the numerous necessaries in which their men were deficient, and to co-operate with each other for the purpose of driving the enemy as expeditiously as possible from the Spanish territory.

Such, our readers will recollect, was the state of things when the Supreme Junta first met, on the 25th September, at Aranjuez. That the integrity, the abilities, and the energy of its members, fitted them for their situation we must believe, since nothing but a high opinion of their merit could have dictated the free choice of their constituents. But they were, in general, strangers to each other; were perplexed by the multiplicity of objects which at once solicited their attention, and embarrassed by the forms of office, to which even genius is condemned to adapt itself, and which can only be learned by experience. In popular revolutions there is such a surplus of power, that the quantity of it expended in giving the first impulse to the complicated machine of government is scarcely felt; but in the present case, the resistance of prejudice and obstinacy and punctilio was not easily overcome. The Junta, though recognized by all, seem to have been thwarted on every side, and obeyed with sullen reluctance. Perhaps they wanted firmness to resist popular clamour; perhaps, in their wish to punish or repress the want of discipline which was said to prevail in the camps, they adopted towards the generals an impolitic and mischievous severity. But whatever conduct they might have pursued, whatever energy they might have displayed, it is very doubtful whether they could have materially delayed the subjugation of the Castilles, a country only defensible by cavalry, or prevented the loss of Madrid. The duration of the interregnum had, we think, insured the success of the invasion, which the French had been so long preparing; and we see nothing in the military operations of November which can excite surprise, except the patient valour which the Spanish soldiers opposed to every kind of distress, as well as to the artillery and swords of the enemy.

Having thus far considered the obstacles which disabled the Spaniards, at a most critical juncture, from availing themselves of their internal resources, we will now take a view of their relations to GreatBritain. It cannot have escaped the recollection of our readers that, at the moment when the Junta of Seville, having thrown off the yoke of France, sent deputies to solicit an armistice, as a step towards peace and future alliance, and to request a supply of arms and ammunition, they disclaimed any wish of receiving further assistance; and that, to every offer of co-operation on the part of our fleet and army at Cadiz, the government of that city opposed a civil but firm and determined refusal. With equal firmness have the Junta of Gallicia, on more recent occasions, repeatedly declined our assistance in the defence of Ferrol. Neither are these to be considered as instances of a local or temporary jealousy; for it is evident from the whole public conduct of the Spaniards, that they came to their great

conflict resolved to work out their own emancipation by their own efforts; not from a romantic disdain of foreign aid, but from a deep conviction that their situation precluded them from any such reliance. 'We must not (say the Junta of Valentia) indulge a hope which cannot be realised. Which of our constituted authorities can maintain a correspondence with foreign powers? None of those powers can regularly treat with a single province.' Besides, it is evident that the mutual jealousy of the provinces would have been increased, in a ten-fold degree, by the introduction of foreign troops; and that the partizans of the different candidates for the regency, two of whom were proposed by powers in the closest alliance with Great-Britain, would have endeavoured to attach as friends, or to render odious as enemies, the generals whom we had sent out for merely military purposes. It has been asserted, and perhaps with truth, that there were moments in the course of the summer, when even small detachments of our excellent cavalry and artillery might have turned the tide of success; and it would have been a most gratifying event if, by their intervention, the disaster of Rio Seco had been converted into a victory. But we entertain some doubt whether this hope would have been considered as a sufficient exculpation of our cabinet, had they confided to the very dubious talents of a Blake or a Cuesta the safety of such a valuable detachment; whether any British officer would have willingly incurred the responsibility attached to such a subordinate command; whether, with the utmost possible discretion, he could have escaped being involved in the well-known dissentions of the two rival generals; and whether the mischief attending such an intervention would not have overbalanced all the advantage of his military exertions. Since therefore our cavalry, the most costly but least numerous part of our military establishment, could not be confided in small detachments to the precarious support of the independent bodies of Spanish infantry; since a regular British army could only be applied for by the legal organ of the Spanish government; since that government was not formed till late in the month of September; and since after all, our expedition arrived at Corunna a fortnight before the time when those to whom it was sent were prepared to receive it, or would permit its debarkation; we cannot think it fair to impute the unsatisfactory conduct of the campaign during the summer to the inactivity of Great-Britain.

As we feel ourselves by no means competent to the discussion of objects purely military, we would willingly have avoided the proverbial rebuke ne sutor, &c. but, cobblers as we are, we cannot refrain from answering, with due humility, a question or two which some brother cobblers have propounded in a style which we think rather too arrogant and authoritative, for professors of our gentle craft. We demand (say they) the reason of locking up our army in the south-west corner of Portugal, when the great battle was

fighting in the north-east extremity of Spain? We ask why so silly a measure was thought of, as turning away our force to conquer an army necessarily in our power, should our allies be successful, and the conquest of which was worth nothing should our allies be beaten.'

Now we apprehend that, to these questions, our readers will have anticipated some very obvious answers. 1st. The Portuguese government were the victims of their fidelity to us; and we were bound in honour, though not under any direct engagement, to re-conquer Portugal if possible; and we did so. 2d. It was the opinion of the Spaniards that, by the expulsion of Junôt from Portugal we should render them the most essential service in our power. 3d. When the expedition was sent out, no battle great or small was fighting in the north-eastern extremity of Spain. 4th. Lisbon was of infinite value, whether our allies (who were not our allies) were beaten or not. The mere cessation of the blockade was an object of great importance, and well worth insuring at the moment, even if the contin→ gency of complete final success on the part of the Spaniards could have been rationally anticipated. Why our army was, for a time, so strangely locked up in Portugal; why our commander in chief withheld from government the armistice of Vimeira, till he had modelled it into the final, irremediable, incomprehensible convention of Cintra; or whence arises that proneness to pen and ink, in preference to more professional weapons, of which our generals have lately exhibited more than one unlucky specimen, we cannot presume to say; the Court of Inquiry having left the rules and principles of military diplomacy to be inquired into by any other court (not martial) that shall think itself competent to the investigation. But to proceed. The questions to which we have offered some replies are immediately connected with a military plan which, it seems, ought to have been pursued, and which is thus briefly stated. 'Had such an army as England could raise—had an army of 60 or 70,000 men, the best equipped and best hearted in the world, been ready to land in Spain at the moment when Dupont surrendered, and when Joseph fled in confusion from Madrid,-who shall say that the whole remains of the French army would not most probably have been overpowered, and the peninsula swept clean of its invaders?' Far be it from us to deny that 70,000 British troops would be fully adequate to the intire destruction of 50,000 French when opposed to them in the field: but it is necessary to examine the whole proposition. Our readers will remember that the insurrection at Cadiz was first made known in England, by Lord Castlereagh's letter to the Lord Mayor, on the first of July. Dupont's surrender took place about the 20th of that month; and Joseph quitted Madrid on the 1st of August. Admitting, therefore, that the latter events ought to have been foreseen as the necessary consequence of the former, and that England could well spare 70,000

men, the previous question comes to this. If these men had been fitted for foreign service, and marched to proper points on the seacoast; if a fleet of transports not very much exceeding in tonnage the old Invincible Armada had been contracted for, properly fitted and victualled, and sent to such places of rendezvous as should have been appointed for the embarkation; and if this fleet, when united, had been able to reach its destination at the south-eastern extremity of the bay of Biscay, at an appointed moment; which moment supposes a whole month to be allowed for the equipment of the expedition and the subsequent voyage, then, &c. But though our army had been then ready to land, the rocky shores of the province of Biscay have not the character of being very favourable to such a purpose. The simultaneous landing of 70,000 men is not generally supposed to be practicable on any shore; and a succession of such operations, conducted in the face of a powerful and vigilant enemy, might, if at all interrupted by variations of weather, require considerable time. The subsistence of so large an army, in a province so long occupied by the French, might have been subject to some difficulty; and lastly, when we should have driven the enemy, (whom we will suppose to receive during this time no reinforcements from the neighbouring provinces of France) through a succession of wellchosen positions to the very foot of the Pyrenees, the formidable fortress of Pampeluna might have opposed no inconsiderable obstacle to the proposed cleansing of the peninsula. It is true that, after so many exhausting efforts, we might have hoped to attain the valuable object of meeting the main body' of the enemy, and the hazardous part of the contest; but this advantage is, we think, very much over-rated; because nearly equal peril might perhaps be encountered, with much less trouble and expense, by landing on the nearest part of the French coast and attempting the conquest of Paris.

We

We confess that, far from blaming our government for abstaining from such extravagant attempts, we rather feel disposed to question the wisdom of employing in Spain, at so early a period, the large portion of our military strength which is now serving there. think it was, from the first, highly improbable that such a contest as the present could be decided, in favour of the Spaniards, by the efforts of a single campaign; because the resources of the French empire could not be so soon exhausted. Perhaps it was not less improbable, if the Spanish spirit remained unbroken, that Spain should be effectually subdued within the same period. Her strength did not, nor does it now consist in her regular armies, which, however brave, were never equal in discipline, nor even in numbers, to those of the invader; but in the undaunted spirit of the universal nation, which when called into action by an elective government, may, in the first instance, harass and annoy, and, when marshalled into large masses, and enabled to act with unanimity on a preconcerted

plan, may finally overwhelm and bear down the exhausted and less numerous forces of the enemy. Such was the object to which, at the outset of the contest, the Spanish leaders directed the attention of their countrymen, in the justly celebrated paper of Precautions published by the Junta of Seville. In that excellent document our readers will find, not a plan of a campaign, but a well digested military system, adapted to a protracted state of war; a system to which we think that Spain must ultimately owe her salvation. We conceive therefore that, in discussing any plans of co-operation with Spain, it would be reasonable to prefer those which should be recommended-by facility of execution-by promising the attainment of some immediate and definite advantage-and by a tendency to promote a unity of force in Spain, by rendering available for general purposes any portion of her armed or unarmed population. Such was, we think, the character of the expedition to Portugal, which procured for our fleets the possession of the mouth of the Tagus; for the Portuguese freedom from French tyranny; and for Spain the liberation of 3000 prisoners, together with an additional security to the connection between its northern and southern provinces, and the power of employing elsewhere that portion of the Andalusian troops which had been occupied in watching the motions of Junôt. Perhaps the same British army might have obtained permission, by a provisional arrangement with the Junta of the province, to attempt the reduction of the citadel of Barcelona; and if competent to such an attack, would have obtained for the Spanish patriots a valuable place of arms; would have rendered available nearly the whole population of Catalonia; would have connected all those southern provinces whose inhabitants are most distinguished by their zeal and enthusiasm; and would have secured for our fleets in the Mediterranean, a most important naval station. Had the attempt unfortunately failed, the means of retreat were easy. Had it suc

ceeded, the troops might have been sent, without loss of time, wherever assistance might be necessary; they might have checked the predatory excursions of the French garrisons in the eastern parts of Catalonia; they might have acted in Arragon; or might have marched to Madrid, if the state of the campaign had justified such

a measure.

In the combined expeditions which have been sent to Spain under Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird, we confess ourselves mable to discover any practicable and determinate object. These expeditions certainly prove the anxiety of our government, to gratify, at the earliest possible moment, the wishes of the Spaniards, by sending to their assistance a very large portion of our disposable force; and we admit that, to give them this effectual proof of our zeal in their cause, was a duty imposed upon our cabinet by the general feelings of the nation. Whatever aids this country was able to