came into the world to save sinners," than there is in receiving the postulate, that all the parts of any thing are equal to the whole both are proposed as truths; and when it is found, upon inquiry, that they are so, reason is bound to receive them. Precisely in this way is Christianity proposed in our Scriptures; but, inasmuch as formidable difficulties are really opposed to its effectual adoption, which is not the case with our postulate just adverted to; means are also proposed, by which every necessary assistance shall be secured: these have been termed "the means of grace." The real difficulties are: to realise in the believer the mind of Christ; the denial of self; the life of faith; to bear and forbear; and to hold fast an unshaken integrity, under all circumstances, however flattering or however terrific. It is for these ends that the effectual influences of the Spirit are promised, which indeed are alone adequate to produce them. The devils, we are told, believe and tremble; and so may man, and yet be destitute of every saving gift and grace of God. But, to believe to the saving of the soul, seems to require, that God not only afford the truths to be believed and embraced in the first instance, but also that he co-operate with the believer after he has received them, in order to bring about those ends which the weakness of flesh and blood never can.

It may perhaps still be suggested, that it will be difficult to see what the Apostle can be supposed to thank God for, if it is not His having given these Philippians the power to believe. I answer: I can see no difficulty in supposing, that he might have had in view the final means, which he himself had been the instrument of proposing, namely, the Gospel of Christ. For, there can be no doubt, this had been given by God's grace; and, that God had, by an extraordinary act of favour, raised up the Apostle to preach and enforce it, is equally true. This, then, I think, was cause sufficient to call forth the Apostle's thanks; and was, most likely, the real cause in this instance.

That the power to believe, to hear, and to think, are God's gifts, there certainly can be no doubt; but, then, they are ordinary, not extraordinary gifts; which leaves our conclusion untouched; namely, that the power to believe, in the first instance, is no where ascribed in Scripture to an extraordinary influence of the Spirit. And if this be true, a want

of faith in any man, cannot be ascribed to any positive withholding of God's favours where the doctrine of the Gospel has been once proposed; and, consequently, no such thing is taught in the Scripture as absolute and foreordained individual reprobation. If the case of Pharaoh be adduced, I shall reply, as on a former occasion: Pharaoh is not mentioned by St. Paul for the purpose of shewing, that those to whom the terms of the Gospel are proposed, have it not in their power to receive them ;* but only to bear testimony to the fact, that no earthly power, however great, could prevail against the purposes which God had formed with regard to his Church. The same may, indeed, be said of the king of Assyria, of Babylon, and of Persia, where the first was termed the rod of God's power, and the last his anointed: in every case God's purposes, as to his people, were solely had in view which, therefore, could not have been intended to teach us, that either the one or the other of these persons was absolutely predestinated to life or to death and, if this was not the thing intended to be taught, then, to infer any such doctrine from the instances themselves, must be inadmissible.†

The truly philosophical and scriptural apologist Arnobius thus speaks on this subject: "Non æqualiter liberat qui æqualiter omnes vocat, haud ab indulgentiâ principali quemquam repellit, aut respuit, qui sublimibus, infirmis, servis, feminis, pueris, uniformiter potestatem veniendi ad se facit? Patet, inquit, omnibus fons vitæ, neque ab jure potandi quisquam prohibetur, aut pellitur." Lib. ii. p. 84.

est.

So Arnobius: "Quid ergo nos? Undè? Responsionis necessitas nulla Sive enim possumus dicere, sive minùs valemus, nec possumus, utrumque apud nos parvum est: nec in magnis ponderibus duximus, vel ignorare illud, vel scire; unum solum posuisse contenti, NIHIL A DEO PRINCIPE, QUOD SIT NOCENS, ATQUE EXITIABILE, PROFICISCI: hoc tenemus, hoc novimus, in hac unâ consistimus cognitionis, et scientiæ veritate; nihil ab eo fieri, nisi quod sit omnibus salutare; quod dulce; quod amoris, et gaudii, lætitiæque plenissimum; quod infinitas habeat, atque incorruptibiles voluptates; quod sibi quisque contingere votis omnibus expetat, forisque ab his esse exitiabile, ac mortiferum ducat." Adversùs Gentes, lib. ii. (edit. 1634.) p. 78.

SECTION IX.

ON HUMAN FREE WILL.

HAVING discussed these questions as far as it seemed necessary to our purpose, we now come to offer a few remarks on the doctrine of what has been termed the freedom of the will. We shall not stop here to discuss the propriety or impropriety of the terms, freedom of the will, free will, &c. it being sufficiently manifest that they involve an absurdity; because, whether right or wrong, our inquiry would gain nothing by doing so. In considering this question, then, we shall proceed rather with reference to things than to words: because it is from these alone that any good conclusion can be expected.

per

The first question, then, will be: Is the human mind fectly at liberty to think and determine, without reference to any other consideration, or is it only partially so? My answer is: I know of no absolute restraint placed on the operations of the human mind: neither Scripture, reason, nor experience, speaks of any such restraint; and so far we may conclude that there is none. Man may, as far as we can see, will, purpose, plan, &c., the wildest things imaginable: and, from the vast abundance of such phenomena in the intellectual world, we may, perhaps, rest assured that no restraint, either natural or supernatural, has been imposed in these respects.

There is, however, another faculty implanted in man, called Reason, the business of which is carefully to consider the nature both of thoughts and of things, and then to determine (which is named judging), whether such thoughts or things ought or ought not to be entertained; and then to act as counsellor in directing the conduct of the individual. Now, so far as this faculty interferes with the will, its liberty must be curtailed;* that is to say, whenever reason deter

And in the degree to which a man lays claim to the character of a rational agent, in the same will the freedom of his will be controlled. He, therefore, who approximates nearest to perfection, must in the same proportion be regulated in his thoughts, words, and deeds, by principles which he has found to be good. He will, consequently, be less than any other man the subject of caprice; more than any other, actuated by those laws which he knows to be most advantageous to human society, and best calculated to honour its Author: in other words, he will be the best Christian; the

mines that a thought, action, or project, is such as ought not to be entertained, the individual is bound, unless he give up the claim of being considered a rational creature, no longer to entertain such thought, action, or project. For example, I am at liberty to suppose that two and two will make six; or, that a telescope may be made so powerful as to enable me to discover of what specific form the particles composing the disk of the moon, or of any one of the planets, are; and in either or both of these positions I may persevere : but when I have been shewn that the one is absolutely, and the other physically impossible, I am no longer at liberty (unless I claim the privilege of a fool or a madman) to entertain those opinions. A motive now has been proposed, if not a violent one, as Paley would term it, yet one so potent as to insure the conclusion, that I can no longer continue to hold those positions. In cases such as these, therefore, although the power of volition may be possessed to an indefinite extent theoretically, yet no such power can exist in practice; at least in those who lay claim to reason in any degree. Where the reason is, indeed, weak, ill-informed, or perverted, the decision may be wrong, but it must always be made; and when this is done, the liberty of the will is limited.

Now, if we trace cases downwards, from those presenting the highest to those presenting the lowest degrees of probability, we shall at last arrive at those in which we may either have no knowledge, or probabilities may be so nearly balanced as to leave nothing on which the judgment can fix in these cases, then, the Will will remain entirely unfettered. If, for example, two friends were to propose to me for decision the question, whether the language of the Old or New Testament will be the medium of intercourse among the blest; my answer must be: You are at perfect liberty to adopt which side

best citizen of the world; and the person best prepared to be translated to a more perfect state of being. Nor will this entire subjection to principle in any way diminish the power of refusing the evil and choosing the good; on the contrary, this will strengthen it in the greatest possible degree. Where another man will doubt and hesitate eternally, the man of principle will act at once, and he will act rightly. His law provides for consequences; hesitation is with him out of place. Such an one, therefore, will be the best example of a decided character; a distinction to which all think it creditable at least to lay claim.

of the question you please, because I know of nothing whatever likely to influence the judgment of either of you. And again, if two persons, in every respect equally well qualified and recommended, should solicit an office which I may have to dispose of; I conceive, reason and judgment would have nothing to do in the case, and that I should be left perfectly at liberty to exercise my Will. The number or the different shades of cases which will fall between these extremes, will be exceedingly great, while those which occupy the extreme places very small; and consequently, those cases which will be so cogent as to carry conviction with them to every mind; as also those left entirely to the Will, or what is generally termed the caprice, will be few. In the great mass, reason and judgment must predominate; but this rarely to such a degree as to preclude all possibility of doubt; because we are not possessed of experience sufficient to see and judge clearly of all the bearings of every question.

The powers of the mind, in this respect, seem to be very much on a par with those of the body. Any man not fettered, or otherwise not deprived of the use of his limbs, may use them in any way he pleases, as far as nature and circumstances will allow him. He may, for example, knock down, maim, or stab, the first person he meets: he may dance, sing, lie down, stand on his head, or put himself into any position whatsoever, provided no common law of society control him. But if this be the case, he will find it to be most conducive to his own happiness to do no such things; which will, perhaps, be a motive sufficiently potent to make a good member of society of him. But here, as before, innumerable cases (usually termed cases of conscience) may occur, in which it may be extremely difficult to say what it is best to do. In such, analogy is the safest guide, and this involves an operation of reason; and therefore, where the line of duty is clear, the prudent man will not hesitate to submit; where it is not so, the safe side, if this be apparent, must be taken: but where no such thing is discernible, the Will alone must determine what is to be done; and, indeed, from the moment prudence suggests caution, reason, where it has materials to work upon, can alone be relied on in directing the conduct of the individual.

It may now be asked: How do the doctrines of our Scrip