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fuggefted. The philofophers could not apprehend that ART. things could be made out of nothing, and therefore they believed that matter was coeternal with God. But it is as hard to apprehend how a mind by its thought should give motion to matter, as how it should give it being. A being not made by God is not fo eafily conceivable to be under the acts of his mind, as that which is made by him. This conceit plainly deftroys infinite perfection, which cannot be in God, if all beings are not from him, and under his authority; befides that fucceffive duration has been already proved inconfiftent with eternity. This opinion of the world's being a body to God, as the mind that dwells in it, and actuates it, is the foundation of atheism: for if it be once thought that God can do nothing without fuch a body, then as this deftroys the idea of infinite perfection, so it makes way to this conceit, that fince matter is vifible, and God invifible, there is no other God, but the vaft extent of the universe. It is true, God has often fhewed himself in vifible appearances; but that was only his putting a special quantity of matter into fuch motions, as fhould give a great and aftonishing idea of his nature, from that appearance: which was both the effect of his power, and the fymbol of his prefence. And thus what glorious reprefentations foever were made either on mount Sinai, or in the pillar of the cloud, and cloud of glory, thofe were no indications of God's having a body; but were only manifeftations, fuited to beget fuch thoughts in the minds of men, that dwelt in bodies, as might lay the principles and foundations of religion deep in them. The language of the Scriptures fpeaks to the capacities of men, and even of rude men in dark times, in which moft of the Scriptures were writ: but though God is spoke of as having a face, eyes, ears, a fmelling, hands and feet, and as coming down to view things on earth, all this is expreffed after the manner of men, and is to be underftood in a way fuitable to a pure Spirit. For the great care that was used, even under the most imperfect state of Revelation, to keep men from framing any image or fimilitude of the Deity, fhewed that it was far from the meaning of thofe expreffions, that God had an organized body. Thefe do therefore fignify only the feveral varieties of Providence. When God was pleafed with a nation, his face was faid to bine upon it; for fo a man looks towards thofe whom he loves. The particular care he takes of them, and the answering their prayers, is expreffed by figures borrowed from eyes and ears: the peculiar difpenfations of rewards and punishments are ex

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ART. preffed by his bands; and the exactness of his juftice and wifdom is expreffed by coming down to view the state of human affairs. Thus it is clear that God has no body = nor has he parts, for we can apprehend no parts but of a body fo fince it is certain that God has no body, he can have no parts: fomething like parts does indeed belong to fpirits, which are their thoughts diftinct from their being, and they have a fucceffion of them, and do oft change them. But infinite perfection excludes this from the idea of God; fucceffive thoughts, as well as fucceffive duration, feem inconfiftent both with eternity, and with infinite perfection. Therefore the effence of God is one perfect thought, in which he both views and wills all things and though his tranfient acts that pass out of the divine effence, fuch as creation, providence, and miracles, are done in a fucceffion of time; yet his immanent acts, his knowledge and his decrees, are one with his effence. Diftinct thoughts are plainly an imperfection, and argue a progrefs in knowledge, and a deliberation in council, which carry defect and infirmity in them. To conceive how this is in God, is far above our capacity: who, though we feel our imperfection in fucceffive acts, yet cannot apprehend how all things can be both feen and determined by one fingle thought. But the Divine Effence being fo infinitely above us, it is no wonder if we can frame no diftinct act concerning its knowledge or will.

There is indeed a vaft difficulty that arifes here; for thofe acts of God are fuppofed free; fo that they might have been otherwife than we fee they are: and then it is not easy to imagine how they fhould be one with the Divine Effence; to which neceffary exifience does certainly belong. It cannot be faid that thofe acts are neceflary, and could not be otherwife for fince all God's tranfient acts are the certain effects of his immanent ones, if the immanent ones are neceffary, then the tranfient must be fo likewife, and fo every thing must be neceffary: a chain of neceffary fate muft run through the whole order of things; and God himself then is no free being, but acts by a neceflity of nature. This fome have thought was no abfurdity God is neceffarily juft, true, and good, not by any extrinfic neceflity, for that would import an outward limitation, which deftroys the idea of God; but by an intrinfic neceffity, that arifes from his own infinite perfection. Some have from hence thought that, fince God acts by infinite wifdom and goodnefs, things could not have been otherwife than they are: for what is infinitely

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wife or good cannot be altered, or made either better or ART. worse. But this feems on the other hand very hard to conceive: for it would follow from thence, that God could neither have made the world fooner nor later, nor any other way than now it is: nor could he have done any one thing otherwise than as it is done. This feems to establish fate, and to deftroy induftry and all prayers and endeavours. Thus there are fuch great difficulties on all hands in this matter, that it is much the wifeft and fafeft courfe to adore what is above our apprehenfions, rather than to enquire too curiously, or determine too boldly in it. It is certain that God acts both freely and perfectly: nor is he a Being fubject to change, or to new acts; but be is what he is, both infinite and incomprehenfible: we can neither apprehend how he made, nor how he executes his decrees. So we must leave this difficulty, without pretending that we can explain it, or anfwer the objections that arife against all the feveral ways by which divines have endeavoured to resolve it.

The third thing under the head I now confider, is, God's being without paffions. That will be foon explained. Paffion is an agitation that fuppofes a fucceffion of thoughts, together with a trouble for what is paft, and a fear of milling what is aimed at. It arifes out of a heat of mind, and produces a vehemence of action. Now all thefe are fuch inanifeft imperfections, that it does plainly appear they cannot confift with infinite perfection. Yet after all this, there are feveral paffions, fuch as anger, fury, jealousy, and revenge, bowels of mercy, compaffion and pity, joy and forrow, that are afcribed to God in the common forms of speech, that occur often in Scripture, as was formerly obferved, with relation to thofe figures that are taken from the parts of a human body. Paffion produces a vehemence of action: fo when there is in the providences of God fuch a vehemence as according to the manner of men would import a paffion, then that paffion is afcribed to God: when he punishes men for fin, he is faid to be angry when he does that by fevere and redoubled ftrokes, he is faid to be full of fury and revenge : when he punishes for idolatry, or any difhonour done himfelf, he is faid to be jealous when he changes the courfe of his proceedings, he is faid to repent: when his difpenfations of providence are very gentle, and his judgments come flowly from him, he is faid to have bowels. And thus all the varieties of Providence come to be expreffed by all that variety of paflions, which among men might give occasion to such a variety of proceeding.

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The fourth head in this article is concerning the power, vifdom, and goodness of God, that he is infinite in them. If he can give being to things that are not, and can also give all the poffibilities of motion, fize, and fhape, to beings that do exift, here is power without bounds. A power of creating must be infinite, fince nothing can refift it. If fome things are in their own nature impoffible, that does not arife from the want of power in God, which extends to every thing that is poffible. But that which is fuppofed to be impoffible of its own nature, cannot actually be otherwife a thing might.both be and not be; and it is perceptible to every man that this is impoffible. It is not want of power in God, that he cannot lie nor fin: it is the infinite purity of the divine nature that makes this impoffible, by reafon of his infinite perfection. Nor is it a want of power in God, that the truth of propofitions concerning things that are paft, as that yesterday once was, is unalterable. Among impoffibilities, one is, to take from any being that which is eflential to it. God can annihilate every being at his pleafure; for as he gave being with a thought, fo he can deftroy it with another: and this does fully affert the infinite power of God. But if he has made beings with fuch peculiar effences, as that matter must be extended and impenetrable, and that it is capable of peculiar furfaces and other modes, which are only its different fizes and fhapes, then matter cannot be and yet not be extended; nor can thefe modes fubfift, if the matter of which they are the modes is withdrawn. The infinite. power of God is fully believed by thofe who acknowledge both his power of creating and annihilating; together with a power of difpofing of the whole creation, according to the poffibilities of every part or individual of it; though they cannot conceive a poflibility of feparating the effential properties of any being from itfelf; that is to say, that it may both be, and not be, at the fame time; fince an effential property is that which cannot be without that fubftance to which it belongs.

The wisdom of God confifts firft in his feeing all the poflibilities of things, and then in his knowing all things that either are, or ever were, or fhall be: the former is called the knowledge of fimple intelligence or apprehenfion; the other is called the knowledge of vifion. The one arifes from the perfection of the Divine Effence, by which he apprehends whatever is poffible; the other arifes from his own decrees, in which the whole order of things is fixed. But befides these two ideas that we can frame of the knowledge of God, fome have imagined a third know

ledge,

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ledge, which, because it is of a middle order betwixt intel- ART. ligence and vifion, they have called a middle knowledge; which is the knowing certainly how, according to all the poffibilities of circumftances in which free agents might be put, they should choofe and act. Some have thought that this was a vain and needlefs conceit; and that it is impoffible that fuch knowledge fhould be certain, or more than conjectural; and fince conjecture implies doubt, it is an imperfect act, and fo does not become a Being of infinite perfection. But others have thought that the infinite perfection of the Divine Mind muft go fo far as to foresee certainly what free creatures are to do; fince upon this forefight only they imagine that the juftice or goodness of God in his providence can be made out or defended. It feemed fit to mention this upon the prefent occafion; but it will be then proper to enquire more carefully about it, when the article of predeftination is explained.

It is neceffary to ftate the idea of the goodness of God moft carefully; for we naturally enough frame great and juft ideas of power and wifdom; but we eafily fall into falfe conceits of goodnefs. This is that of all the divine perfections in which we are the most concerned, and fo we ought to be the most careful to frame true ideas of it: it is also that, of all God's attributes, of which the Scriptures speak moft copiously. Infinite goodness is a tendency to communicate the divine perfections to all created beings, according to their feveral capacities. God is original goodness, all perfect and happy in himself, acting and feeing every thing in a perfect light; and he having made rational beings capable of fome degrees of his light, purity, and perfection, the first and primary act of goodnefs is to propose to them fuch means as may raise them to thefe, to furnish them with them, to move them oft to them, to accept and to affift their fincere endeavours after them. A fecond act of goodness, which is but in order to the first, is to pity thofe miferies into which men fall, as long as there is any principle or poffibility left in them of their becoming good; to pardon all fuch fins as men have committed, who turn to the purposes of becoming feriously good, and to pafs by all the frailties and errors of thofe who are truly and upon the main good, though surprise and strong temptations prove often too hard for them. Thefe two give us as full an idea as we can have of perfect goodness; whofe first aim must be the making us good, and like to that original goodness; pity and pardon coming in but in a fubfidiary way, to carry on the main defign of making men truly good. Therefore the chief act and de

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