ground between the Serra de Busaco and the sea; and they had yet the famous lines of Torres Vedras on which to retreat. Although it is evident that Lord Wellington had not succeeded in the immediate object which he had in view, in occupying the Serra de Busaco, he did not, according to his own declaration, regret having opposed the enemy upon that point. He considered that it afforded him a favourable opportunity of showing the description of troops of which his army was composed; he had brought the Portuguese levies into action with the enemy, and they had shown the good effect of the high discipline they had received, and fought in a manner worthy of their best days. That the commendation bestowed by Lord Wellington on their conduct, and that of all the British troops, was well merited, appeared by the comparatively small losses they had sustained; those of the former not exceeding 500 in killed and wounded, and the latter not more than 600, including the officers. Nor was it less honourable to them, and gratifying to their commander, that during the entire retreat, and throughout the severe conflict, both armies had conducted themselves with perfect order and regularity. This was to be attributed wholly to the excellent arrangements previously made by their able commander, owing to which, the several corps performed their operations without confusion; they suffered no privations, were exposed to no useless encounters, and no unnecessary fatigue, For the same reason there had been no loss of stores; there was no prospect of hardship and want before them-the invariable cause of insubordinationsuch as fell to the lot of the unfortunate army of Massena, both during the invasion and the retreat. Being in the highest order and state of discipline, the British army, as a natural consequence, was also in the best spirits.

After the occupation of Coimbra, the attention of Massena was principally directed to strengthening his own posts, and reconnoitring the position of the allies. For some time there was a good deal of skirmishing, in which the Portuguese

cavalry realized the high promise it had already given, and acquitted itself with credit in various encounters with the highly disciplined and brave dragoons of France. On the 14th of October the advanced guard of the British was attacked by the enemy with the utmost impetuosity and gallantry; but after a severe struggle, he was finally repulsed and driven back into the town.

On every account, therefore, Lord Wellington was far from indulging apprehensions for the result of the campaign. He expressed his confidence that the enemy would not obtain possession of Portugal during that year, or prevent his retreat to the positions in front of Lisbon, whenever desirable, without difficulty or loss. "My own opinion is," he observes,* "that the French are in a scrape. They are not a sufficient army for their purpose, particularly since their late loss, and that the Portuguese army have behaved so well; and they will find their retreat from this country a most difficult and dangerous operation." In consequence, also, of the military system he had pursued of clearing the entire country before him during his retreat, though the inhabitants, of every class, had been doomed to feel all the horrors of invasion and war, that system was no less fatal to the enemy. However harsh it might seem to resort to so extreme a measure, Lord Wellington conceived it to be essential to the cause, and a duty he owed both to Great Britain and to Portugal, from which he could not swerve; that it was a necessity that could not be avoided; that the inhabitants must make the sacrifice for their own salvation; and that it was preferable to remaining to afford assistance to, and become the prey of, an implacable enemy. The scenes to which it gave rise were doubtless deplorable in the extreme; and it is natural that the people themselves, in abandoning their homes and every thing they held dear, should make little distinction between the causes by which they suffered, and in the bitterness of their feelings, have vented their maledictions upon both

* To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley. Leyria, 3rd October, 1810.

parties. The alternative was desperate-to remain was death by the sentence of their own government, whatever mercy they might hope to experience at the hands of their invaders.

As the tide of war rolled back upon them every town became a desert, and the country around and behind them one barren wilderness. Even the spirit of Massena quailed, and his heart filled with evil forebodings as he traversed the barren waste before him: "the enemy," he exclaimed, " burns and destroys every thing, as he evacuates the country. He forces the inhabitants to abandon their homes under pain of death; Coimbra, a town of 20,000 inhabitants is deserted. We find no provisions. The army is subsisted on Indian corn, and the few vegetables we found remaining on the ground." The order of the regency was in fact rigidly enforced, and whatever could not be carried off by the people was destroyed. The roads were literally blocked up with mingled masses; and carts, waggons, mules, horses, and bullocks, all were in one confused heap striving which should first leave the well-known domiciles and places of old resort. There might be seen mothers, their eyes streaming with tears, bearing infants in their arms; even young women delicately clad, on foot, with those of more tender age separated in the throng from their families. Men with heavy hearts, in silent sorrow were assisting the feeble and aged on their way. The flanks of the British columns were covered with the flying inhabitants; and all who had been enabled to procure means of transport thought themselves fortunate, and offered up thanks to heaven. On the army reaching its fortified positions, the mass of fugitives divided and took different directions-one passing through the lines to seek an asylum at Lisbon; the other crossing the south bank of the Tagus to reach the districts removed from the enemy.

The hour was now come to take possession of the famous barrier lines, that were to prove the safe-guard of Portugal. The allied forces entered by divisions; and it was so well arranged that on the last day of the retreat, each general was met by the officer appointed to conduct the troops to the several