which respects the payment of money for the mainte- estimates that were not presented to the House at the nance of prisoners, and against which no remon- commencement of the sessions. They were the strance had been made by our ministers; at least no usual estimates for supplementary officers, pensioners such remonstrance appeared from the papers on their at the Royal Hospitals at Chelsea and Kilmainham, lordships' table. The first remonstrance was on the the Royal Military College, and the Military Asy14th of Nov., which was after the surrender of the lum. These estimates could not be presented beCape, and that was about the French troops occupy- fore, because the whole of the expense could not be ing Holland, though it was a matter of general noto- assertained until the seven Garrison Battalions were riety that their keeping possession of Holland with complete. The second head of estimates related to an armed force was not then any thing novel in the some augmentation that had been ordered in the reeyes of Europe. The charge which he most po-gular forces, the militia and supplementary militia, sitively brought against ministers was that of a breach and to some further expenses which had taken place of faith with Austria, a breach of faith with Russia in the Barrack Department. These estimates which and Prussia, and above all a breach of faith with related to the supplementary officers, pensioners at France. He charged ministers with deceiving France, Chelsea and Kilmainham, &c. were the same as beand with deceiving our allies, under the idea of ful- fore. The expense of the Royal Military College filling an article which they knew it was impossible was greater than that of last year, it amounted to to be fulfilled. It was now said that, if Sebastiani 81101. This increase was owing to a second compahad not made his report, we should not now be at ny of Cadets being formed. This institution being war. At first satisfaction for what had passed was found to answer so well all the purposes for which it demanded, and then security for the future, and was formed, it had been thought expedient to add a their they rested their ultimatum. All this it ap- second company of Cadets. Any body who consipeared obvious to his mind, might have been obviat- dered fairly the nature of this institution, would, he ed by the acceptance of proffered mediation. was sure, agree with him, that it was an expense well laid out on the part of the public. He trusted that it was an institution that would be constantly kept up, as it afforded to young men destined for the army, better means of instructions than they could obtain in this country: he hoped also, that it would always be managed with economy, and without any partiality or favour. He now came to the Royal Military Asylum; for this service he should move for a sum of 31,000 l. of this sum 21,000 1. was to be applied to complete the building. He was sorry to say, that the buildings which were completed, cost more than had been originally estimated, though every attempt had been made to make the estimates as accurate as possible.-This increase of the expense beyond the estimate arose partly from this circumstance, viz. that soon after the estimate was formed the dispute with the Northern Powers took place, which caused a great increase in the price of many of the articles used in the building-This, however, would he hoped be the whole expense of the building, and he should only ask 10,000l. for fitting up the rooms, &c. He came now to the second head of estimates, viz. those which related to the augmenta

THE LORD CHANCELLOR justified the conduct of ministers on all the points, which he called the counts of an indictment preferred against them. As to the cessions by the treaty of Amiens, Parliament and the country had approved the peace, and the late ministers, by their negotiation at Lisle, declared their opinion respecting the necessity of peace. As to the Italian Republic, Piedmont and Parma, the fate of these countries was decided before the treaty of Amiens, and therefore could not have furnished a ground of war. As to Swisserland, this was certainly the only country which manifested a strong feeling for its oppression, and appeared disposed to resist it; but the continental powers being indifferent, it was not possible for us to save Swisserland. As to the conduct of ministers respecting the Cape, the other conquests had been restored, and the Cape of Good Hope alone was certainly not worth a war; even if it was worth a war, it appeared doubtful at that time whether it also had not been surrendered. Under these circumstances, if we were disposed to go to war singly, there were no advantages to be gained. The government where therefore prepared to give uption of the forces.-The augmentation which had Malta according to the treaty, when the report of Sebastiani was published, developing such projects, that government thought it necessary to retain Malta. He concluded by an appeal to the House and the country for a vigorous prosecution of the contest into which we were forced by the hostile conduct of France.

been ordered was not to a very considerable extent, for the committee would recollect that when the army was voted in December last, it was upon an unusualy high establishment, the highest that ever was pro posed in time of peace. It was thought that completing the army by a small augmentation would be sufficient-as the army voted was 130,000 men.The augmentation that would take place, would be EARL SPENCER said, that all he had heard did but principally in the cavalry. The committee would confirm him in his opinion of the necessity of the re-recollect, that by the plan which he proposed in Desolutions, He supported the arguments of lord Grenville in favour of them, and condemned ministers as grossly inattentive to their duty, and as having sacrificed the honour and the dignity of the country.

cember last, ten men per troop of the cavalry were to remain dismounted; those men were now to be mounted, and their place to be supplied with recruits; this would make 70 men per troop. There was also to be an augmentation in the foot guards. The next augmentation arose from a regulation which had been adopted of abolishing the field-officers having com panies; in consequence of which there would be three additional captains in each regiment. He would not now enter into any arguments upon the propriety of this regulation, he would only say, that it was one (ARMY ESTIMATES.]-THE SECRETARY AT WAR that met with the approbation of the most expesaid, that the remaining army estimates, consist-rienced officers of the army; by this plan the situa pd of two parts:-Ong of them related to those tion of captain-lieutenant would be abolished, aud hg

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Monday, June 6. (Min. 874.)

would of course have one of the three com- |
panies, another of the companies was to be
given to a captain on half pay; and the senior
Heutenant was to have the third company on
condition of raising 30 men, and the senior
ensign to succeed him on raising 10 men. The
expence of this measure would be about
35,000l. viz. 26,000 for Great Britain, and 9000
for Ireland. The greatest part of the ex-
pence of these estimates arose from the militia,
it amount to a sum of 1,267,000l. for Great
Britain, and 480,4971. for Ireland. Contin-
gencies, 13,3451. cloathing, 143,8911. The mi-
litia of Great Britain would amount to 60,893,
supplementary militia 24.000, making (exclu-
sive of officers, non-commissioned officers, &c.)
the number of rank and file above 73,000 men.
The militia of Ireland, amounted to 18,000 men,
making altogether above 90,000 men. And he
was happy to say, that a very short time indeed
would elapse before they were all embodied and
fit for service. The additional expense for the
supplementary militia, would amount to4 16,0001.jection, however, to the measure was, that it
the additional expence of the barrack depart- would create a militia and not an army. This
ment 15,000l. making the total expense for was an universal objection, applicable to all
Great Britain, 2,540,000l. and for Ireland, times, though varying in its force, according to
570,0001. being altogether, 3,110,0001.
circumstances, and according to the nature of
the war in which we might happen to be en-
MR.WINDHAM said, that he had not objec-gaged. It was the duty of those entrusted with
tion to any of the details which the right hon. the government of a country, in the first place,
gent. had gone into except one, which appeared to form in their own minds, some idea of the
to be calculated to revive the practice of raising nature of the war which they were to carry on,
men for the rank, and which was productive of and then to regulate the public force accord-
such inconvenience that he should always objectingly. When this was done, it was easy to
to it. It was resorted to in time of necessity, form a notion of the nature of a war which a
when the inconvenience which it was calculated government had in view, from the nature of
to produce was not foreseen; but he should be the establishment which they proposed to make.
sorry to see it revived again. His object in ri-He was afraid, however, that the inference in
sing, was not so much to comment upon the de- this case, was not a very sure one. It looked
tails which had been laid before the House, as as if the government had gone into the war,
to take the opportunity, which the army esti-without at all considering the nature of it, and,
mates always afforded, of making some obser- in truth, without plan of any sort. After en-
vations upon the war and the general state of deavouring to preserve peace as long as they
the country. The first subject upon which he could, and longer than they ought, they were
should make any observations was one upon forced into war, when all their means of con-
which he had touched on a former occasion: hecession and submission were exhausted, and
meant, the propriety of having so large a part when no option was left; and finding them-
of our force to consist of militia. He thought selves in that situation, they seemed to have
the scale upon which it was proposed to form the no idea of doing any thing but what they under-
military force was wrong, because the popula-stood to have been usual on such occasions, and
tion of the country was such, that it would not what the situation itself, indeed, necessarily
afford, at once, a large militia and a large army forced upon them. They issued press-warrants,
In fact, the system pursued of late years, if it they offered bounties, they sent out recruiting
did not "suckle armies and dry-nurse the land,' parties, they put ships in commission, they did
must at least, be said to suckle the militia and whatever they were told was regular and
dry-nurse the army. If such large bounties were proper. It was indeed curious to hear the enu,
given to men who engaged only for a few years, meration of their services in these respects,
and for home-service, how was it to be supposed, and the list of articles for which they took
that for a small bounty men would be induced credit. These extended back, beyond the period
to enter the army, to serve for life and in every when war was become inevitable, "Did we
quarter of the globe? The army, in such a "not," said the hon, Gent., "in the midst of
state of things, must not only stand still, it must profound peace, and in a few months after
go backwards, for it was not to be conceived," signing a definitive treaty, call upon the
that, with these high bribes, desertion would" country for two successive augmentations of
not become general: so that the army would," army and navy? Afterwards, when the
not only get no new men, but lose many of those " danger became more pressing, and we were

whom they already had. In fact, desertion, it
was well known, had become a sort of trade.
Men got a livelihood by passing from corps to
corps, and performing, what they called, the
grand tour. If, at the end of the tour the man
remained in the service, the only effect of all
these bounties was, that you had obtained a sol-
dier in the militia or fencibles, in exchange for
a soldier in the regular army. One reason, per-
haps, for this anxiety for augmenting the mili
tia, was, that the money with which they were
levied, did not come in the shape of a direct tax,
and therefore, it was thought, would pass with-
out notice. But this was a poor and criminal
policy. The money, though not raised avowed-
¡y by Parliament, was equally drawn from the
pockets of the people. The man who paid this
tax for procuring a militia-man, was less able,
as well as less willing to pay other taxes. The
nation equally paid: the only difference was,
that they paid to a greater amount, and in a far
more incommodious manner. His general ob-

66

a

obliged to say something, did we not bring but he trusted that our object was not confined "a message to the House, true, perhaps, in merely to defence. The cause which drew us into "the mere terms of it, but wholly untrue the present war, was, the destruction of the balance as to the sense in which it was sure to be of power in Europe; and, in consequence thereof, understood? When, by these means, war the great acquisition of power by one state. was, as it were, declared, did we not, like Now, when the balance of power was de"good watchmen of the state, immediately stroyed, he knew but two ways in nature of "spring our rattles, and call out the militia? restoring it, either by taking some weight out "What is it that we have left undone "of one scale, or by putting some into the other; He admitted, that all these merits claimed by unless, indeed, you might forcibly hold both ministers were justly due to them; but it did scales even, by means of an external force, such not follow from thence, that they had any just as a powerful mediator or guarantee But, geviews of their situation, or indeed, any distinct nerally speaking, the only means we had to views at all. If they could be said to have any adopt, was either to strengthen ourselves or to plan at all, it seemed to be one of strict de- weaken the enemy; or we could not exist as fence; that is to say, we were to wait pas an independent nation. This being the case, sively, until we could find an opportunity of it remained only to consider the order in which sneaking into a peace, as we had just sneaked these subjects were to be taken, and what the out of one. If we voluntarily confined our- means by which they might severally be purselves to this sort of war, nothing could be sued. In touching upon this point fairly, he said too bad of our counsels, but if we were really would refer for a moment to the events of last forced to it, nothing could be more deplorable war. In that war, it appeared to him that the than our situation. The worst of all condi- plan of weakening the enemy was not only the tions in which a country or an individual could most proper and most effectual, but, by far, the be placed, was one, in which it would be pussi-shortest and most practicable. He thought it ble to lose and impossible to win. There was would be more easy to kill the revolutionary. not an instance to be found in history, in which tiger, than to chain or to cage him. To that nation successfully carried on a system of object, therefore, almost the whole force of this pure defence. Every body knew the advan-country ought to have been directed, though tage which assailants had over those whom they attacked; and that which was true of an individual was true of a nation. So far as to the nature of the force now proposed, considered as indicating the views of ministers, or as determining the character of the war, whether intended by ministers or not but it remained to be considered how far a force of this sort was good, even as a mere defensive force. It appeared to him that for the purposes of defence, you ought to have as large a regular force as possible, because regular forces could only be opposed by regular forces: it was "diamond cut diamond". But even adopting the system that ministers were acting upon, and admitting the number of men to be realized, he should contend that there would not be men enough, supposing an invasion to take place. And in the mean time that such exertions were made to raise an ineffectual force, the recruiting of an army, the force certainly most effecaal, would be essentially impeded. If, at last, it would be necessary to have recourse to more extensive and energetic means of raising the force of the country, it would, in his opinion, be better to begin with them. He would have a force still less regular than the militia, but one that should not stand in the way of recruiting the army. Some such measure must in the end, be resorted to; and, in his opinion, it would be better to adopt it in the first instance; at the same time that he would employ every means of recruiting the army, because we must not only have a large army now, but always, at least until some very material change took place on the continent. For the purposes of mere defence, therefore, this was a bad force;

there was no reason, in the meanwhile, that the other object should have been lost sight of. The same objects that existed at that time, exist at present, though, certainly, the progress of time might have changed the relations of these objects, as well as the means of attaining them. That which before was practicable might now be hopeless; and, in that case, could be no longer an object of pursuit: for he knew of no situation so deplorable, as that of remaining, with respect to France, in our present relative state, with no means of augmentating our own force, or of diminishing that of our rival. Whatever might be thought, therefore, of the project of reducing the power of France; in the only way in which it can be reduced, namely, by cooperation with parties within, it had, at least, this recommendation, that if practicable at all, it was at once the most effectual and the most easy. Whether we believed or not in the truth of the notion, it was, at least, one which we must wish to be true. As Mrs. Cole said of the Roman Catholic religion, "that it was a most comfortable persuasion to one of her calling;" so we may say, that a possible co-ope ration with royalists and destruction of the present revolutionary government, or, which is the same thing, restoration of the ancient monarchy, is a very comfortable persuasion to persons in our situation. If some means of this kind were not adopted, the prospect before us would be gloomy indeed, in spite even of that mediation, of which Gent. had talked so much, but from which, for his own part, he so little hoped any good, in which he foresaw so much possible future mischief, and in which he felt so much present disgrace. We were to

Whom predicted that on a certain day, a comet would appear which wold destroy the earth; ase, when the day came and appeared, no be loved that though Mr. Waxx might put accor wiedge that his prea anna wa fla er frum ti on principles imprimert chosen, he had no bjen s to own, when the day was past, and man od safe, that the pr copies of his cocular a hat for once deceived him. So he thought * at whatever woul the right hon. Gent, in thak he had cs played in making the heaty of Arens, t could now have no great station in aderig that it had not quite answered is expectant, He did n't know what might be the res.f the experiments he had recommendet, a be protested against a declaration, thi, they buf not be tried at all. It was his oppon, that f

the sympathy and feeling of all Europe, : would contribute more than any singe act, to terminate the calamities which new oppressed the world. Much was always said of the great power of the French republic, but it was of no means right to confound together iden separate as those of strength and durably Nothing was more intelligible than that a s or individual might be at the period of thr greatest strength, when they touched the very moment of their dissolution. The power

comider what the task was, of restoring the Joan bilince of Europe, by the addition of consequence and power to oursites. The treaty of Amiens mad, by one stroke, taken from the power and consequence of this country, in point of actual possessions, to say noting of character, what we might be well satisfied if ten yeas of successful war would replice. We Eid, in one fatal moment, so fallen to lecw.rd, that unless some fortunate shift of wind should come to favour us, we might be beating for years and years against a head-sea without regaining our former station. If he were asked what his hopes were of doing any thing at this moment, either in France itself or on the rest of the continent (the powers of the continent could hardly be considered in existence), he should certainly say "very little," thanks to the treaty of Amiens, which had given away, Engiand would make an open, grand decre Le powers and the mind of the coutment from¦tion, in the face of Europe, of her views aten us, and had made the whole coast of Europe an,jects, he did not mean a romantic, chanu iron-bound coast to us, not affording an inlet declaration, but one that w und draw with s or a creek into which we could run a cutter, It might be said, that the powers of the contiDent Geterred France; he be ieved they did but did Gent. rever hear of that maxim of tyrants, “Oderint dum metuant ?" However strong their hatred might be, while there was another feeling as strong as it is at present, namely, fear, it mattered little whether they loved or hated her. He, however, could not entirely abandon the hope, which he had placed in the exertions which the continent would, some time or other, make for itself, and therefore he was the more hostile against the scheme of policy now proposed, because it would not only render such exertions infinitely less probable, but would make us incapable of taking advantage of them should they be made. He was not only dissatisfied with the policy which ministers seemed inclined to adopt, but with the language which they held. It was, with peculiar regret, that he read the passage at the end of his Majesty's declaration, which was calculated to prove to the continent, that we looked merely to British objects, and that we should be ready, if those objects were attained, to give them up as we had done before. He knew very well what the sort of clamour was which this observation was calculated to excite. It would be said, "you are fighting for the Bourbons, for the Royalists, for Monarchy, &c." He must still, he feared, retain his opinion; even if he was wrong it could not be said that he was an obstinate sinner: his plans never having been tried, his opinions were, at least, not contradicted by experience. This was more than could be said by the hon. Cent. who made the experiment of the treaty of Amiens. His opinions had certainly been so contradicted. He did not expect of the hon. Gent. a confession that these opinions were originally wrong, that, perhaps, would be too much to look for, even from his candour, but he might, perhaps, admit, that they had not been exactly verified by the event.-When Mr.

rance was, at this time, indisputable; buth w long that power would exist was a different question. That we wished and hoped to see an end to it, it was impossible for us to deny, not withstanding all the dissembling and crouching language which we held at certain times, and all the boastful and vapouring which we in dulged in at others, That prospect was at the bottom of all our hopes. Every thing wh he saw in our plans and counsels, as well as those who were to conduct them, was calcu lated to throw him into despair; but he begged that this declaration might not be understood as implying any distrust in the resources and strength of the country, supposing them to be properly applied. Much as he thought of the dangers of invasion (and few persons were inclined to treat them more seriously), they were only formidable to him from the idea of the manner in which they might possibly be met. We were in the state of a ship in a storm. The vessel was tight and well-found, and no thing was wanted but care and conduct, to en able it to brave all the fury of the elements. But if the officers were ignorant or negligent, if the crew were drunken and mutinous, if all proper precautions were not taken, and all proper exertions used, down she might go all the means of safety in her power. We must not dissemble to ourselves the violence of the storm, with which we were threatened. We had to deal with an adversary who would not do things by halves; and who had the 16

with

ation of his Majesty's ministers, which, he trusted, would be found fully substantial and efficacious, calculated to repel every danger, and to enable the country to put forth its arms for the complete attainment of the objects of the war. When his right honourable Friend (Mr. Windham) talked of a mere defensive war, he in fact conjured up a phantom in

sources of a continent at his command. Against such an attack he confessed he wished to have something more than the mere loose notions, and vapouring talk of which we heard so much in that House. He entertained, as well as others, a high idea of the native courage of the people of this country: but he did not quite understand the notion, which many seemed to rely on with confidence, of stopping armies by peasantry. An army incapable of recruiting itself, may be finally worn down by the continued attacks even of irregular troops; but he wished to know where the examples were to be found of armies stopped by such troops, unless, possibly in circumstances far different from the present. He believed that none of the generals whose names were familiar to us, either in earlier or more recent history, when they had beaten the army before them, ever asked leave of the peasantry of the country, to pursue their march in whatever direction they thought proper.ment of any war; our militia in like manner was Such notions belonged only to men, who were totally ignorant of what they were talking about, who had never heard a gun fired in anger,

"Nor in the division of a battle knew "More than a spinster."

order to combat it, for it was by no means the purpose of ministers to confine their operations purely to defence. They had not shewn a disposition to leave any measure untried that could tend to the safety of the nation, and Gentlemen might rely that nothing would be omitted which could qualify us to strike the severest and strongest blows at the enemy. He spoke of arrangements subsequent to the treaty of Amiens; we had been in that short period of peace active in many respects; we had been put on a much stronger footing than we had been in any former period of peace. Our regular army was much more considerable now than it had been at the commence

in a much better state for military purposes than it had been at any former commencement of a war; we had in every respect a much greater force than we ever had before at the beginning of hostilities; but was he saying that this was therefore sufficient? No, he was not; but the energy of the country must be called forth, and there must be such a disposal of Men who had rely pretensions to be heard upon such that force as to shew our enemies, of the disposition subjects, who spoke of what they knew and had seen, of its people, of its internal vigour, of its resources, the men upon whom we must rely, and upon whom and almost every thing about it, for very ignorant inwe might with confidence rely, should dangers of the deed were our enemies of all these things; but it was sort in question really arise: these men would talk a not a vote for a large sum of money that would raise different language, would tell us that invasion was a large disposable force, that would depend much neither to be despised nor dreaded, or was only to be more on the nature of the measures to be adopted for dreaded, should it happen that by a foolish and igno- raising such force, than upon the vote for paying rant policy it had previously been despised.-Upon them; and he flattered himself that the measures the whole, whether he considered the interest of about to be proposed for that purpose would be effithe country with a view to the war in general, or cacious; that the men would be furnished as they to the narrower and more immediate object of de- should be found to be necessary, and they should be fence, he must equally condemn the present system, proposed to be under the command of officers of the which went to create a great and disproportionate mi-regular troops, and a militia force was intended to be litia force, and by the same act, as well as by the means of carrying into effect, to impoverish and keep down the army.

MR. PITT said, he should say only a very few words upon this subject, he merely wished to ask whether the force which it was now proposed to vote, included the whole of the regular force that was to be proposed, or whether they were to expect in the present session, any more substantial augmentation to that which certainly was an unusually large peace ablishment? He was averse to discussing in that House any question respecting the amount of the force necessary for the public safety. That ought certainly to rest in the first instance with ministers under the responsibility of their situation. It was a confidence that Parliament ought to place in them, and if they did not possess that confidence they ought not to retain their situation. But he did not apprehend that it was proper to discuss in that House the distribution of the public force, he therefore would not enter into any detail upon the subject. To ministers it belonged to prepare such a plan, and the House and the country looked for it with just uneasiness. It ought to be brought forward promptly; no time was to be lost; for in our present situation there was none.

as a supplement to the regular army; and after this plan was completed, then there would remain to be done that which it would be in this country more easy perhaps to do than the rest of it, namely, to find the money. Voting a number of men however great, and voting a sum of money, however large, to pay them, did not appear to him to be wise, until the plan for raising the men shall have been matured, because until that was done it was only raising men upon paper, which was not what we wanted; neither did large votes, without method of carrying them into effect, prove very useful. Having said thus much generally, he would take now up a few of the points brought forward by the right honourable gentleman opposite to him, but not all of them," for of some he could not help saying, that although they were like every thing delivered by that right honourable gent., very sensible, yet in this case they did not appear to him to have an immediate refe rence to the question now before the committee. He could not help thinking that the right honourable gentleman had given way a little too much to a tone of despondency, as appllicable either to the mannes in which we were now preparing for war, or to the manner in which we concluded peace. He agreed however with the right honourable gentleman, it was right to state the situation of this country fairly, to state even the chance of an invasion, but he thought he might be permitted to say that the right honourgentleman had considered that subject a little * 8 E

THE SECRETARY AT WAR said, that in reply to the question of his right honourable friend, he had the satisfaction to say that a plan was under the considerable VOL. III.