VIII. The credibility of the Jewish Exodus, defended against some Remarks of Edward Gibbon, Esq. and the Edin- IX. Speeches of the Right Honourable John Philpot Cur- X. Théorie de l'Action Capillare; par M. Laplace; Sup- XI. An Essay on Medals; or an Introduction to the Know- ledge of Ancient and modern Coins and Medals, espe- XIII. Chronicle of the Cid Rodrigo Dias de Bevar, the Cam- peador; from the Spanish. By Robert Southey. Page 117 XIV. A Manual of Analytical Mineralogy, intended to facili- XVI. Caledonian Sketches, or a Tour through Scotland, in THE QUARTERLY REVIEW. FEBRUARY, 1809. NEW Y JELIC LIBRARY AC0601 ASTOR, LENOX AND 1LDEN FOUNDATIONS. 1901 ART. I. Affaires d'Espagne, Nos. 1 to 5.-Confédération des Royaumes et Provinces d'Espagne contre Buonaparte, Nos. 1 to u, &c. HIS is a collection of all the papers which have yet been pub tral Junta of the Government, together with extracts from our Gazettes, translated into French for the purpose of dissemination on the Continent: where such official documents are received with an avidity proportioned to the difficulty of obtaining authentic information. In such a collection there can be nothing which is not already familiar to the English reader; but there is much which appears to be forgotten, or very imperfectly remembered; and, as the intelligence from Spain is daily increasing in volume, as well as in importance, we are glad to avail ourselves of these materials whilst they are of a manageable bulk, and whilst facts are too recent and notorious to be disputed, for the purpose of giving a slight and general sketch of a most interesting subject, of recording our own opinions, and of examining some statements and reasonings published by other writers respecting the conduct of the Spanish and English Governments, which we believe to be incorrect. In surveying the transactions recorded or referred to in these papers we are almost tempted to doubt whether we are reading the events of real history. A King surreptitiously.removed from the centre of his dominions; transferred, with his family and court, to a foreign city, and there directed to abdicate his throne u favour of an alien upstart; presents a spectacle, certainly, not less improbable than the wildest fictions of romance. Even those who were most familiarised with the singular caprices of Buonaparte's despotism, had by no means expected, from his austere and sullen policy, such a theatrical and fanciful display of his unbounded power. But any serious resistance to that power appeared impossible. It was at a moment when the plan, for the subjugation of Spam, was thought to be complete in all its parts; when her treasury was quite exhausted; when she was without arms, ammunition, clothing, or even horses; when the flower of her army, enrolled under the banners of Napoleon, were transported to the north of Europe; when the many strong and almost impregnable fortresses on her eastern frontier were surrendered to French garrisons; when the metropolis, together with all the principal cities of the interior, and the adjoining kingdom of Portugal, were occupied by 100,000 veterans, commanded by experienced and able generals; that the Spanish nation proudly threw down the gage of defiance, and declared eternal war against their perfidious and insolent oppressor. The actor who claims our first attention in this strange drama, is Napoleon, whose most ardent admirers are of opinion, that he was, in this instance, actuated by childish vanity and blind impetuosity. To the master of the French empire it was, evidently, a matter of indifference, whether Charles IV. or Ferdinand VII. or Joseph Buonaparte, were intrusted with the office of Tax-gatherer in Spain for the benefit of France; except that a Prince of the House of Bourbon might have been expected to collect, at least for some years longer, the contributions of America: whereas a change of dynasty could not fail to endanger that great source of supply, by affording to those extensive provinces, against which, during the present maritime war, neither Spain nor France were able to employ any means of coercion, an excuse for asserting their independence. But, even if it were admitted, that the establishment of Joseph on the throne of Spain was a reasonable object of ambition, the impetuous haste with which, after a long scene of successful treachery, Napoleon threw off the mask of friendship, renounced every semblance and pretence of moral or honourable motives, and seized the persons of the royal family, was indefensible on any ground of policy. In his former conduct he had displayed much address and prudence. Not content with directing, through the medium of the Prince of the Peace, every motion of the royal puppet, whom he professed to treat as his august ally, he had cautiously avoided a too implicit reliance on the fidelity of the Favourite, and by secretly encouraging the hopes of the heir to the throne, had gained, if not his affection and confidence, at least a complete and unlimited ascendancy over his mind and conduct. This is fully proved by every act of Ferdinand when raised to the throne, and particularly by his journey to Bayonne; and although the predominant influence of his party, evinced by the abdication of Charles IV. might naturally give considerable umbrage to France, it is plain that the monarch must have remained in a state of vassalage. Napoleon, in his character of ally and mediator, was nearly omnipotent. It depended on himself to occupy the important ports of Cadiz, Carthagena, and Ferrol, and thus to cut off the possibility of a communication with England. By bestowing on Ferdinand, as a gift, the throne of his ancestors, he might have degraded that unliappy prince in the eyes of his subjects, compelled him to become, like his father, the miserable instrument of French rapacity, and ultimately, like him, to abdicate dignity as the price of safety. In a word, he might have pursued, with impunity, any conduct but that which mortally wounded the pride of every Spaniard, and which was felt by each as a personal insult. Still, however, we must confess, that if, by the bold and decisive measure, from which he anticipated the utter dismay and confusion of his opponents, he only excited their indignation, and animated their courage, his failure was not more contrary to his own expectation, than to that of all the surrounding nations. Indeed the explosion of indignant patriotism, which burst out at the same moment in all the provinces of Spain, seems to have astonished even the Spaniards themselves, insomuch that the Junta of Seville have boldly appealed to it as to a manifest proof of the miraculous inspiration of Heaven. But much more surprising, in our opinion, was the equally universal confidence of success, which was evinced in Spain, under circumstances the most discouraging and hopeless. This was not confined to those assemblies of delegates, who, possessing sovereign power with a divided responsibility, might be supposed to derive firmness in danger from their political constitution. It equally prevailed amongst those who from their sex, their age, their education, their habits, their duties, were most liable to despondency and intimidation; amongst women, and monks, and prelates: and our readers will probably recollect an early and curious example of this spirit, in a public letter from the Bishop of Orense, containing his reasons for refusing to attend the convocation at Bayonne. It was not a blind and arrogant presumption; it was the confidence of men who had calmly and attentively surveyed the gigantic power opposed to them; who had prepared themselves to encounter privations, and defeats, and disasters; and who foresaw that by bringing successively into action all their means of annoyance, they must ultimately exhaust and wear out the mighty enemy, whom they were unable to subdue by a direct encounter. Animated by this spirit, the Spaniards became, for a time, a nation of statesmen and of heroes. The temperate, yet firm and energetic Government of the Juntas, whilst acting as confederated Republics, astonished all Europe. That of Seville in particular displayed, 'n 'the first moments of its formation, all the energy of the best organized senate; with a happy audacity it assumed, and exercised, for a time, all the functions of a sovereign; seized the French fleet at Cadiz; opened a communication with Spanish America; created and organized an amy; and employing with great ability the powerful influence of a free press, dispersed throughout Spain a series of state-papers and manifestoes, distinguished by sound argument and persuasive eloquence, and equally calculated to instruct, to excite, and to encourage their countrymen. The brilliant success of Castanos at Baylen; the still more brilliant and even romantic exploits of Palafox in the defence of Zaragoza; and the unexpected flight of Joseph Buonaparte from Madrid, seemed to be the earnest of new and prodigious victories; and the expectations of those who were distant from the scene of action, and particularly of the British public, could no longer be confined within the bounds of reason or probability. All seemed to tread on fairy ground; and those who should have hesitated to believe in the complete and early triumph of the Patriots, would have been considered as disaffected to the cause of freedom. If these sanguine hopes were very unreasonable, if they were never entertained by the Spaniards themselves, if their completion was incompatible with the state of the country; perhaps the gloom and despondency occasioned by their failure, may be, if not groundless, at least disproportioned to the occasion; perhaps too the misconduct of our Government in its relations with Spain may not be very evident; and it is because such is in fact our opinion, that we have sought to support it by the testimony of the papers now before us. But as that opinion is founded on the supposition that the Spaniards have been, and are acting in conformity to their own peculiar character, from motives, and with objects of their own, and that to view their conduct through the medium of our opinions, and feelings, and prejudices, is to pervert and distort it; we shall request the indulgence of the reader, whilst we examine two very different representations of the case, both of which we consider as erroneous. It has been contended, by one class of writers, that the Spaniards have forfeited their whole claim to the sympathy of free nations, by making the restoration of a foolish prince, the ultimate object of all their efforts; that having felt and deplored the vices of their old Government, they ought to have profited by the vacancy of the throne, and to have reformed all abuses; that, fighting in such a cause, they would have been invincible; but that now they will be totally subdued and trampled on by Buonaparte, and will deserve their fate, because they have substituted an ill-timed and unmeaning loyalty, in the room of a rational and ardent patriotism. Now this is to require that Spaniards should argue and feel like Englishmen, which is not quite reasonable : and it is also as we think, a very incorrect representation of the fact. We do not suppose that the clear-sighted clergy of Spain, or the nobles, or the magistrates, ever felt, or now feel that enthusiastic affection for the person of Ferdinand VII. which they have expressed, and still express to the world; but he had long been an object of hatred to the Favourite, and this hatred rendered him the natural patron of all the disaffected, that is to say of nearly the whole nation. The clergy saw in him the protector of their property, against that confiscation which they naturally apprehended to be the grand object of Buonaparte's |