond.

The only remaining charge is, the respondent's having been present at a meeting of the British Convention, his having read aloud upon that occasion, the trial and sentence of D. Holt, for reprinting the duke of Richmond's and Mr. Pitt's resolutions for a parliamentary reform, and having been allowed by the meeting, what they were pleased to call the honours of the sitting; and a particular stress appears to be laid upon this being the eleventh meeting of the convention; from which the respondent presumes, it is intended to be inferred, that he knew, and must have approved of all the former proceedings of the British Convention.

In point of fact, however, your lordships will be informed, that the British Convention,

as they called themselves, had their first meeting on Tuesday the 19th of November last, in the evening, after which their meetings were regularly held in the evenings. At none of those meetings was the respondent present; nor is it charged, that he had any communication with members, by which he could know what proceedings had been held from time to time, nor had he any means of knowing this, except from the publication of their speeches and proceedings in the newspaper, called the Edinburgh Gazetteer. On the forenoon of the 30th of November, the respondent very rashly and improperly, as he acknowledges, was tempted by curiosity, to go for a few mi nutes into a meeting of one of the committees. There were there present a very few peo ple; no business was done while the respondent was there, nor any resolutions made; the persons present were merely engaged in sepa rate conversations with each other, when the respondent, who had taken up a newspaper, containing the trial and sentence of D. Holt, was desired by some person present to read it, which he accordingly did, without making any particular animadversions upon it, and he soon after left the meeting. If what is called the honours of the sitting were conferred upon him, of which he has no recollection, he cannot perceive how any absurdity of a meeting, of which he was no member, in the shape of an honour, which he neither asked nor ac cepted of, can be charged against him; and how, at any rate, such an absurdity can be reared up as a ground of crimination, unless the meeting had passed unconstitutional or seditious resolutions; in which case, such a ceremony, if accepted of by the respondent, might be construed into an accession, on his part, to such a resolution. But it has been already mentioned, that no resolution of any kind was passed; nor is the contrary charged in the complaint, far less any resolutions condescended upon to which the respondent's accession can be inferred.

This

Neither can it be said that the respondent, by being present at this meeting, became ac cessary to any of the former, and far less to any of the latter proceedings of this convention. Even though the respondent had been a member of the convention, it may be doubted how far he could be chargeable with an accession to their proceedings, unless in so far as he either expressly concurred in such proceedings, or was present when they were passed, without objecting to them. must clearly be the idea of the public prosecutor himself; for although a great number of persons were present at the meetings, no measures have been taken against any of them, but such as actually concurred in resolutions of a criminal nature. At the same time, it would not impair the respondent's argument, although it should be your lordships opinion that every person inrolled a member of the convention, should be answerable for all their proceedings, whether

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