his vessels, the winds and the tides, and a thousand other considerations. These are truths too well known to admit of a moment's doubt, and yet it is equally well known, that these efforts alone can in no case insure success. The ordinary operations of Providence must also concur-in other words, one may sow, another water, but God must give the increase. On the side of Providence, however, we find no failure; fruitful seasons are invariably given; and, upon the whole, persons deliberately invest their capital on the faith of Providence and industry working together; and hence all national and individual wealth is known to arise. But suspend the necessity for exertion, and universal idleness, араthy, and wickedness, must inevitably succeed: or cut off the hope of the co-operating influences of a gracious Providence, and the same consequences will as necessarily follow.

In the religion proposed in our Scripture, man is in the same manner called upon for exertion, and for such as it is evidently in his power to make; upon this, assistance is promised, and success is spoken of as already attained to. The same Being which has in the one case made it absolutely necessary to the welfare of the individual to be up and stirring, has also in the other and for the same reasons, laid his commands on all, "to work out their salvation with fear and trembling;" because, it is said, he will work with them both to will and to do, and that they shall never fail. I may now ask, does this, in any measure, ascribe merit to the effort? The only thing it recommends is obviously prudence, and that but to a degree recognised and acted upon in every other pursuit the only discernible difference is, in the former case there may be occasional failures; in the latter there can be none.

But it may be said, it will induce despondency. Men may fail at one time or other to exert these efforts, and then Divine assistance may be withdrawn. To depend, therefore, on the exertion of human efforts, will be so nearly allied to a dependence on human merits, that both may be considered as virtually identical. I answer, to rely on the efficiency of human efforts is one thing; to wait for the Divine promise on their being obediently exerted, another: the one would be an act of presumption, the other a work of faith. After we have done all, we are indeed "unprofitable servants;"

but, if assistance is graciously promised on no other grounds, and graciously it must be given in any case, then is the commandment truly ordained unto life: and, although our imperfect services can merit nothing but condemnation, they may, through the mercy of the promises, hope for all things. Besides, in human affairs where there is confessedly occasional risk and loss, we find nothing like despondency. The man would here be termed a fool, were he to lay up his talent in a napkin: a busy and active world judges far better, and the earth is accordingly ransacked from the east to the west. Dangers are, in this case, treated as morning dreams, and even life itself put in jeopardy for the acquisition of wealth. But, according to our Scripture, in labouring after the one thing needful there can be no risk, no probability of loss whatsoever. The kingdom of grace is subject to no storms; the artifices of enemies can avail nothing here; nor will the vessel ever founder, because He who can control all these has promised never to forsake us. Besides, if any man occasionally mistake the way, and so fall upon the shoals or the quicksands, there is an Advocate with the Father, who will make intercession for the sinner; and, by one means or other, point out the safer path. His pilots too will be found near every place of danger, and his winds attempered to the wants of his servants. This is the tenor of his promise; and we are assured, that contrary to this no example. can be cited. But if we give up our energies, poor as they confessedly are, what must be the consequence? As far as we can learn from our Scriptures, not only shall we be left to the mercy of the waves, but the winds will be adverse! Every experienced mariner will predict the certainty of our destruction; and we must perish without remedy and without hope. Give up your energies however weak they may be, and you give up your only means of obedience,-of either glorifying God or of benefiting man without these, faith, however strong, is but a name; and, however it may depend upon its own simple exertions for the removal of mountains, it may finally stand for nothing.

The objection however will recur. Still it will be said, man, may eventually fail in his obedience; and then, on this view, he must also fail in his hope; and, consequently, no assurance of salvation can ever be entertained. I answer:

D

If he do this deliberately, then is there an end to his entertaining the title of christian, believer, servant of God, and every other such name; and his condemnation will be just. If, in the next place, such disobedience be involuntary, or brought about accidentally, or by some sudden and overpowering temptation, still we may trust that mercy will be extended to the culprit. Chastisement from above, admonition from a friend, or the pangs of a wounded conscience, may bring the sinner to repentance and to prayer; and, in this case, faith and hope will never be exerted in vain. And, indeed, so long as a man can judge between right and wrong-can make the choice between good and bad, righteousness and sin, heaven and hell, he must continue to be a responsible creature; and, as such, reason requires that he be accordingly rewarded or punished. But, should his faculties fail him, of the sin then committed he cannot be justly charged as guilty; nor of this, as far as we can see, need he be afraid. So long as he retains his reasoning faculties, he must be responsible; and so long will he be enabled to appreciate and to employ the means of grace: but why he should make provision for a different state, it is hard to say, especially as He, whom he serves, has declared, that his "grace is sufficient:" or why such supposititious case should be resorted to, none, perhaps, but a being highly fantastical and ridiculously theoretic, can see any good reason. If it be intended, however, as it seems to be by this mode of arguing, to determine the exact point where the ordinary and extraordinary operations of Providence meet, the answer is: Revelation has not determined this point; and human reason is unequal to the task. Faith and hope stand in need of no such determination; and obedience prefers taking the naked command of its liege Sovereign, unencumbered and unexplained.

With regard to the last objection, that an unnecessary appeal is made to supernatural influences, I would answer: Although the power appealed to is evidently supernatural, it is no more unreasonable to expect it, than it is to look for success in life from a due exertion of our common energies. In the cultivation of the earth, as we have seen, success is almost universally attained to, and that by the exertion of a power evidently Divine. And, if religion be really a gift of the Deity, which our Scripture declares is the

case, it is but reasonable to believe, that the man who is sincere and active in its cultivation, will in some way or other receive similar encouragements-blessings such as to secure an inward happiness, and to confirm him in the belief that "his labour is not in vain." In this case, then, we expect powers no more miraculous, than those daily witnessed in the natural world; we are justified in expecting those only of a different kind, and such as are available to the end for which they are sought. In the one case, nature, which is an appointment of the Deity, warrants us in expecting an increase from a proper cultivation; in the other, the Scripture, which we are taught is also an appointment of the Deity, positively declares that suitable assistance shall be afforded not, let it be remembered, for the purpose of bringing about events which properly deserve the name of miracles; but to raise the believer to such a degree of faith and of hope, as can bring him within the reach of mercy from above, and of that peace which passeth all understanding here. The influences expected in this instance then, are such only as the nature of the case requires; and, as we find similar energies employed in the natural world for the purpose of bringing about certain necessary results, it is quite reasonable to look for these in the case of religion. Whether they be considered natural or supernatural, ordinary or extraordinary (points which we can never determine), it will signify nothing to our present purpose, which is to shew the reasonableness of such result, without attempting to account for it philosophically; and this, we affirm, is not only what we might expect would be the fact, but what it is absolutely necessary should, were man intended to fill his sphere of action here, in a manner worthy of his nature and capacities, and gradually to be prepared for a higher state of being in another.

SECTION VIII.

ON THE NATURE OF SCRIPTURAL ELECTION AND REPROBATION.

ANY question involving a certain portion of abstract or metaphysical reasoning, will, upon its being generally adopted and discussed, soon become entangled with difficulties, such

as will require no ordinary degree of patience and penetration to separate the true from the false; which however would, after all, be thrown away on the multitude, who can never be expected to be good metaphysicians. But, upon granting even this almost impossibility to take place, it may still be affirmed, that religious truths recommended on grounds no better, must be quite inadequate to secure the ends for which they had been given; because the human mind, however gifted in many respects, is still far from infallible, especially in cases where neither real knowledge of all the circumstances, nor experience sufficient to correct the errors of observation, is attainable. If, then, the doctrines above mentioned had been proposed on grounds of this sort, it may be asked, To what discordant and irreconcilable conclusions must not men have come?- conclusions repugnant perhaps to the well-being of society, and consequently unsuitable to the ends for which religion had itself been given. On the character and operations of the human mind, a subject with which we are indeed conversant, and one proper enough for human investigation, What shadowy, groundless, and deceptive theories, it may be asked, have not been proposed? What then are we to expect either sound or satisfactory in the results arrived at, when we presume to make those of the Deity (matters totally removed from the reach of human observation) the subject of our researches ?* Can

In a work lately published, entitled "Mahometanism Unveiled," evincing very great ingenuity, research, and piety, we have a remarkable instance of an appeal to one of the properties of the Divine mind, namely a particular Providence, in order to account for the origin, progress, and continuance of Mahommedanism; and, as this is followed by an endeavour to give a new interpretation to certain passages of Scripture, I may be excused if I notice the principle just adverted to here, and that of interpretation brought in to its aid, in a subsequent place. Mr. Forster is of opinion that no satisfactory reason has yet been assigned for the phenomenon just mentioned he proposes, therefore, to settle this question by appealing at once to a special and superintending Providence. "The coming," says he, "of Mahomet at such a point of time, is a problem that can yield to no process of solution, which can shut out the idea of a special and superintending Providence." (Introd. p. 63.) This may at first sight appear startling, because it may be made to inculcate the doctrine, that God is the author of evil. Mr. Forster, however, does not intend this; for at pages 74, 163, of the first volume of this work, he speaks of Providence in its permissive character only. He ought not, therefore, to be charged