· Sardanapalus: And feveral writers believe, that he then immediately became fovereign mafter of Media, and many other provinces, and affumed the title of king. Herodotus is not of this opinion. I fhall relate what that celebrated historian fays upon the fubject.

(i) The Affyrians, who had for many ages held the empire of Afia, began to decline in their power by the revolt of feveral nations. The Medes first threw off their yoke, and maintained for fome time the liberty they had acquired by their valour: But that liberty degenerating into licentioufnefs, and their government not being well established, they fell into a kind of anarchy, worfe than their former fubjection. Injuftice, violence, and rapine, prevailed every where, because there was nobody that had either power enough to restrain them, or fufficient authority to punish the offenders. But all thefe diforders induced the people to fettle a form of government, which rendered the ftate more flourishing than ever it was before.

The nation of the Medes was then divided into tribes. Almost all the people dwelt in villages, when Dejoces, the fon of Phraortes, a Mede by birth, erected the flate into a monarchy. This person seeing the great disorders that prevailed throughout all Media, refolved to take advantage of thofe troubles, and make them ferve to exalt him to the royal dignity. He had a great reputation in his own country, and paffed for a man, not only regular in his own conduct, but poffeffed of all the prudence and equity neceffary for a governor.

As foon as he had formed the defign of obtaining the throne, he laboured to make the good qualities that had been obferved in him more confpicuous than ever: He fucceeded fo well, that the inhabitants of the village where he lived made him their judge. In this office he acquitted himfelf with great prudence; and his cares had all the fuccefs expected from them; for he brought the people of that village to a fober and regular life. The inhabitants of other villages, whom perpetual diforders fuffered not to live in quiet, obferving the good order Dejoces had introduced in the place where he prefided as judge, began to addrefs themfelves to him, and make him arbitrator of their differences. The fame of his equity daily increafing, all fuch as had any affair of confequence, brought it before him, expecting to find that equity in Dejoces, which they could meet with no where else.

When he found himself thus far advanced in his designs, he judged it a proper time to fet his laft engines to work for the

(i) Herod. 1. i. c. 95•

com

compaffing his point. He therefore retired from bufinefs, pretending to be over-fatigued with the multitude of people, that reforted to him from all quarters; and would not exercife the office of judge any longer, notwithstanding all the importunity of fuch as wished well to the publick tranquillity. Whenever any perfons addrefled themselves to him, he told them, that his own domeftick affairs would not allow him to attend thofe of other people.

The licentiousness, which had been for fome time restrained by the management of Dejoces, began to prevail more than ever, as foon as he had withdrawn himself from the adminif tration of affairs; and the evil increased to fuch a degree, that the Medes were obliged to affemble, and deliberate upon the means of curing fo dangerous a diforder.

There are different sorts of ambition: Some violent and impetuous, carry every thing as it were by ftorm, fticking at no kind of cruelty or murder: Another fort more gentle, like that we are speaking of, puts on an appearance of moderation and justice, working under ground (if I may use that expression) and yet arrives at her point as furely as the other.

Dejoces, who faw things fucceeding according to his wish, fent his emiffaries to the aflembly, after having inftructed them in the part they were to act. When expedients for ftopping the course of the publick evils came to be propofed, these emiffaries, fpeaking in their turn, reprefented, that unless the face of the republick was entirely changed, their country would become uninhabitable; that the only means to remedy the present diforders was to ele&t a king, who should have authority to refrain violence, and make laws for the government of the nation. Then every man could profecute his own affairs in peace and fafety; whereas the injuftice, that now reigned in all parts, would quickly force the people to abandon the country. This opinion was generally approved; and the whole company was convinced, that no expedient could be devised more effectual for curing the prefent evil, than that of converting the state into a monarchy. The only thing then to be done, was to chuse a king; and about this their deliberations were not long. They all agreed, there was not a man in Media fo capable of governing as Dejoces; fo that he was immediately with common confent elected king.

If we reflect in the leaft on the first establishment of kingdoms, in any age or country whatsoever, we shall find, that the maintenance of order, and the care of the publick good, was the original defign of monarchy. Indeed there would be no poffibility of establishing order and peace, if all men were

refolved

refolved to be independent, and would not submit to an authority, which takes from them a part of their liberty, in order to preferve the reft. Mankind must be perpetually at war, if they will always be striving for dominion over others, or refufe to fubmit to the ftrongeft. For the fake of their own > peace and fafety, they must have a mafter, and must consent to obey him. This is the human origin of government. (k) And the fcripture teacheth us, that the divine providence has not only allowed of the project, and the execution of it, but confecrated it likewife by an immediate communication of his own power.

There is nothing certainly nobler or greater, than to see a private perfon, eminent for his merit and virtue, and fitted by his excellent talents for the higheft employments, and yet through inclination and modesty preferring a life of obfcurity and retirement; than to fee fuch a man fincerely refuse the offer made to him, of reigning over a whole nation, and at laft confent to undergo the toil of government, upon no other motive than that of being ferviceable to his fellow citizens. His firft difpofition, by which he declares that he is acquainted with the duties, and confequently with the dangers annexed to a fovereign power, fhews him to have a foul more elevated and great than greatnefs itself; or, to fpeak more justly, a foul fuperior to all ambition: Nothing can fhew him fo perfectly worthy of that important charge, as the opinion he has of its not being fo, and his fears of being unequal to it. But when he generously facrifices his own quiet and fatisfaction to the welfare and tranquillity of the publick, it is plain he underffands what that fovereign power has in it really good, or truly valuable; which is, that it puts a man in a condition of becoming the defender of his country, of procuring it many advantages, and of redreffing various evils; of caufing law and juftice to flourish, of bringing virtue and probity into reputation, and of establishing peace and plenty: And he comforts himself for the cares and troubles, to which he is expofed, by the profpect of the many benefits refulting from: them to the publick. Such a governor was Numa at Rome,. and fuch have been fome other emperors, whom the people have constrained to accept the fupreme power.

It must be owned (I cannot help repeating it) that there is nothing nobler or greater than fuch a difpofition. But to put on the mafk of modefty and virtue, in order to fatisfy one's ambition, as Dejoces did; to affect to appear outwardly what a man is not inwardly; to refufe for a time, and then accept with

(k) Rom. xiii. 1, 2.

with a feeming repugnancy what a man earnestly defires, and what he has been labouring by fecret under-hand practices to obtain; this double dealing has fo much meannefs in it, that it neceffarily leffens our opinion of the perfon, and extremely eclipfes his merit, be his talents at the fame time never so extraordinary.

DEJOCES reigned fifty-three years. When Dejoces had afcended the throne, he endeavoured to convince the people, that they were not miftaken in the choice they had made of him, for restoring of order. At first he refolved to have his dignity of king attended with all the marks that could inspire an awe and refpect for his perfon. He obliged his fubjects to build him a magnificent palace in the place he appointed. This palace he frongly fortified, and chofe out from among his people fuch perfons as he judged fitteft to be his guards.

After having thus provided for his own fecurity, he applied himfelf to polith and civilize his fubjects, who having been accustomed to live in the country and in villages, almost without laws and without polity, had contracted a favage difpofition. To this end he commanded them to build a city, marking out himself the place and circumference of the walls. This city was compafied about with feven distinct walls, all difpofed in fuch a manner, that the outermoft did not hinder the parapet of the fecond from being feen, nor the second that of the third, and fo of all the reft. The fituation of the place was extremely favourable for fuch a defign, for it was a regular hill, whofe afcent was equal on every fide. Within the laft and fmalleft enclofure ftood the king's palace, with all his treasures: In the fixth, which was next to that, there were feveral apartments for lodging the officers of his houfhold; and the intermediate fpaces, between the other walls, were appointed for the habitation of the people: The first and largest enclosure was about the bignefs of Athens. The name of this city was Ecbatana.

The profpect of it was magnificent and beautiful; for, befides the difpofition of the walls, which formed a kind of amphitheatre, the different colours wherewith the feveral parapets were painted formed a delightful variety.

After the city was finished, and Dejoces had obliged part of the Medes to fettle in it, he turned all his thoughts to compofing of laws for the good of the ftate. But being perfuaded, that the majesty of kings is moft refpected afar off [major ex longinquo reverentia, Tacit.] he began to keep himTelf at a distance from his people; was almoft inacceffible and invifible

() A. M. 3294. Ant. J. C. 710, Her. 1. i. c.
c. 96-101.

invifible to his fubjects, not fuffering them to fpeak, or communicate their affairs to him, but only by petitions, and the interpofition of his officers. And even those, that had the privilege of approaching him, might neither laugh nor fpit in his prefence.

This great statesman acted in this manner, in order the better to fecure to himself the poffeffion of the crown. For, having to deal with men yet uncivilized, and no very good judges of true merit, he was afraid, that too great a familiarity with him might induce contempt, and occafion plots and confpiracies against growing power, which is generally looked upon with invidious and difcontented eyes. But by keeping himfelf thus concealed from the eyes of the people, and mak-. ing himself known only by the wife laws he made, and the ftrict juftice he took care to adminifter to every one, he acquired the refpect and efteem of all his fubjects.

It is faid, that from the innermoft part of his palace he faw every thing that was done in his dominions, by means of his emiffaries, who brought him accounts, and informed him of all tranfactions. By this means no crime efcaped either the knowledge of the prince, or the rigour of the law; and the punishment treading upon the heels of the offence, kept the wicked in awe, and stopped the courfe of violence and injustice.

Things might poffibly pafs in this manner to a certain degree during his adminiftration: But there is nothing more obvious than the great inconveniencies neceffarily refulting from the cuftom introduced by Dejoces, and wherein he has been imitated by the rest of the Eaftern potentates; the cuf tom, I mean, of living concealed in his palace, of governing by fpies difperfed throughout his kingdom, of relying folely upon their fincerity for the truth of facts; of not fuffering truth, the complaints of the oppreffed, and the just reasons of innocent perfons to be conveyed to him any other way, than through foreign channels, that is, by men liable to be prejudiced or corrupted; men that stopped up all avenues to remon ftrances, or the reparation of injuries, and that were capable of doing the greatest injuftice themselves, with fo much the more eafe and affurance, as their iniquity remained undifcovered, and confequently unpunished. But befides all this, methinks, that very affectation in princes of being invifible, fhews them to be confcious of their flender merit, which fhuns the light, and dares not stand the teft of a near examination. Dejoces u as fo wholly taken up in humanizing and foftening the manners, and in making laws for the good government

of