have been made known by the Author of our nature, likely to raise the mind of man to that height of moral feeling and of enjoyment, of which it is capable; and without which its capacities must have been given in vain? Is it reasonable, that a being endued with powers so marvellous in their extent, and admitting of such a variety in their application, should have been called into being, only to lament his success or discomfiture in every stage of his existence, and in every day of his experience? To court, it may be and to mourn over, the blandishments of wealth, their inefficiency, and want of duration - the uncertainty of popularity, and even the worthlessness of fame; to fear and admire the unostentatious retreat of indigent, despised, and inflexible, honesty; and to envy and to vilify the conscience void of offence, if such were to be found. To have created, I say, and to have left man thus destitute of motives to honourable exertion, and of the means of real and permanent happiness, would surely have been an anomaly in the Divine proceedings. Philosophy must, in this case, have had nothing to which it could aspire; virtue nothing worth contending for; and life itself have eventually been scarcely worth the trouble and expense of its support. The doctrine of a future life, then, being, as it is, the best and indeed the only efficient motive to human virtue, as well as the only source of real happiness, involving too, as it does, no impossibility in the event proposed, is surely most necessary and most reasonable: and, if it can be shewn, which we shall do hereafter, that it is well grounded, it will, perhaps, be difficult to say, in what way a rational being can excuse himself from adopting it as a point of faith.

SECTION V.

ON THE REASONABLENESS OF THE DOCTRINE RESPECTING THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.

THAT human knowledge or reason can come to no immediate conclusion as to the certainty, or not, of this event, is a truth, to which, perhaps, no objection can be made. Analogy may indeed be resorted to, by way of illustration, and

this has been frequently and successfully done; but analogy can go no further: and therefore here, as in our last question, authority alone must determine what is right or wrong. Our only question, however, now is, whether there is or not any thing unreasonable in the doctrine itself, as proposed for belief in the pages of our Scriptures: and this we now proceed to consider.

In the first place, then, we need not dwell upon the fact of the death and consequent dissolution of the body: our first question will therefore be (grounded on this fact), whether it is credible or not, this mass can again be recalled into life, and put in possession of all the faculties which it once possessed? My answer is: Supposing Omnipotence to undertake to do this, I know of no reason why we are to suppose the event itself impossible, or even improbable. He who first created the body and formed it out of the dust, may, for aught we know, again vest it with life and sensibility: and if he have some beneficent end to bring about by this event, perhaps no arguments can be produced to shew that it is improbable. Other difficulties, however, have been started, of which the following seems to be the most formidable. If, it is urged, this identical body is with all its members hereafter to be raised to life, how, upon the supposition of various parts of it having been deposited in different parts of the earth, or devoured by the beasts or the fishes, is the identity to consist or to be known? Are the parts, for instance, so separated, again to be brought together, bone to its bone, sinew to its sinew, and so on in every other particular? And then, when the improbability of this seems to be established, a conclusion is made, that no such thing can reasonably be expected to come to pass, and, consequently, that the doctrine itself is incredible. I believe I have stated this argument with all the force usually ascribed to it by its advocates. Let us now see how far it is, or is not, conclusive.

In the first place, then, the perfect identity of matter here contended for, seems to me to be an unnecessary and unreasonable condition. If, indeed, I am again to be endued with a body, composed out of all, or only part of, the matter, which constitutes that I now possess, having still the same powers, feelings, and capacities, extended and improved it may

DISS

[

be to an indefinite degree; it can be of little importance to me, whether there is to be an entire identity with all the former matter composing it or not. For, it may be asked, who can tell how little of the composition, which any one as an infant brings into the world, continues with him to the most extended age, and then descends with him to the grave?

Perfect identity, then, seems scarcely to be cognizable during the present life, although the identity of the body is never called in question; and, if this be the case, the point now to be determined must be, How much of that identical primitive matter ought to be expected in a future. resuscitation of the body, in order to constitute identity in the person ? It may be answered: As neither reason nor science can determine the case of the one, neither ought it to make the attempt in the other: and, as far as we can see, no such determination need be thought about. If it is a doctrine of the Scripture, that this shall take place, and if it can be shewn that the declarations thus made may be relied on, reason can have no more to object, than it can to the reasonableness of the production of a tree from an acorn, or the growth of an ear of corn from the grain. Both must be produced by a power nothing short of Omnipotent, whether that operate in the ordinary or extraordinary ways of Providence. Reason would, in the one case, never think of proposing objections to what it is bound to recognise as fact and, in the other, the difficulty is in no sense greater, nor the event proposed less likely. For if the atonement, as we have already shewn, was undertaken and made for the purpose of restoring all that was lost by the fall, it is by no means unlikely that the resurrection of the body was intended also to be brought about as an invariable consequence, though not always to enjoy the same degree of beatitude; and in this sense the Scripture seems to argue when it speaks of this doctrine. If this then be the case, nothing can be more reasonable, nothing more likely, than that the work of our Redeemer was complete in all its parts; and in one respect exceeding even the blessings of creation and of an earthly paradise, viz. in raising the body to eternal life, and in giving it an inheritance among the saints in light. Where, when, or how, this will take place, our Scriptures no where inform us; and, as the solution of these questions manifestly exceeds

human powers to effect, it can never be the province of reason, as it certainly is not of science, to attempt it; neither can the one or the other pronounce the event impossible. Reason has here nothing from which such a conclusion can be drawn, and science is quite destitute of matter upon which observation can be made. If then no impossibility can here be made out, and this is the fact; and if it be not unreasonable to expect the event, which we affirm also to be the case; then, if our Scriptures mention it as certain, and we can shew that these are worthy of all acceptation, it will follow that reason is bound to admit this also as a point of faith. But it ought to be observed, our Scriptures not only teach this as a doctrine revealed from above, they also exemplify it in an apparently well-attested, fact. If, therefore, it can be shewn that these books are such as to be worthy of belief, no reasonable objection can be made to this doctrine.

SECTION VI.

ON THE FALL, REDEMPTION, &c.

THESE are subjects against which much and loud declamation has often been urged. Reason, it has been said again and again, can see no end to be gained by routes so tedious and circuitous, and which might have been brought about by one single volition of the Deity. Conclusions have then been drawn more suitable, perhaps, to the tempers of such disputants, than reasonable, and the Scriptures consequently denounced as the work of imposture.

In considering all questions of this sort, however, I think it will be granted, that our arguments ought to be formed and directed with strict regard to things as they are, not to things as they might have been. Had the world, indeed, been differently constituted; then should we have had reason for entertaining notions widely different from those we now hold, because they would necessarily be formed on knowledge which we do not now possess, and would therefore be justifiable.

Our question must, therefore, be considered with reference to things as they now are, and in this respect we now pro-.

ceed to consider it. It is granted I think on all hands, that God created man, and it will as necessarily be granted that he has created him such in form, condition, and powers, as suited the decisions of his infinite wisdom. It will, perhaps, also be granted, that the Deity would not create a being independent of himself; such an event would certainly be unreasonable to expect, and perhaps impossible to bring about. The plan chosen seems to be, that man should be endued with capacities suited to the confined sphere he had been destined to fill, capable of being extended and improved as society should multiply about him, and in proportion as all possible means afforded for that purpose should be employed, nevertheless still limited; with bodily powers, too, partaking very much of this character though limited in a still greater degree.

Now, if we can suppose such a being to have been made dependent on his Creator (and it would be unreasonable to suppose the contrary), some marks of that dependence must as necessarily have been left for his observance-something either to be given or abstained from, in testimony of his fealty. Man, however, had nothing to give; negative obedience was, therefore, all that could reasonably be asked for and, it will now follow, that the less the privation called for was, light in the same proportion would the tax demanded be; and such we are taught was the fact. Now, if we can suppose any such law as this to have been laid down, we must also suppose some punishment annexed to its infraction; and, for the purpose of securing obedience with beings such as man confessedly was, this punishment must have been severe. Not that the Lawgiver might not, if he had chosen, made the penalty light, as he had the conditions; but because reason judges differently. In human laws we know, as the facility for transgression is increased, punishments have usually been made severe; not for the purpose of wantonly inflicting the punishment, but to prevent the occurrence of crime. In the case before us, then, as no want whatever is said to have existed, and such it is reasonable to suppose a new creation coming from a perfect Deity would be, to refuse to acquiesce in a very small privation (and the smaller this was, so much greater would the crime of transgression be), would be to engage in an act of open rebellion against