so far mastered by his feelings, as to lose sight of the calamities which the present discussion might entail upon humanity. He dwelt much on this topic, and explained the measures to which he should be obliged to resort; he said that if England wished to discuss fairly, he wished the same; that if England prepared for war he would do the same; and that if England should finally determine on hostilities, he trusted to the support of the French nation in the cause of honour and of justice. It was in vain that I repeated that England did not wish for war; that peace was as necessary to us as it could be to France; that all we desired, and all that we were contending for, was security; that every thing proved to us that that security was threatened by the First Consul's views on Egypt; and that consequently our refusal to evacuate Malta, was become as much a necessary measure of precaution, as the defence of any part of his Majesty's dominions. To this kind of reasoning M. de Talleyrand opposed the moderation of the First Cousul, his great self denial, and his determination to sacrifice even the most favourite points to his sincere desire to avoid a rupture. M. de Talleyrand row told me, that, in order to facilitate my communication of the First Consul's sentiments, he would communicate to me a paper which he had that morning drawn up with him; that it was not to be considered as any thing absolutely official; that it was a memorandum to assist me, but such as I might, if I chose, transmit to your Lordship. I now inclose it. I have the honour to be, &c. WHITWORTH. Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. Note verbale, referred to in No. 42.Translation.-I. If his Britannic Majesty in his message means to speak of the expedition of Helvoetfluys, all the world knows that it was destined for America, and that it was on the point of sailing for its destination, but in consequence of his Majesty's message, the embarkation and putting to sea are about to be countermanded.-II. If we do not receive satisfactory explanation respecting these armaments in England, and if they actually take place, it is natural that the First Consul should march 20,000 men into Holland, since Holland is mentioned in the message.-III. These troops being once in the country, it is natural that an encampment should be formed on the frontiers of Hanover; and, moreover, that additional bodies should join those troops which were already embarked for America, in order to form new embarkations, and to maintain an offensive and defensive position.-IV. It is natural that the First Cousul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coasts.-V. It is likewise in the nature of things, that the First Consul, who was on the point of evacuating Swisserland, should be under the necessity of con tinuing a French army in that country. VI. It is also the natural consequence of all this, that the First Consul should send a tresh force into Italy, in order to occupy, in case of neces‐ sity, the position of Tarentum.-VII. England arming, and arming with so much publicity, will compel France to put her armies on the war establishment, a step so important as cannot fail to agitate all Europe. The result of all these movements will be to irritate the two countries still more. -France will have been compelled to take all these precautions in consequence of the English armaments, and nevertheless every means will be taken to excite the English nation by the assertion, that France meditates an invasion. The whole British population will be obliged to put themselves under arms for their defence, and their export trade will, even before the war, be in a state of stagnation throughout the whole extent of the countries occupied by the French arms. The experience of nations, and the course of events prove, that the distance between such a state of things and actual hostility, is unfortunately not remote. As to the differences, of which mention is made in his Britannic Majesty's message, we know not of any that we have with England; for it cannot be imagined that a serious intention can have existed in England of evading the execution of the Treaty of Amiens, under the protection of a military armament. Europe well knows that it is possible to attempt the dismemberment of France, but not to intimidate her. Paris, March 14, 1803. No. 43.-My Lord, The messenger Mason went on Saturday with my dispatches of that date, and until yesterday (Sunday) I saw no one likely to give me any further information such as I could depend upon, as to the effect which his Majesty's message had produced on the First Consul. At the court which was held at the Thuilleries upon that day, he accosted me evidently under very considerable agitation. He began by asking me if I had any news from England. I told him that I had received letters from your lordship two days ago. He immediately said, and so you are determined to go to war. No! I replied, we are too sensible of the advantages of peace.Nous avons, said he, déjà fait la guerre pendant quinze ans.-As he seemed to wait for an answer, I observed only, C'en est déja trop.Mais, said ie, vous voulez la faire encore quinze années, et vous m'y forcez.-I told him, that was very far from his Majesty's intentions.--He then proceeded to Count Marcow and the Chevalier Azara, who were standing together at a little distance from me, and said to them, Les Anglois veulent la guerre, mais s'ils sont les premiers à tirer l'Epée, je serai le dernier à la remettre. Ils ne respectent pas les Traités. Il faut dorénavant les couvrir de Crepe noir.-He then went his actual state of possession of the different parround, in a few minutes he came back to me, ties, and to the treaties or public engagements and resumed the conversation, if such it can by which they were bound at the time of its be called, by something personally civil to conclusion; and that if that state of possession He began again.-Pourquoi des Arme- and of engagements was so materially altered mens? Contre qui des mesures de precau- by the act of either of the parties as to affect tion? Je n'ai pas un seul vaisseau de ligne the nature of the compact itself, the other dans les ports de France; mais si vous voulez party has a right, according to the law of naarmer, j'armerai aussi; si vous voulez vous tions, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining battre, je me battrai aussi. Vous pourrez satisfaction or compensation for any essential peut-être tuer la France, mais jamais l'intimi- difference which such acts may have subseder.-On ne vou droit, said I, ni l'un ni quently made in their relative situation; that l'autre. On voudroit vivre en bonne intelli- if there ever was a case to which this pringence avec elle.-Il faut dono respecter les ciple might be applied with peculiar propriety, traités, replied he; Malheur à ceux qui ne it was that of the late treaty of peace; for the respectent pas les traités; ils en seront re- negotiation was conducted on a basis not sponsable à toute l'Europe. He was too merely proposed by his Majesty, but spemuch agitated to make it adviseable for me cially agreed to, in an official note, by the to prolong the conversation; I therefore made French government, viz. that his Majesty no answer, and he retired to his apartment, should keep a compensation out of his conquests repeating the last phrase. It is to be re-for the important acquisition of territory made marked that all this passed loud enough to be by France upon the Continent. That is a sufficient overheard by 200 people who were pre-proof that the compact was understood to sent, and I am persuaded that there was not a single person, who did not feel the extreme impropriety of his conduct, and the total want of dignity as well as of decency on the occa sion. I propose taking the first opportunity of speaking to Mr. Talleyrand on this subject. I have the honour to be, &c. WHITWORTH. Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. No. 44.-Extract of a dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, dated March 15, 1803.—I send your excellency a copy of the note presented to me by General Andreossy on the 10th instant, (vide page 57) and a copy of the answer which I have this day by his Majesty's commands returned to it. No. 45.-Note. The undersigned, his Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has laid before the King the note of his excellency the French ambassador of the 10th instant. In obeying the commands of his Majesty, by returning an official answer to this note, the undersigned feels it necessary for him to do little more than repeat the explanations which have been already given on more than one occasion by himself verbally to General Andréossy, and by Lord Whitworth to M. Talleyrand, on the subject of the note, and of the points which appear to be connected with it. He can have no difficulty in assuring the French Ambassador, that his Majesty has entertained a most sincere desire that the Treaty of Amiens might be executed in a full and complete manner; but it has not been possible for him to consider this Treaty as having been founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other antecedent treaty or convention, namely, that they were negotiated with reference to the have been concluded in relation to the then existing state of things; for the measure of his Majesty's compensation was to be calcu lated with reference to the acquisitions of France at that time; and if the interference of the French government in the general affairs of Europe since that period: if their interposition with respect to Switzerland and Holland, whose independence was guarantied by them at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of peace; if the acquisitions which have been made by France in various quarters, but particularly those in Italy, have extended the territory and increased the power of France, his Majesty would be warranted, consistently with the spirit of the treaty of peace, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His Majesty, however, anxious to prevent all ground of misunderstanding, and desirous of consolidating the general peace of Europe, as far as might be in his power, was willing to have waved the pretensions he might have a right to advance of this nature; and as the other articles of the definitive treaty have been in a course of execution on his part, so he would have been ready to have carried into effect an arrangement conformable to the true intent and spirit of the 10th article; the execution of that arrangement, according to its terms, having been rendered impracticable by circumstances which it was not in his Majesty's power to controul. Whilst his Majesty was actuated by these sentiments of moderation and forbearance, and prepared to regulate his conduct in conformity to them, his attention was particularly attracted by the very extraordinary publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani to the First Consul. This report contains the most unjustifiable insinuations and charges against his Majesty's govern ment; against the Officer commanding his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter: insinuations and charges wholly destitute of foundation, and such as would have warranted his Majesty in demanding that satisfaction which on occasions of this nature, independent powers, in a state of amity, have a right to expect from each other. It discloses, moreover, views in the highest degree injurious to the interests of his Majesty's dominions, and directly repugnant to, and utterly inconsistent with, the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace concluded between his Majesty and the French government. His Majesty's ambassador at Paris was accordingly directed to make such a representation to the French govern ment, as his Majesty felt to be called for by imputations of the nature above described, by the disclosure of purposes inconsistent with good faith, and highly injurious to the interests of his people; and as a claim had recently been made by the French government, on the subject of the evacuation of Malta, Lord Whitworth was instructed to accompany this representation by a declaration on the part of his Majesty, that before he could enter into any further discussions relative to that island, it was expected, that satisfactory explanations should be given upon the various points respecting which his Majesty had complained. This representation and this claim, founded on principles incontestibly just, and couched in terms the most temperate, appear to have been wholly disregarded by the French government; no satisfaction has been afforded, no explanation whatever has been given; but on the contrary, his Majefty's suspicions of the views of the French government with respect to the Turkish Empire have been confirmed and strengthened by subsequent events. Under these circumstances his Majesty feels that he has no alternative, and that a just regard to his own honor and to the interests of his people, makes it necessary for him to declare, that he cannot consent that his troops should evacuate the island of Malta, until substantial security has been provided for those objects which, under the present circumstances, might be materially endangered by their removal. With respect to several of the positions stated in the note, and grounded on the idea of the 10th article being executed in its literal sense, they call for some observations. By the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, the island of Malta was to be restored by his Majesty to the order of St. John, upon certain conditions. The evacuation of the island, at a specified period, formed a part of these conditions; and if the other stipulations had been in a due course of execution, his Majesty would have been bound, by the terms of the treaty, to have ordered his forces to evacuate the island: but these conditions must be considered as being all of equal effect; and if any material parts of them should have been found incapable of execution, or if the execution of them fhould from any circumstances have been retarded, his Majesty would be warranted in deferring the evacuation of the island until such time as the other conditions of the article could be effected; or until some new arrangement could be concluded which should be judged satisfactory by the contracting parties. The refusal of Russia to accede to the arrangement, except on condition that the Maltese langue should be abolished; the silence of the court of Berlin, with respect to the invitation that has been made to it, in consequence of the treaty, to become a guaranty ing power; the abolition of the Spanish priories in defiance of the treaty to which the King of Spain was a party; the declaration of the Portuguese government of their intention to sequestrate the property of the Portuguese priory, as forming a part of the Spanish langue, unless the property of the Spanish priories was restored to them,-these circumstances would have been sufficient, without any other special grounds, to have warranted his Majesty in suspending the evacuation of the island. The evacuation of Tarentum and Brundusium is in no respect connected with that of Malta. The French government were bound to evacuate the kingdom of Naples by their treaty of peace with the king of Naples, at a period antecedent to that at which this stipulation was carried into effect. The French government were bound likewise, by engagements with the Emperor of Russia, to respect the independence of the kingdom of Naples; but even admitting that the departure of the French troops from Tarentum depended solely on the article of the treaty of Amiens, their departure is, by the terms of the treaty, to take place at the same period as the other evacuations in Europe; namely, one month after the ratification of the definitive treaty; at which period both Porto Ferrajo and Minorca were evacuated by his Majesty's forces; whereas the troops of his Majesty were in no case bound to evacuate the island of Malta antecedent to the period of three months after the ratification of the definitive treaty and even in that event, it must be considered as depending upon the other parts of the arrangement being in a course of execution. With respect to the assertion in the note, that the Neapolitan troops were to form the garrison of Malta, until the period when the arrangements relative to the order could be carried into effect, it will appear, by a reference to the article, that by the preliminary paragraph, the island was to be restored to the order upon the condition of the succeeding stipulations, and that it was only from the period when the restitution | M. de Talleyrand sent to desire I would call to the Order had actually taken place, upon him, which I accordingly did. He that by the 12th paragraph the Neapolitan told me that he had not only received your troops were to form a part of the garrison. lordship's note to the French ambassador, but The undersigned has thus stated, with all the also the sentiments of the First Consul upon frankness which the importance of the sub-it, which he was desirous to communicate to ject appears to require, the sentiments of his Majesty on the note delivered to him by General Andreossy, and on the points in discussion between the two countries. His Majesty is willing to indulge the hope, that the conduct of the French government on this occasion may be influenced by principles similar to those which have invariably influenced his own. That as far as possible all causes of distrust, and every impediment to a good understanding between the two countries, may be completely and effectually re-interpretation they choose to give to it, the moved, and that the peace may be consolidated on a secure and lasting foundation. The undersigned requests General Andreossy to accept the assurances of his high consideration. Downing-street, March 15, 1803. (Signed) HAWKESBURY. His Excellency General Andreossy, &c. Paris, March 17, 1803. No. 46. My lord, I called yesterday on M. de Talleyrand, to converse with him on the subject of what had passed on Sunday last at the Thuilleries. He had been since that day so fully occupied with his expeditions to different foreign courts, that I had no opportunity of seeing him sooner. I told him, that I had been placed by the First Consul in a situation which could neither suit my public nor my private feelings. That I went to the Thuilleries to pay my respects to the First Consul, and to present my countrymen, but not to treat of political subjects; and that unless I had the assurance from him, that I should not be exposed to a repetition of the same disagreeable circumstances, I should be under the necessity of discontinuing my visits to the Thuilleries. M. de Talleyrand assured me, that it was very far from the First Consul's intention to distress me; but he had felt himself personally insulted by the charges which were brought against him by the English government; and that it was incumbent upon him to take the first opportunity of exculpating himself in the presence of the ministers of the different powers of Europe. He assured me that nothing similar would (Signed) WHITWORTH. The Rt. Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. occur. me, before he re-dispatched the messenger. This he did, and I refer your lordship to the communication, which General Andreossy will make, according to his instructions, without loss of time. From the tenor of this note, it appears that this government is not desirous to proceed to extremities; that is to say, it is not prepared so to do; and therefore it expresses a willingness to enter on the discussion of the point, which appears according to their conception, or rather to the most material. This of course is the safety of Egypt. On this the First Consul declares in the note, as M. de Talleyrand did repeatedly to me, that he would be willing to enter into any engagement, by which such a security as would fully quiet our apprehensions, might be given on the part of the French government. On the subject of Malta, the First Consul maintains that he cannot listen to any compromise; with regard to Egypt he is willing to enter into any engagement which may be thought sufficient. I told him that he had departed from the letter and the sense of your lordship's note, by confining the question to Malta alone. That note had comprehended other most important considerations. That the best method of bringing the discussion to a speedy conclusion, such as his Majesty's government appeared to wish, was to take it up on a broader scale, But that at the same time his Majesty's government would not refuse to lend itself to any thing reasonable which might be suggested. There was however, I told him, one distinction to be made in the situation of the two governments, in the discussion of this question. By our possession of Malta, France was not threatened, but the reverse was the case, should the access to Egypt be opened by its evacuation. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) WHITWORTH. The Rt. Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. Downing-street, March 22, 1803. No. 48.-My lord, Your excellency's se veral dispatches to No. 26 inclusive, have been received and laid before the King.With respect to the subject of your excellency's dispatch of March 14, I have it in command to signify to you his Majesty's Paris, March 18, 1803. No. 47. My lord, I received your lordship's dispatch, with its inclosures, this morn-pleasure, that you take the earliest opportuing carly; and I learnt at the same time that a messenger had arrived from General AnArcossy to M. de Talleyrand; shortly after, nity to represent to Monsieur de Talleyrand, the surprise with which his Majesty has learnt the conduct which the First Consul had ob served towards your excellency in the instance to which that dispatch refers; and you will add, that as his Majesty has a right to expect that his ambassador should be treated with the respect and attention due to the dignity of the sovereign whom he represents, it will be impossible for you to present yourself on any days of ceremony to the First Consul, unless you receive an assurance that you will never he exposed to a repetition of the treatment which you experienced on the occasion. Although your excellency appears to have anticipated this instruction in one of your most recent conversations with Monsieur de Talleyrand, I nevertheless think it right to enable your excellency to state to that minister, the sense which the King entertains of this transaction, I am, with great truth and respect, &c. (Signed) HAWKESBURY. His Excellency Lord Whitworth, &c. Downing-street, April 3, 1803. No. 49.-My Lord, I inclose to your excellency, for your information, copies of the official note delivered to me on the 29th ultimo by General Andréossy, and of the answer which, by his Majesty's command, I this day returned to that communication. I am, with great truth and respect, &c. (Signed) HAWKESBURY. His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B. &c. important deliberations. Was it not conformable to the usage practised among nations, first to demand explanations, and thus to take means for being convinced of the falsehood of the intelligence which the ministers might have received? Must not the least effects of the omission of this practice be, to bring on the ruin of families, and carry confusion, uncertainty, and disorder, into all the commercial affairs of both nations? The First Consul knows, both from his own sentiments, and judging of other people by the French, that a great nation can never be terrified. He believes that good policy and the feelings of true dignity ever inspire the sentiment of esteem for a rival nation, and never the design of menacing her. A great nation may be destroyed, but not intimidated. The second part of his Majesty's message consists of another assertion no better founded. His Britannic Majesty makes mention of discussions, the success of which is doubtful. What are these discussions? What official notes, what protocole prove the opening, the progress, the vicissitudes of a debate? Can a state of difficulties, which leads to an alternative of peace or war, spring up unawares without commencement, without progression, and lead, without distinction, to an appeal to arms before all the means of conciliation have been exhausted. In this case, the appeal has been publicly made before it could be known that there was room for misunderstanding. The termination of the discussions was announced before they had begun. The (Translation of inclosure referred to in No. 49.)-The undersigned general of division, ambassador and minister plenipotentiary from the French Republic, has laid before his government the note addressed to him by his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury. He has re-issue of a difficult discussion has been deceived orders to make the following answer to the observations therein contained. The object of this note appears to be to explain his Britannic Majesty's message; and to give some elucidations which had been demanded respecting the execution of the treaty of Amiens. The First Consul will not make any complaint relative to the extraordinary and unexpected assertions of this act issued by his Britannic Majesty. Not one of them is founded. His Britannic Majesty believes that his kingdom is menaced by preparations made in the ports of Holland and France. He has been deceived: the First Consul has made no preparation. There were, at the time of the message, but two frigates in the Roads of Holland, and but three corvettes in the Road of Dunkirk. How can his Britannic Majesty's ministers have been deceived on facts so evident? His Britannic Majesty's ambassadors at Paris and at the Hague have seriously to reproach themselves, if they have credited information so evidently false, and if they did not foresee that they thereby exposed their government to err in the most clared before it arose. What would Europe, what would both nations think, if they knew that these discussions, announced by his Britannic Majesty as so difficult to terminate, were unknown to the French government; and that the First Consul, on reading the message, could not comprehend the meaning of either of the declarations therein contained. He has also abstained from any ostensible step; and whatever may have been the clamour, the activity, the provocations of war, which have taken place in England since that message, he has given no orders, he has made no dispositions, no preparations. He places his glory, in an affair of this nature, wholly in being taken in an unprovided state. He will continue in this system of honest frankness, until his Britannic Ma→ jesty has reflected fully on the part he proposes to take. In Lord Hawkesbury's note, an opinion is expressed, that the French Republic has increased in power since the peace of Amiens. This is a decided error. Since that epoch, France has evacuated a considerable territory. The French power |